PAKISTAN'S WESTERN BORDERLANDS

The Transformation of a Political Order

edited by

AINSLIE T. EMBREE

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All modern books on the history and politics of modern India and Pakistan are beset by vexing problems of transliteration of names of people and places. The problem is compounded in writing of the western borderlands, where usage and pronunciation differ from that of the Urdu- and Hindi-speaking peoples of the plains. In the end, the only feasible solution seemed to be to leave spelling to the judgement of the authors, except that the editor decided against the use of diacritical marks. Latitude was also permitted in the method of footnoting and bibliography; the authors have followed the customs of their own academic disciplines.

The sketch maps, which were drawn by Sarah MacMillan, are intended to indicate major political divisions as they existed about 1947, not to give an accurate representation of national or international boundaries.

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

This is a book about a harsh and strangely beautiful land, the western borderlands of Pakistan, which, while it has seldom been of more than peripheral concern to the outside world, has engendered a fierce attachment in the peoples who inhabit it. Defined in terms of modern political sovereignty, the area consists of Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. Geographically, the area begins on the Arabian Sea, stretching northward for a thousand miles as the eastern edge of the Iranian plateau, then merging into the tangled complexity of mountains and valleys of the Hindu Kush and the Pamirs. On the west, the region is bounded first by Iran and then by Afghanistan; it touches China in the extreme north in an arid barrier of the mountain ranges; along the east, the whole region from the Arabian Sea to the northern mountains is bounded by the Indus plain.

Baluchistan is part of the mountain system that is linked with the plateaus and hills of southern Iran. In the north, the Sulaiman Range runs north and south above the Indus plains, then curves westward to Quetta. Then the direction of the ranges becomes north to south, until they turn westward again, forming the parallel ranges along the Makran coast. There is a coastline of 472 miles, but because of lack of rainfall it is entirely arid, and the mountains rise abruptly from the coast plain. Thomas Holdich, the great geographer, described it as a "brazen coast, washed by a molten sea," and travellers, including Alexander's armies, who retreated homeward along the Makran coast, have pictured it as an inhospitable land. The interior is equally bleak. *The Imperial Gazetteer* gives a succinct summary: "Rugged, barren, sunburnt mountains, rent by huge chasms and gorges, alternate with arid deserts and stony plains....This is redeemed in places by level valleys of considerable size, in which irrigation enables much cultivation to be carried on." The area has been inhabited since prehistoric times, and its inhabitants, with ingenuity and back-breaking labor, have

managed to survive. The harshness of nature probably explains why, although many of the great civilizations have sent conquerors through the area—Greek, Arab, Hindu, Turkish, Persian—there are few surviving traces of their passage.

The area that became known at the beginning of the 20th century as the Northwest Frontier Province consisted of three fairly well-defined areas; the Hazara district, east of the Indus; the narrow strip of plains between the Indus and the hills; and mountain areas, from the plains to the borders of Afghanistan, and running from Baluchistan in the south northward to the Pamirs and China. This mountainous region is very different from Baluchistan. The direction of the mountain ranges and valleys are more complex and broken; the hills are higher; the valleys more inaccessible. Some of the area is barren and treeless; other parts are heavily wooded, with many fertile valleys. But like Baluchistan, while representatives of the great historic civilizations passed through the region, the visible remains are few. An exception must be made for Buddhism: here, as in so many other parts of India and Central Asia, remnants of great monuments speak of the once extraordinary vitality of a faith that has now disappeared from the region.

If one looked at a topographical map, and knew nothing of history or modern boundaries, one would conclude that this region would belong both geographically and politically with the countries to the west, Iran and Afghanistan. But the force of historical experience has defied the logic of geography, and the political history of the area has been linked with powers that were centred in the Indo-Gangetic plains of the Indian subcontinent.

Little is known in detail of the earliest stages of these linkages between the western borderlands and India proper, but Buddhist artifacts are found throughout the area, and a Hindu dynasty ruled the Kabul Valley in the 10th century. Then the nature of the linkages changed. Hindu culture no longer pushed in from the east, for the Turks, Islamic in religion and Persian in culture, had moved down from their bases in the Afghan plateau into India. They took Sind, which has been conquered by Arab forces early in the 8th century, as well as what is now West Punjab. For almost two centuries, the Turkish conquests in India were confined into this area, which corresponds roughly

Map 1



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

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to modern Pakistan. It was divided into a number of principalities with Muslim rulers, until the end of the 12th century when a Turkish chieftain, Muhammad Ghuri, conquered the whole region, and used it as the base for an attack on the great Hindu kingdoms of north India. The defeat of the confederacy of Hindu rulers at Tarain in 1192 opened the way for the thrust of the Turks into the Indian heartland. By 1201 they had reached Bengal, but it took them almost 150 years to extend their rule deep into penninsular India. By then, the Turks had become Indian dynasties, but they never lost their contacts with their Central Asian origins nor did they abandon their claims, however tenuous, to the western mountain marchlands.

New and stronger links between the western marchlands were formed in the 16th century, when Babur, a Turkish chieftain of the Timurid dynasty of Central Asia, established himself in 1504 at Kabul. Babur's dynastic interests were in Central Asia, but the realities of practical politics led him to invade India. His victory at Panipat in 1526 meant that his successors, the Mughal dynasty, were Indian rulers, with all their great centers of power in the Indo-Gangetic plain. But Kabul was a province of the Empire, as was Baluchistan after 1594, although Mughal rule there was tentative and uncertain. Nonetheless, the whole of the western borderlands and the Indus plains were formally part of the Mughal inheritance, with Lahore one of the principal capitals.

This linkage of the area with India was enhanced by the importance the Mughal emperors gave to their dynastic interests in Central Asia, even though they were never able to assert them with any success. What are now the Northwest Frontier Province and Baluchistan were never fully integrated into the Mughal Empire. The Persians claimed Baluchistan, and as late as 1672, the forces of the Governor of Kabul were wiped out when they tried to pacify a rebellious tribal area near Peshwar. In the 18th century, as part of the general decline of the central authority of the Empire, the western borderlands passed almost completely from the control of the Mughals. In Baluchistan, the Persians asserted their authority during the rule of Nadir Shah, but after his death in 1747, the new Afghan dynasty of Ahmad Shah Durrani claimed the allegiance of the leading chieftains of the area. But the Afghan supremacy was even more nominal than

Map 2


CHITRAL
AFGHANISTAN
DIR STATE
SWAT STATE
INDUS KOHISTAN
MOHMAND AGENCY
MALA KAND
HAZARA
MARDAN
PESHAWAR
KURRAM AGENCY
KHYBER AGENCY
KOHAT
PUNJAB
NORTH WAZIRISTAN
BANNU
SOUTH WAZIRISTAN
DERA ISMAIL KHAN
North West Frontier Province
Tribal Agencies and States
(Circa 1947)
sm

that of their predecessors, the Persians and the Indian Mughals, and by the end of the 18th century the area was controlled by tribal chieftains, the most important of whom was the Khan of Kalat.

In the Northwest Province area, the Afghan supremacy was challenged by both the tribal chieftains and a new and very important power based in the Indian plains. This was the Sikh kingdom, which had been created by Ranjit Singh at the very end of the 18th century. Ranjit Singh's conquest of Peshawar brought an Indian power once more to the foot of the mountain area; it was both a partial restoration of the Mughal pattern and a precursor of the new one that was to be established by the inheritors of the Mughals, the British. While it was the Turks, and before them the Arbas in Sind, who bequeathed Pakistan its religious and cultural inheritance, it was the British who bequeathed them the forms of political arrangements that existed in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier areas in 1947.

The forms of political control created in the Indian subcontinent in the 19th century—and which, for better or for worse, essentially determine existing government structures in India and Pakistan—were, to a very remarkable degree, *sui generis*. There are, of course, similarities to administrative systems elsewhere, but a number of factors assured their uniqueness. One, obvious but often forgotten, was the social and political arrangements of the subcontinent, arrangements that had been forged in the course of a long and complex history, and which had, as it were, built-in mechanisms for dealing with the impact of intrusive political and social forces. For both Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier, as all the studies in this book stress, the nature of the tribal societies, and the relationships to other social groups, are of fundamental importance for the construction of any administrative structure. Balancing this factor is one of almost equal importance: the historical moment in the West that produced the British take-over in India. British attitudes towards other peoples and culture were, for example, deeply influenced by Social Darwinism just at the time the new political order was being created in the western borderlands. On another level, the European balance of power, notably Anglo-Russian relations, was a dominant theme. The

revolution in communications—particularly the telegraph and the railway—made possible degrees of control that had been unattainable by previous overlords of the area. Nor should one ignore the significance of the emotional and psychological role of the challenge of the unknown frontier for the urbanized middle classes who provided the leadership for expansion in India. The sentiment of the Kipling rhyme was genuine: "Something lost behind the ranges, Lost and waiting for you. Go." It expresses, as does so much of Kipling, both what the English felt and what they believed they should feel; inchoate emotions were translated into a respectable moral imperative.

Giving final shape to the administrative and political structures that emerged from the interplay of all these forces was the Government of India's perception of what its needs were in the western borderlands. The official statement of the government's intention was that the British, unlike their Mughal predecessors, did not seek dominion, or, as we would now put it, complete political integration, but rather suzerainty. Another way of stating it is that they wanted the cheapest and most efficient political structure that would permit ultimate control but would not require direct administration of the kind that existed in British India. The result was that forms of government were established in Baluchistan and the Northwest Frontier Province that were rather different from each other as well as from those that existed elsewhere in India. In Baluchistan, what was passed to Pakistan in 1947 were three kinds of territorial control. One part has been directly administered by the British. This consisted of a long, thin strip of territory stretching from the extreme southwest corner of Afghanistan northward to the Northwest Frontier Province. The purpose was to have a buffer which would isolate the Baluchistan tribes from their neighbors, both in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. Not wholly integrated into "British India" were a few border districts that had been leased after the original annexation. Both kinds of territories were under the Chief Commissioner. The rest of Baluchistan was controlled by chiefs, who had treaty relationships with the British which gave them internal independence, but with all external relationships controlled by the Government of India. The most important of these chiefs was the Khan of Kalat, whose own territories were

divided among a number of feudatories with varying degrees of independence. Three of these had emerged as separate political entities by 1947: Las Bela, Kharan, and Makran. With Kalat, they formed the Baluchistan States Union. All of these were something more than tribes but something less than states.

The Northwest Frontier Province was created in 1901 out of the territory of the western borderlands that up to then had been part of the Punjab. Here again there were three different kinds of control recognized. There were the directly administered areas, mainly in the Indus plains, consisting of Hazara, Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, and Dera Ismail Khan. Beyond these areas, which were administered essentially on the pattern of the rest of British India, were the unadministered districts. These were the Political Agencies of the Khyber, Khurram, and Northern and Southern Waziristan. In these areas no attempt was made to administer the laws of British India, but only to keep the tribal chieftains under minimal control. The third kind of territory consisted of the three northern chieftainships of Dir, Swat, and Chitral, which, unlike the other unadministered areas, had rudimentary forms of organized government. All three forms of territorial control were under a Chief Commissioner, whose capital was Peshawar.

The authors of the various essays presented here have undertaken to analyze and describe the stresses, strains and conflicts that have ensued as the western borderlands became involved in the processes of modern politics and of integration into Pakistan. The ends of the new nation-state were very different from those of the pre-1947 Government of India, of which it was a residuary legatee. The essays are interdisciplinary both in the sense that they have been written by historians, anthropologists, and political scientists, and, perhaps more importantly, in that all the authors recognize that an understanding of the area requires that use be made of materials from many disciplines and from many points of view. None of the authors would claim to have presented a complete picture or even a general introduction. What they have done instead is to look at different segments of the life of the area and, out of their own particular backgrounds and training, to argue the validity of their interpretations.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF A BORDERLAND

JAMES W. SPAIN

"... For the North, guns always—quietly—
but always guns."
(*One Viceroy Resigns*; *Lord Dufferin to Lord Lansdowne*, Rudyard Kipling)

In its 2,500 years of recorded history, the area astride what is now the Pakistan-Afghanistan border has received more than its proportionate share of attention from strategists, administrators, and soldiers. It was the Arachosian satrapy of the Persian Empire of Darius. It was the center of the Seleucid Greek dynasty left by Alexander the Great, from which it passed into the hands of Chandragupta Maurya, the first great native ruler of India. His grandson, Ashoka, made it Buddhist, and so it remained until the Kushan Empire was swept away by the White Huns in the 6th Century A.D.

Mahmud of Ghazni, "the Idol Breaker," first major Muslim ruler of South Asia, attached the Frontier to his empire about the year 1000 A.D. Two hundred years later, Mohammad Ghori displaced the Ghaznavids, but his descendents soon gave way to the incursions of Genghis Khan (1221) and Timur (1398). Then came Babur, Sher Shah Suri, the Great Mughals: Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan, and Aurangzeb, Nadir Shah, Ahmad Shah, and the Mohammadzai Durranis of Afghanistan.

In the 1820s, the Sikhs took over, ending the long line of Muslim rulers whose names sound like a royal roster of Islam. Finally, in 1849, authority passed to the British, and many of the great names of British Indian history won their glory or served their apprenticeship on the Frontier: Edwardes, Lumsden, Lawrence, Nicolson, Sandeman, Curzon, Barton, Caroe, and dozens of others. On 14 August 1947 responsibility passed to Pakistan, and in the quarter-century that has passed since then, almost all

of its leaders (some of them reluctantly) have had to pay close attention to the Frontier and its people.

From Darius Hystaspes to Zulfikar Bhutto the reason for this attention has been the same. How do you rule an area whose deepest nature is reflected in its vernacular name: Yaghistan, the "Land of the Unruled" (or "unruly")? Each ruler tries his own techniques. Alexander founded cities. Bhutto builds schools. Timur sacked towns. Babur erected pillars of the heads of the slain inhabitants. Aurangzeb and Curzon schemed and parleyed. All of these efforts, however, can be fitted reasonably neatly into one or the other of two fundamental and conflicting approaches to government of the Frontier. In the language of the 19th Century British administrators whose terminology dominates the more recent literature, these are: (1) a "Forward Policy" whose aim is to administer and assimilate the area and its people, and (2) a "Close Border Policy," the objective of which is merely to monitor and manipulate land and people.

The Ingredients of Intractability

Before turning to these, however, a little of the home-brewed historical-strategic-political-economic-cultural-religious-sociological-psychological analysis of the kind beloved alike of the student and denizen of the Frontier is in order. The subject is a simple one: What makes this particular land and people so intractable?

The Frontier is a collection of diverse geographic areas and widely differing tribes, and when talking about it, it is important to remember this. As the "One-Unit" Province of West Pakistan was created and then abandoned, the names for the political subdivisions have changed, but the terminology used here, which is intended primarily only to distinguish the tribal areas from the North West Frontier Province administered area, still seems adequate. Not everything said here applies to the whole. Yet there are certain common elements and these are of a kind to give nightmares to even the bravest administrator.

Perhaps the most important of these is simply a sense of "Pathanishness," a cultural and racial awareness on the part of 12 million or so people strong enough to transcend international as well as internal political boundaries. A similar feeling of ethnic identity exists among the Baluch and Brahui tribes of the

southern part of the Frontier. Coupled with this is a limited but real sense of kinship with the Pathan tribes. Among the non-Pathan peoples of mixed origin in Peshawar and other towns of the NWFP and among the "Kohistanis" ("People of the Mountains") in the northeast, the feeling of identity is much less, but even here time and social practices have given them an acceptable place in the Pathan-dominated society and a sense of belonging which is not without political implications.

To most writers at least it is in the nature of the Pathan and his land that the hard core of intractability lies. If Pathan temperament and cultural values were the same as, say, Kashmiri or Malabari ones, the problem of administration would be much less acute. However, a numerous and virile people still possessed of real tribal affiliations and attitudes with a literature and tradition which glorifies independence, battle, and personal bravery and a deeply inbred code of honor ("Pukhtunwali") whose three cardinal tenets are revenge, sanctuary, and hospitality present a very formidable problem of government indeed.

Put into the hands of this people enough weapons to provide a rifle for every adult male and several small but efficient arms factories of their own; make smuggling, especially of arms and ammunition, an ancient and honorable profession; endow them to a man with a simple and militant form of the world's most martial religion, and you have a very volatile mixture.

Throw in a tradition of never having been truly conquered, a barren and infertile physical environment offering minimum opportunities for progress by peaceful pursuits but affording almost ideal conditions for armed resistance to authority, a sovereign neighbor with many historical and cultural ties which opposes integration of the Frontier with the rest of the subcontinent (Afghanistan), and finally, a long history of Great Power rivalry in the area. It is not then difficult to see why, quite apart from any specific political, economic, or social issue, the Frontier has been difficult to govern.

The Tradition of Revolt

The tradition of revolt produced by the factors outlined above has a long history. We have little or no detailed knowledge of the Frontier in the times of Darius, Alexander, Ashoka, Mahmud,

and Mohammad Ghori, but from the 14th and 15th centuries when the Pathans emerged clearly as a distinct people, their history has almost exclusively been one of revolt against outside authority. They revolted against the Turkish sultans of Delhi. They harassed Timur's armies in 1399 on the great conqueror's return to Central Asia from the sack of Delhi. In 1505 their night raids on Babur's camps won from that formidable warrior the adjective "death-devoted." In 1587 they killed 8,000 Mughal soldiers under the personal command of Akbar the Great. They decimated Jahangir's army which was trying to force passage of the hills in 1620. Shah Jahan's governor was kept under seige in Peshawar for six months in 1630. Between 1672 and 1674, they completely cut off communications between Delhi and Kabul, bringing Aurangzeb himself to spend eighteen months on the Frontier re-establishing a precarious route through the border hills. (If, as some authors suggest, the Mughal Empire in India began to die when it was cut off from its vigorous taproots in Central Asia, the Pathans can undoubtedly claim a share of credit for its demise.)

Nadir Shah, retiring with the peacock throne from his sack of Delhi in 1739, was unable to force his way through the Khyber and had to be led with his army through the backtrails of the hills by a renegade tribesman. Throughout the thirty-odd years that the Sikhs held the Frontier (1815-1849), Ranjit Singh and his associates faced continual resistance. They collected their meagre revenues principally by garrisoning Peshawar with 30,000 to 40,000 troops and occasionally sallying forth to extract whatever moveable property they could find in the villages. From 1838 to 1842, Ranjit Singh had to detail one of his most able European generals, Avitable, as governor to maintain even this foothold.

The pattern of revolt continued without let under the British who took over the Frontier area from the Sikhs in 1849. With the curious exceptions of 1857 (the Sepoy Mutiny), 1878-80 (the Second British-Afghan War), and 1914-18 (World War I), there is hardly a single one of the 98 years during which the British held the Frontier that they did not have to mount an expedition to put down a revolt. The troops employed ranged from a few companies to 60,000 regulars in 1897-98, 80,000 in 1919-20, and 40,000 in one two-month campaign in 1938.

One of Pakistan's first acts, after taking control of the Frontier

from the departing British in 1947, was to withdraw all regular troops from the tribal area lying between the NWFP and the Afghan border. With certain minor exceptions, it has continued this policy until the present, although the army has been called in on several occasions in Baluchistan and has several garrisons in the NWFP itself.

The Close Border Policy

Pakistan is thus pursuing a Close Border policy, albeit with an added twist to it. This and the arguments for and against Islamabad's continuing such a policy will be discussed later. First, let us look at some aspects of the Close Border policy in the past.

During the centuries of Muslim rule of the Frontier there was little reason for the central power (sometimes located to the west but more generally to the east) to be concerned with the day-to-day life of the people of the Frontier. They were co-religionists; their land was relatively unproductive; the potential for revenue was limited. In those days the objectives of central governments were usually modest anyway. By and large, the question of assimilation and administration did not arise. In the 15th to 18th centuries, rulers' interests in the borderland were essentially two: the warriors it could provide for the royal armies, and the need to ensure passage through it.

As far as the first of these is concerned, the Pathans did fight for, as well as against, a long succession of rulers in Central Asia and in Delhi. In doing so they established for themselves a number of small states in different parts of India, e.g. Tonk and Ruhelkhand. They were less obliging on the matter of passage. Realizing early that their main natural resource was their control of the routes between South and Central Asia, they demanded benefits in return. Usually the rulers paid them. During Aurangzeb's time the annual payment by the Mughals for passage through the Khyber was 600,000 rupees. When the demands became too extortionate, the rulers resorted to military measures to force passage. These almost inevitably turned out to be even more costly.

With the deterioration in Muslim power in Asia in the 18th Century, the right of passage became less important politically (since there were no longer major power centers to be connected), though it continued to have some commercial value. Even this

was minimal, however, by the early 19th century when the political and social organization of the Muslim peoples in Asia had broken down to the point where lands and peoples stopped producing and trading in their traditional goods. By the time the Sikhs took control of the Frontier, trade through the Khyber had virtually ceased. Indeed, the great high road of Central Asia had become little more than a shooting gallery into which bands of Afghans and Sikhs occasionally ventured to expend powder on one another.

The expansion of the British Indian Empire to the northwest corner of the subcontinent in 1849 changed all this. The British came with an almost mystical devotion to equitable and efficient centralized administration. This was intensified within the decade by the demise of the British East India Company and the assumption of direct responsibility by the Crown. New prospects for re-establishment of trade with Central Asia and for the revenue associated with it appeared. Properly administered, the fertile valleys lying just to the west of the Indus would take on new importance agriculturally. Most of all, as most Empire-minded Englishmen of the time saw it, the Frontier was the key defence against "Russian Expansionism in the East" which was becoming almost a national paranoia in England.

The first British administrators responsible for the Frontier found their work cut out for them. Sikh oppression had driven much of the population from the valleys into the hills where many lived exclusively by brigandage. The departure of the Sikhs inspired new interest in Kabul (encouraged by the Russians) in recovering territory it had lost to the Sikhs only a short generation earlier. The Pathans saw the British new-comers as no less infidel and alien than the Sikhs. The headquarters of the only India-wide organization dedicated to ridding the country of "infidel British rule," the "Hindustani Fanatics" of Sayyid Ahmad Brelvi, had recently been established in Hazara District, just east of the Indus. A large number of *thugs* (practioneers of *thugee*, ritual murder and robbery) had also settled in the Frontier area after having been pushed out of India proper by increasingly strong British pressure against their sect.

Under the circumstances, it was not surprising that the British officers charged with responsibility for Frontier affairs, Edwardes, Taylor, James, Lumsden, Mackleson, and Abbott on the Frontier,

and Henry and John Lawrence in Lahore, determined from the beginning to try to administer only the accessible valley areas and not to station troops in the hills. The three districts of Peshawar, Kohat, and Hazara were grouped together under a commissioner. Dera Ismail Khan and Bannu were put under a separate deputy-commissioner. Thus, the NWFP, though it did not become a separate province for fifty years, began with almost the identical territory it has today.

A special military body was promptly set up. First called the Punjab Irregular Force, its name was soon changed to the Punjab Frontier Force, and its members have come down through history as "Piffers." It consisted of five regiments of infantry, three batteries of light field artillery, two garrison artillery batteries, two companies of sappers, a camel corps, five regiments of cavalry, and the famous Corps of Guides (irregular cavalry). Most of the troops were Indian and some were Pathans.

The new guardians of the Frontier realized promptly that military force alone was not an effective instrument of control. There was no problem with stationing troops in the settled districts and in most circumstances these garrisons could be counted upon to protect vital towns and roads. However, when regular troops moved out into the hills, casualties from snipers and hit-and-run raids were high; the costs of supply, enormous; the offending tribesmen, elusive. Frequently, the most a force of several thousand men could accomplish was the destruction of an empty fort or an abandoned village.

Having rejected the possibility of stationing garrisons in the hills as too costly and dangerous, and having found that even "scuttle and burn" punitive expeditions produced no lasting effect, the British administrators began to devise a new and more sophisticated system which in fact remained the basis of Frontier administration until they left almost a hundred years later. Less than a month after the British annexation, the Adam Khel Afridis who dwell in and around the Kohat Pass provided a case in point.

In order to ensure communications between Peshawar and the whole southern two-thirds of the settled area, the Adam Khel were promised a subsidy of 5,700 rupees annually for "protecting," i. e. not attacking, travelers through the Pass. Long before the first year's payment had been earned, the Adam Khel closed the Pass again. Sir Charles Napier, Commander-in-Chief of all British

forces in India, came personally to the Frontier to lead the expedition to reopen the Pass and punish the offending tribesmen. Napier had little trouble marching his 3,200 soldiers through the Pass. When he withdrew, the Adam Khel fell upon the caravans again.

This time an Orakzai chief, whose clan lived nearby, was offered a subsidy of 8,000 rupees to assume the responsibility for protecting the Pass. The resulting Orakzai-Afridi feud kept the Adam Khel too busy to interfere with traffic in what had formerly been their exclusive preserve, and for two years the caravans passed relatively safely. Eventually, however, the Afridi-Orakzai fighting built up to the point where almost all movement in the whole area had to be suspended. At this point the British offered yet a third subsidy to the Bangash to protect the Pass. The resulting expansion of intertribal feuding drew the fighting well away from the Pass itself and traffic moved through it again.

Finally, on 1 December 1853, the Adam Khel came to terms. In a fifteen article "treaty," they promised to return or pay for all property "already robbed or in future robbed," to expel from their territory all fugitives from justice in the settled areas, to turn over any tribesmen guilty of murder in British territory, to undertake that no member of the tribe would commit a crime in British territory, to maintain posts in the Pass for the safety of travelers, and to give hostages to live in British territory. They also settled for a subsidy of 5,000 rupees a year, 700 less than they had been getting before the whole thing started. The saving to the Queen's accounts may have been small but in its way it was a significant victory for a new approach to administration of the Frontier.

At this point, however, the British were still pretty much following in the footsteps of the Mughals, who had also relied on subsidies, playing one clan against another, and taking hostages for future good behavior. Shortly afterwards, the officer in charge of the Kohat Pass Afridis, one Colonel Coke, advanced the theory of control one step further. He prescribed that in the event of trouble the procedure to be followed was: "To close the Pass at once, seize all the Afridis to be found in Peshawar and Kohat Districts, put the men in jail, sell their cattle, stop all Pass allowances held by the Afridis, and, when the matter is settled, cause all losses to be made good, not from their confiscated

allowances, but from the allowances made from the time they commence."

This notion of collective responsibility reflected the keen insight of the British administrators into tribal customs and values. It was admirably simple and practical and was to be the keystone of British policy in the future. The various Pathan tribes thought and felt as a unit, although their members might on occasion act individually. If the whole clan was made responsible for the action of any of its members, it would be more likely to control such actions and more vulnerable if it did not. Since all of the hill tribes depended for at least some of their necessities on the settled area and many of their members could be expected to be there at any given time, the weapons of seizure and blockade were potent indeed. Additionally, of course, any tribal chief who was prepared to accord even only minimal cooperation to the British had an opportunity to enhance his own power by accepting responsibility with them for both the subsidies and the tribesmen's behavior.

Edwardes perfected the blockade technique shortly after becoming Commissioner of the Peshawar Division in 1853. He dismissed the *arbabs* (certain families in the settled area which since Mughal times had acted as middlemen for the tribes) and "civilized" Pathan informers whom his predecessors had employed and himself dealt directly with the tribal chiefs. When a tribe offended the new government's conception of right and justice, Edwardes barred the entire group from the Peshawar market, "thereby making the community suffer for its complicity in crime or unwillingness to exert itself for its punishment or prevention." Denying a clan access to the Peshawar market meant that it had to bring in the goods it needed from a great distance or obtain them through its neighbors, who, of course, took a heavy commission for this service.

Toward the end of 1853 some Kuki Khel Afridis waylayed a messenger in the Khyber who was carrying a bottle of quinine to the native representative maintained by the British in Kabul. Edwardes immediately announced that every Kuki Khel found within British territory was to be imprisoned. To speed the process he offered twenty rupees for each tribesman and fifty rupees for each *malik* (chief) apprehended. So well did the men of other tribes respond that before nightfall, 300 rupees worth of Kuki

Khel reposed in the Peshawar jail. The next afternoon the Kuki Khel elders came down from the Pass and returned the quinine. Edwardes made them reimburse the 300 rupees before releasing the imprisoned men.

The blockade technique was later to become more complicated and impersonal, as well as less effective, as the British bureaucracy grew in size if not in imagination. Edwardes was a master of it in his day, however. He respected the tribesmen and they respected him. Perhaps part of their respect came from Edwardes' willingness to make an occasional exception to his rules to conform to tribal mores. One such exception appears in a "treaty" signed 24 August 1857 with the notoriously unruly Zakka Khel Afridis. Article Five of this document reads: "Reparation is *not* to be made in the event of any person of the tribe abducting the wife or daughter of a resident of British territory, but if he should have brought off any property also, that shall be returned; if the parties deny that any property has been extracted, an oath on the Koran shall be administered to them." (A clue to Edwardes' generosity may lie in the date of the document. The Sepoy Rebellion had begun and Delhi was in the hands of the mutineers. No one wished to provoke the tribes to join the uprising.)

The pattern of administration set in the 1850s did not alter greatly in the following thirty years. The bureaucracy grew larger and the caliber of the administrators declined as the web of government, manifested in police, public works, land settlement, irrigation, and new forms of taxation spread over the settled districts. The hill tribes remained intensely suspicious of these developments in the districts and would have nothing to do with them. The British remained unwilling to pay the price of pacification by military force and, secure in their base in the settled area, continued to try to manipulate the hill tribes through political measures supplemented by periodic punitive expeditions. These "scuttle and burn" raids did set limits to tribal misbehavior but gradually also they began to build up a deep and lasting sense of bitterness which was not present in the early days and as the century passed, the weight of tribal desire for revenge grew.

The increasingly difficult problem of tribal control was a subject of much learned discussion in England and in India. It became especially lively during the Second Afghan War (1878-80) as Imperial Russia advanced steadily southward and eastward until

the Tsarist empire was within marching distance of the British Indian frontier. This inspired new examination of just where that frontier should be. While the "Frontier wallahs" insisted from the beginning that what they had taken they could hold and that British terriotry should run at least as far west as the border hills (i.e. including the settled districts), others were not so sure. Indeed, as early as the 1860s Viceroy Lord Lawrence was prepared to revert to the Indus as a natural and more easily defensible border.

The "hawks" had their way, however, and by the time the Afghan War was ended, it was generally accepted that the international border should be at least as far west as that inherited from the Sikhs. As everyone realized, the key problem was less where to draw the line than what do to about the area beyond it, since it was manifestly impossible to ignore the fierce and poweful hill tribes. As the advocates of the Close Border policy saw it, this was a diplomatic or a political problem. It was largely separate from the problem of administration within the settled districts which was not totally unlike that of other parts of India. Political control of the trans-border tribes, the theory went, could be effected from a strong base within the settled districts through subsidies, blockade, occasional manipulation of tribal affairs, and, when absolutely necessary, punitive expeditions. The objective was simple: to protect the security and potential prosperity of the settled districts and to deny the area beyond them to any non-indigenous power, most immediately the Amir of Afghanistan and most importantly the Tsar of Russia.

As will be seen subsequently, a combination of factors in the 1890s led to the giving way of the Close Border policy in favor of a Forward Policy under which the British undertook to administer some of the tribal area, to move strong garrisons forward into other parts of it, and to dictate a boundary settlement (the Durand Line) with the Afgan Amir Abdur Rahman which pushed the international border from the eastern foot of the border hills to their crest. In 1947 Pakistan inherited both the fruits and the liabilities of the results of this Forward Policy. Some of these it left untouched, e.g. a reasonably direct administration of the Kurram Agency which has orginally been unadministered. Others it embraced, e.g. the sanctity of the Durand Line as an international border in the face of Afghanistan's demand for the

Pathans' being given a right to choose independence if they so wanted. In one way, it deliberately retrogressed by withdrawing all regular troops behind the administered line and abandoning the garrisons in tribal territory. This, it seems to the present writer, together with Pakistan's continued reliance on subsidies, political manipulation, and occasional punitive raids (now often aerial), puts the new sovereign's policy for most of the almost thirty years it has been responsible for the Frontier closer to the Close Border than to the Forward policy. (It should be noted that Pakistan has also almost entirely given up Colonel Coke's "collective responsibility" concept, at least in the direct and forceful form in which he practiced it.)

Some new movement toward a Forward policy, however, may be seen in the push for development and integration of the whole area made under President Bhutto in the past few years. Perhaps, the most notable efforts appear to be going on in what was once the most intractable part of all of tribal territory, i.e. Waziristan. A correspondent for the *Wall Street Journal* (symbolic of what?) in July 1974 made what was probably the most extensive trip through Waziristan by a foreigner in many years. He reports that Razmak, the great garrison of British might, after twenty-seven years of abandonment, has been reoccupied by a 1,000 man unit of scouts (irregulars), and that development has come to Miranshah, headquarters of the North Waziristan Agency, in the form of new schools, a junior college, a small hospital, a center for training weavers, and a match factory. He notes also, however, that he still traveled about in armed convoy and that the prevailing local law is still *Pukhtunwali*, the Pathan code of honor, administered by tribal *jirgas* (assemblies) without interference from Pakistani law or officialdom.

The Forward Policy

To return to the Forward policy in its development and classic form of implementation by the British in the 1890s, one must look at the circumstances surrounding the Second Afghan War in 1878-80 and at developments to the south in Baluchistan where another remarkable British administrator, Colonel Robert Sandeman was evolving his own theory of tribal control.

As British administrators in the last quarter of the 19th century

saw it, the Forward Policy meant pushing the international boundary as far westward and northward as physically possible and by dint of changing existing conditions in the extended area through both education and force of arms exercising full sovereignty over the whole. Apart from the problem of changing conditions in such an intractable area as has already been described, there was also the question of what would happen when England and Russia (which was rapidly expanding southward and eastward) eventually came face to face in Central Asia. There were differing opinions as to just where this should come about. Some said India's true frontier lay on the Oxus; others were satisfied with Herat and the Hindu Kush Mountains. During and immediately after the Second Afgan War, a proposal for a "scientific frontier" on a line from Kabul through Ghazni to Kandahar was popular. (The British were in actual occupation of the three cities in 1879-80.)

That it was possible in certain circumstances to push administration out into the tribal area was proven by Colonel Sandeman in Baluchistan. The Sandeman system, a benign corollary of the Forward Policy, was unique insofar as it had as its basic objective the welfare of the tribes. Sandeman, in the tradition of earlier Englishmen overseas, held that the government had a moral obligation to attempt the gradual civilization and settlement of the tribes. His formula for this was "peaceful penetration" of their homelands, based on knowledge and sympathy. Behind this was the assumption that, given the chance to improve their economic lot, the improverished hillmen would abandon their predatory habits in favor of more peaceful ones. The immediate instrument for such improvement was their employment in levies, road-making, and other services.

The Sandeman system worked well in Baluchistan. Almost from the beginning administration was extended up the limits of the area of British interest. However, the Baluch border tribes were less well-armed and less intractable than the Pathans. Their tribal culture was less developed, and they had but recently suffered under the corrupt and despotic rule of the Khan of Kalat and the Amirs of Sind, compared to which British rule was light and benign. They were also many fewer in number than the Pathans.

Finally, in 1890, the debate ended and the British pushed their base out beyond the close border. Appropriately it was Sandeman

who led the way. From Zhoḃ in Baluchistan, he moved up the Gomal in Waziristan, picketing it and establishing posts in key positions. The Khidarzai Shiranis opposed the movement but were overcome and forced to agree to the establishment of levy posts in their territory.

In 1891 a punitive expedition against the Orakzai further north was followed by a British declaration that the Samana Crest, a high ridge in the hills which dominated the Miranzai Valley and the Southern Tirah, would be the *de facto* British boundary. Pickets were constructed along it, and the following year, these were extended up the Kurram Valley with the consent of the Shia Turis, who were facing the prospect of extinction in a *jihad* declared against them by their Sunni neighbors. Next the valley was brought under the rule of a British political agent.

In 1893 Amir Abdur Rahman of Kabul reluctantly gave way to British pressure for delimitation of his eastern boundaries. The line which was settled on by the Amir and Sir Mortimer Durand was demarcated in 1894-95 and remains the international border today. During the course of the demarcation, the Mahsuds attacked and burned the British Boundary Commission camp at Wana in South Waziristan. The British then decided to station a substantial permanent garrison there. A short time later the Tochi Valley was occupied at the request of the Daurs, a small tribe which, like the Turis, was in danger of being wiped out by its more powerful neighbors, the Wazirs and Mahsuds.

In the far north a British political agent had been established at Gilgit as early as 1876. In the beginning, however, his primary purpose was to keep an eye on the Central Asian trade routes and to watch for Russian advances. In 1889 a separate Gilgit Agency was established and in 1892 garrisons were set up at Chalt and Hunza. In 1895 a road was built through the Malakand Pass, and posts were set up in the Pass, at the crossing of the Swat River, and in Chitral.

The concept of Afghanistan as a buffer state between the British and Russian empires was now firmly established in Calcutta and London. It had been gradually and reluctantly accepted by St. Petersburg also, and on 10 September 1895, the Pamir Boundary Agreement between the United Kingdom and the Russian Czar set the Afghan-Russian boundary in the Pamir area, thus completing the international borders of Afghanistan. In the east the Pamir

Boundary ended at the northernmost point of the Durand Line. The area in-between, in places only a half-dozen miles wide, comprised the Wakhan Corridor of Afghanistan, which would neatly, and it was hoped, eternally, separate the Asian domains of Russia and England.

With the international borders of the Indian Empire settled, London and Calcutta turned to setting a permanent pattern of administration for the Frontier area itself. The settled districts were treated as part of the Punjab in the hope of cutting them off from their troublesome tribal relatives in the hills. The 25,000 miles of marchland occupied by the hill tribes were outside British law but under British control by virtue of the fingers of British penetration in the Gomal, the Tochi, the Kurram, the Khyber, and the Malakand.

The problem was that the fingers could not relax for a moment without getting severely scarred by the hostile tribes which held the ridges between them. Pickets and posts were cut off for weeks at a time. Many a British officer riding out from Peshawar or Bannu to his new post in the hills never got there. The advocates of the Forward policy who were riding high as a result of the outward movements in the early 1890s urged full occupation and pacification of the area up to the Durand Line—either by "peaceful penetration" if the political officers could carry that out promptly or by the same brute military force which had established the beachheads in the first place.

The Close Border supporters, now on the defensive, argued that the 1895 agreement with Russia by establishing the Afghan buffer had reduced the chances of a clash between the two great empires. If this were so, why take responsibility for the tribal area, especially since to do so would clearly mean paying, a heavy cost in money and men. This argument was highlighted by the great tribal rising of 1897-98 when, as Sir William Barton put it, "the border burst into flame from the Tochi to the Malakand," and more than 60,000 regular troops had to go into battle merely to preserve the fingers of what had been assumed to be the "strong right hand" of British imperial power in Asia. The "hand," under such circumstances, would obviously have been incapable of striking a blow at Russia had the need arisen.

In January of 1899, Lord Curzon of Kedleston became Viceroy of India. He had long been fascinated by Central Asia and keenly

interested in Indian affairs. Having studied the Frontier situation for a year, he proposed making the settled districts a separate unit and bringing the tribal territory completely under the Government of India. This, he said, would "entrust tribal management exclusively to those who know the tribes." On 9 November 1901, the North-West Frontier Province came into being; the tribal area became a central responsibility with strategic and political considerations overriding social and economic ones, and the administrative pattern for the last half of Britain's rule over the Frontier was set. To carry it out and to take into account the peculiar relationship which existed between the Province and the tribal area, Curzon took the somewhat disorganized sets of regulations which had governed crimes earlier and consolidated them into the Frontier Crimes Regulations (III) of 1901. Except for a few brief periods of suspension, the FCR remained in use throughout British days, and are still, in amended form, in use in Pakistan today.

The FCR provided for the referral of criminal and civil cases to *jirgas* in accordance with tribal custom but henceforth the *jirgas* would be appointed or at least convened by the deputy commissioners and political agents. Provisions for the blockade of offending tribes, community fines, prohibition of the erection of new villages and the removal of old ones, regulation of village guest houses, and "imprisonment with a view to prevent crime" were all included.

Curzon's neat new structure held for almost twenty years. Perhaps its greatest achievement was that it kept the peace on the Frontier during World War I, even despite German agents in Kabul, the collapse of Russia, the advance of German armies into the Caucasus and Turkish forces into Persia. In May 1919, however, the hot-headed young new Afghan Amir, Amanullah, declared war on British India. At this point, in the Government of India's own words: "The Curzon system, like so many older and more majestic institutions, broke under the mighty pressure." The tribes joined the Afghans, cheerfully abandoning their subsidies. The irregular Pathan troops in the Scouts and Levies deserted. An Afghan army under the future King Nadir Shah of Afghanistan made a successful, albeit very brief, raid into the Tochi Valley.

The Third Afghan War ended in little more than three months,

to Kabul's considerable advantage. (It was to gain control over its own foreign affairs, a responsibility hitherto claimed by the British.) However, the tribal rising which the war had inspired was not dealt with so easily. For all practical purposes British influence and control in the tribal area had been reduced to nil and the problem was what to do about it.

Again, a few voices urged reversion to the Close Border policy. The land was worth nothing in terms of revenue. The people were hopelessly intractable. Concentrate attention on the rest of India and let the Pathans alone. However, Delhi and London did not think in such narrow terms. A new Russian menace was developing as the radical Bolshevik regime consolidated its power in the old Czarist territories. The Frontier must be made secure, and in the winter of 1919-20, a large force of British troops moved out against the recalcitrant tribes. The main attack was in Waziristan, and in the course of several months of severe fighting, a British column managed to reach and burn Kanniguram, the principal town of the Mahsuds. They remained in the Mahsud country six months. The cost can be illustrated by a single fight (one of dozens) near Makin on February 19-20, 1920. The British lost sixty killed and ninety-one wounded. Mahsud casualties were twenty-two killed and forty-eight wounded. The overall cost of the Mahsud campaign alone was more than one million pounds, several times greater than that of the whole Third Afghan War. More than 80,000 troops were employed; 500 were killed; 2,000 wounded; and 5,000 sent out of action by cholera and other diseases. When it was all over and the British withdrew, the Mahsuds had never formally surrendered and they never paid the fines in money and rifles assessed against them.

Clearly London and Delhi were now faced with a painful choice. The "fingers" of influence and control extended into tribal territory by the Forward policy of the 1890s had been wiped out. Curzon's FCR were unenforceable. Punitive expeditions of the most formidable sort from the settled districts into the tribal area had not been able to restore the situation. It was either admit that it could not be controlled and let it remain a permanent marchland or carry the Forward policy to its logical conclusions and attempt to dominate the whole area permanently by force.

The choice was essentially for the latter. First, a new system of

local irregular troops was instituted. Officers were detached in large numbers from regular regiments and assigned to the tribal agencies. No more than one-third of recruits in the new units were permitted to be from tribal territory. A new Frontier Constabulary, officered by members of the Imperial Indian Police, was set up to guard the districts from tribal incursions and to enforce the FCR. Organized reserve parties were set up in the villages of the districts. The old haphazard system of calling on a tribe that was in receipt of subsidies to provide men on demand was changed to establishment of a formal list of individual tribesmen who were given specific pay for specific duties.

Most importantly, regular troops in force moved back to garrison key areas of tribal territory. Roads were built into Waziristan and new garrisons stationed at Wana and Razmak in the heart of the Wazir and Mahsud countries. The railroad linking Peshawar and Fort Jamrud was pushed up the Khyber to Landikotal. Regular convoys linked the forts in tribal territory with the main north-south road from Peshawar to Bannu. "Peaceful penetration" was now known as "control from within."

Thus far, the conflict between Pathans and British had been primarily a simple bilateral one. The British feared Russia and the Pathans found support from Afghanistan, but the events that set them into struggle were ones which had their genesis on the Frontier itself. In the 1930s, events in India began to intrude and it was around these that the last major British-Pathan confrontation took place.

The general desire for more self-rule which was growing in India chiefly under the urgings of the Congress Party did not leave the more sophisticated Pathans of the NWFP untouched. In 1929 a young landlord of Utmanzai, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and his brother, Dr Khan Sahib, an officer in the Indian Medical Service, founded a local political group which they called the Khudai Khitmatgars, the "Servants of God"; party members affected a kind of uniform, shirts dyed a distinctive red with the local brick dust. This soon led them to be dubbed "Red Shirts," which awakened suspicions in the minds of local administrators of some kind of connection with the Russian Reds beyond the Hindu Kush.[1]

[1]The following pages summarize, from a rather different point of view, some of the events discussed in Stephen Rittenberg's essay.

The Khudai Khitmatgars gained adherents rapidly in Peshawar and the surrounding countryside, and Abdul Ghaffar Khan became a leading figure in Indian political activities. Khudai Khitmatgar *jirgas* were set up in most villages in Peshawar District and links established between them. At the top was a provincial *jirga* which included the party high command. The system began to develop into a parallel administration independent of the British government. Side by side with the *jirgas* was an organization of volunteers bound by an oath of discipline to follow and enforce the party's policies as ordered by the high command. Relations were established with tribal dissidents in the hills, especially the Mohmands, to whose most turbulent leader, the Haji of Turangzai, the Khan brothers were related by marriage.

On 23 April 1930, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his associates were arrested for fomenting unrest. Peshawar erupted into rioting. Thousands of people who had no connection with the Khudai Khitmatgars put on red shirts and began dying every piece of cloth they could find with brick dust. Troops and tanks were brought into the city. When there was a confrontation with the demonstrators in the Kissa Khani Bazaar, two platoons of the Royal Garhwal rifles were ordered to open fire on the crowd but refused to do so. They were disarmed and removed by British troops who then fired on the crowd, killing a number.

Simultaneously, hostile *lashkars* (war parties) assembled in the hills. Attacks were made on the edge of Peshawar District and at several places in Waziristan. An Utman Khel *lashkar* threatened Shabqadar. Near Fort Jamrud, 5,000 Afridis assembled, and on the night of 4-5 June, 2,000 of them poured down in a hit-and-run raid on Peshawar itself, the eighty-five-year-old symbol of British rule on the Frontier. They returned the first week in August to encircle the city again but did not enter it. Meanwhile, the Mahsuds, Mohmands, and Yusufzai in Buner joined in the attack on British rule.

On 15 August, martial law was imposed throughout the Frontier, and the army, reinforced by units hastily collected in the Punjab and other parts of India, moved to reassert control. Mohmand and Afridi *lashkars* were broken up by aerial bombing. Strong columns moved out from Peshawar against the Afridis and from Razmak against the Mahsuds and Wazirs. Every effort was made to break up the Khudai Khitmatgar or-

ganization and special appointed *jirgas* were set up under the FCR to try those who had participated in the disturbances. It took almost a year to quiet the countryside, however, and it was the middle of 1931 before it was possible to recommence revenue collection in Mardan District.

In the Spring of 1931 Abdul Ghaffar Khan was released as a result of the Gandhi-Irwin Pact concommitant on the London Round Table Conference. He disregarded Gandhi's promise that agitation would cease during the discussions, reorganized the Khudai Khitmatgars, established new contacts with hostile tribal leaders, and began violent resistance all over again. By late summer, even the established khans in the settled districts, whose loyalty to the British had been assured for decades, began to refuse to pay taxes, and some of them appeared on the same platform with Khudai Khitmatgar leaders. In the last weeks of 1931, the Round Table Conference broke down, and the Gandhi-Irwin Pact was abrogated. On 26 December, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and most of the Khudai Khitmatgar leaders were arrested again. More than a thousand local leaders of the party were also taken into custody and its units broken up by force. In Kohat, fourteen Red Shirts were killed and thirty wounded by British troops. Shortly afterward, Gandhi was arrested and the Congress Party put under ban.

The next three or four years on the Frontier were something like an armed truce—frequently violated. The mass movement had been stopped but individual killings and kidnappings of British officers and those who cooperated with them continued. Politics in India, especially communal politics, began to have more and more effect on opinion. The Muslim League made its influence felt through a "Buy Muslim" campaign. The Islam Bibi and Shahidganj Mosque cases inflamed religious opinion. Finally, in 1936, the Fakir of Ipi, a Tori Khel *mullah* (priest) of the Utmanzai Wazirs, of whom relatively little had hitherto been heard, raised a *lashkar* of Daurs among whom he lived in the Tochi Valley and demanded the return of Islam Bibi (a Hindu girl, kidnapped, married, and converted by a Muslim whom the British had returned to her family) to her husband. When the ordinarily tractable Daurs began to threaten Bannu, the British marched out to build a new road to get at the hideaways of the rebels. On 25 November 1936 a clash took place with heavy

casualties on both sides. Ipi fled to a remote corner of the Mahsud country but his fame had spread throughout the Frontier and across India and small bands of tribesmen from all over the Frontier came to join his *jihad* against the British.

Several times moving his headquarters during the next two years, Ipi finally holed up in a series of caves in the cliffs at Gorwekt, west of Razmak and nearly astride the Afghan border. The tribal rising he directed cost the British more than five million pounds and never really ended. At one point, ten thousand troops were required to keep communications open alone. What is usually known as "Waziristan, 1936-38" on the medal roles of the British Army was a battle that was never really won. With the coming of World War II active fighting on the Frontier ended and, mysteriously, as in earlier wars when the British were gravely threatened elsewhere, the Pathans relaxed their pressure. Ipi was never captured, however, and lived out his life in Pakistan to win for himself the honor of being that sovereign's "most notorious hostile," finally dying unrepentent in 1960.

It is ironic that in the last decade of British rule on the Frontier, when the Forward policy was in its most vigorous operation in the tribal area and more political reforms than ever before were being offered to the Province, security was weaker than ever before. While there were no large-scale battles after 1938, traffic on the main Peshawar-Dera Ismail Khan road could be permitted for only a few hours in the morning when the heights alongside were heavily picketed. The Grand Trunk Road between Peshawar and Naoshera was closed after sunset. People were kidnapped regularly from villages and towns all over the province. Road-making could be done only under escort and for limited daylight hours. In Bannu Cantonment, the garrison had to lay out an inner cordon enclosing the houses of top officers and the Deputy Commissioner to provide a redoubt against tribal attack. To a degree, the Frontier was being administered and monitored. However, it certainly had not been assimilated, and it was proving increasingly difficult to manipulate.

Prospects in Pakistan

This was the situation inherited by Pakistan—complicated by the trauma and dislocation of Partition. The initial measures

taken by the new government have already been mentioned. Its subsequent efforts to cope with the problem of the Frontier and the opposition it has faced all have their clear echoes from an earlier day. The creation of the "One-Unit" province of West Pakistan and its incorporation of the NWFP and the subsequent reestablishment of the NWFP, the Pukhtunistan agitation, the buildings of schools and bombings of villages, reorganizations of political and military cadre, and the rise and fall of parties and politicians can be left to others, though the temptation cannot be resisted to note that Khan Abdul Wali Khan, the leader of the National Awami Party, main opposition today to President Bhutto on the Frontier, is not only the spiritual but the actual blood descendant of the Red Shirt leaders of 1929, and that almost exact parallels to the stories appearing in the *New York Times* in 1973 and 1974 may be found in the *Times* of 1930 to 1938.

The question remains, parties and personalities aside, as to whether there is any wisdom to be gained out of all of the thought and experience that has been given to governing the Frontier and whether things are really very different now than they were a hundred years ago. As to the latter, there can be no doubt in one respect. While still far from well off, almost all Pathans in the hills as in the settled areas are considerably better off today. They have better educational and medical facilities. The roads that were built to subdue them have brought at least modest economic advantages. The old religious alienation from the British is no longer present and the sense of cultural alienation has been greatly reduced. For its not inconsiderably worth, this has taken place without the kind of destruction of a tribal society that has taken place elsewhere in the world. Curiously, it is also difficult to say how much of it can be traced to the Forward as opposed to the Close Border policy or to judge over the long run which technique of government has worked well and which has not.

On the otherside of the picture (at least from the administrators viewpoint), Pathan power, both political and military, has not been broken and the Frontier still possesses the ability to disrupt Pakistan's national life, conceiveably fatally. If the Great Power contest which caused strategic considerations to override humane ones for so much of British rule has tapered off, it could come back suddenly, and in any event, Kabul continues to offer succor to any element on the Frontier which is dissatisfied with Islama-

bad. (Although the very large potential Iranian influence in Afghanistan, if realized, could mollify traditional Afghan inclinations for trouble-making.)

From a historian's standpoint, perhaps the most that can be said is that the Frontier is still more of a marchland than anything else but a more benign one than it has been for a long time before. "Peaceful Penetration" through economic and social welfare measures has generally worked well; as long as it is based on Sandeman's conception of a moral obligation to the people rather than a soldier's strategic imperatives, it can bring with it a certain amount of security and military control. If the pace is pushed too fast, however, or if policy vacillates rapidly from one extreme to another, the potential for another major explosion is still there. It will take at least another generation to remove it.

PAKISTAN'S IMPERIAL LEGACY

AINSLIE T. EMBREE

In 1956, a spokesman of the Afghan government, supporting the advocates of Pakhtunistan, claimed that the Durand Line had no legitimacy as a boundary. Drawn by an alien government, it artificially divided the peoples of the area without reference to race or language. Pakistan's Minister of Foreign Affairs at once denounced this interpretation as "a proposition that admits no discussion." The Durand Line, he said, "has been, is, and will continue to be, the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan." [1] In making this assertion, the Foreign Minister, perhaps unconsciously, was moving into one of the most interesting and perplexing areas in modern international politics: the nature of relationships between an independent, post-colonial state and its colonial predecessor.

Pakistan is often referred to as a "new state," with the categorization carrying the suggestion that as a country that had achieved independent status after World War II, it was beginning its existence without commitments and policies from the past. This emphasis on newness had a double edge. On the one hand, a new state unburdened with directives from the past would be free to innovate and experiment. It was assumed its foreign policies would be more benevolent, more concerned with reciprocity and less with self-interest. On the other hand, it was also assumed, especially by the former colonial powers, that the execution of the policies of the new states, unguided by the wisdom that supposedly comes from experience, would be marked by instability and erratic behavior.

This categorization of Pakistan, with the attendant implicit

[1] Hamidul Haq Chowdhury, Minister of Foreign Affairs in Pakistan National Assembly, 25 March 1956, in *Foreign Relations*, Karachi, Government of Pakistan, 1956, p. 53.

assumptions, masked an important reality in regard to foreign policy. Pakistan did not emerge on the international scene in 1947 without any limitations on its initiatives, but, quite as much as the "older" nations, the direction of its foreign relations was determined to a very considerable extent by historical legacies. Some of these, of which the most obvious is Partition itself, are functions of the transfer of power in 1947. Others, less apparent, are the legacy of the nineteenth century imperial experience, which entailed the formation of a new kind of power in the subcontinent, a modern, centralized bureaucratic state, the Government of India. Two aspects of this legacy will be explored in this essay. One has to do with the definition of frontiers and the demarcation of linear boundaries; the other with the general thrust of the foreign policy of the old Government of India.

The Legacy of the Frontier Structure

The two related, but not identical, processes, the definition of frontiers and the demarcation of borders, were of paramount importance for the politics of the Government of India in the nineteenth century. One could argue, and make a very plausible case, that Pakistan is the legatee of Mughal frontier policy, but the more direct continuities are clearly with the imperial pattern worked out in the mid-nineteenth century.

The distinctive feature of this imperial pattern was the recognition that the Indian Empire had not one frontier, but three. Lord Curzon seems first to have used the phrase, "the three-fold Frontier,"[2] but the concept, and its significance for the subcontinent, had been elaborated earlier by Sir Henry Rawlinson[3] and Sir Alfred Lyall.[4] Their views are of special interest because of the influential positions they occupied, and their intellectual grasps of the political and social significance of frontiers in the life of a nation. What was needed in India, both writers argued, was a

[2]Lord Curzon, *Frontiers*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907, p. 4.

[3]Sir Henry Rawlinson (1810-95), who went to India in 1827, was later a member of Parliament. He served in the India Council and had, in addition to these posts, a forum for his views as President of the Royal Asiatic Society and Royal Geographic Society.

[4]Sir Alfred Lyall (1835-1911) was Foreign Secretary of the Government of India and Lieutenant-General of the Northwest Provinces.

"Frontier of Separation," in contrast to a "Frontier of Contact." For Rawlinson, the important fact was the simultaneous expansion of the Indian and Russian empires, so that "instead of two empires being divided by half the continent of Asia, as of old, there is now intervening between their political frontiers a mere narrow strip of territory, a few hundred miles across."[5] Rawlinson, like Curzon and the others, saw nothing to be condemned in Russian expansion, for Russia was a civilized power pursuing her manifest destiny. But contact between India and Russia was to be avoided for many reasons, not least because the discontent that inevitably smoldered in India, as in any conquered country, might be fanned into flame by the contiguity of another European power. This was a point to which Rawlinson often returned, emphasizing that the Muslims of North India especially had undying hatred of the British. He was convinced that if the Russians were able to make use of this, it would probably mean the end of British power in India.[6]

The maintenance of Frontiers of Separation in the face of the simultaneous advance of the two great powers seemed possible only through the creation of some form of protectorates to act as buffers. For Sir Alfred Lyall, the true frontier was not coterminous with the limits of territory actually administered by the Government of India.[7] Beyond this were areas that the Government of India insisted were vital to its security, but where it did not attempt to exercise any administrative control. But, as Lyall realized, this assumption of political influence required a definition of the kind of authority to be exercised and the working out of the distinction of the operation of power within the boundaries of administration and within boundaries of influence became a central feature of the polity of the Government of India in the nineteenth century. It is probably without an exact parallel anywhere else in modern history.

The "Three-fold Frontier" was the solution to the problem of defining the forms of power to be exercised by the Government of India in the subcontinent and its environs. The first frontier

[5]Sir Henry Rawlinson, *England and Russia in the East*, London: John Murray, 1875, p. 14.

[6]*Ibid.*, pp. 279-82.

[7]Sir Alfred Lyall, "Frontiers and Protectorates," *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 30, 1891, pp. 315.

was the outer edge of directly administered territory; the second was that of indirect administration; and the third, the outer edge of the area of influence. The first of these frontiers defined "British India," the territory administered in the normal pattern, where the Government of India exercised full authority, imposing its legal and political system. Beyond this was a zone regarded as under the territorial control of the Government, but where the law and administrative forms, especially the systems of taxation, were not applied. This was the "Frontier of Separation." Tribal chieftains continued customary forms of government, with general control exercised over them by the Government of India through subsidies and, ultimately, the army.

Here it should be noted that a distinction must be made between the princely states in the interior of the subcontinent or, in the south, in the coastal regions, and the "unadministered" border areas, the "Frontier of Separation." Culturally, geographically, and economically, the princely states of India proper were integrated into the mainstream of Indian life, even though they had a quite distinct political existence from that of British India. These states are not included in this definition of the second frontier zone, the unadministered areas.

On the outer edge of this "unadministered" territory was one of the truly crucial innovations of the British in the subcontinent—the demarcated linear boundary. Such boundaries did not exist in India before the nineteenth century, and they are a fateful element in the imperial legacy of both Pakistan and India. In making this statement, the distinction between a "frontier" and a "boundary" must be kept in mind, especially as the terms were sometimes used interchangeably by nineteenth century writers. Properly used, frontier means, according to Sir Henry MacMahon, a wide tract of border country, hinterlands, or a buffer state.[8] Historically, such frontiers had no external boundaries. The momentous change came, in both the northeast and northwest, but especially in the northwest, when the Government of India delimited and demarcated boundaries. Delimitation means describing the boundary in written, verbal terms in documents and as a line on a map; demarcation is the physical

[8]Sir A. Henry McMahon, "International Boundaries," *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, vol. 84, 1935, p. 4.

transference of these definitions to an actual line on the ground.[9] The classic example of such a boundary line beyond the unadministered zone (where both these processes were carried out) is, of course, the Durand Line. In the east, the MacMahon Line was delimited but not demarcated. Delimitation and demarcation of boundaries assumes the concurrence of the sovereign states concerned.

Beyond this delimited and demarcated boundary was the third frontier region, the protectorate or buffer state, independent but tied by treaties or other forms of obligations to the Government of India. Nepal and, less successfully, Afghanistan were such frontiers. In the case of Afghanistan, its farther external border was delimited and demarcated by the two interested powers, Russia and the Government of India.

A brief sketch of the formation of one section of the Threefold Frontier, the area from Sind through Baluchistan to Afghanistan, can illustrate various aspects of the process, as well as suggesting why the imperial legacy is still a determining force in the integration of modern Pakistan.

At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the East India Company was largely an eastern Gangetic power, but the acquisition of Delhi in 1804 made involvement in the politics of Punjab, the Indus Valley, and the northwest mountain area inevitable. The British discovered what conquerors coming from the northwest had always known: the mountains are a transitional zone into the subcontinent, not a barrier. Power in the past had generally flowed downward from the mountains into the plains, finding ready access through the passes after the establishment of bases on the Afghan plateau; now the movement was to be in the reverse direction.

This process was already under way by 1833, with Lord William Bentinck's administration showing a renewed interest, after the hiatus that had followed the activity during the Napoleonic Wars, in the search for frontiers in Sind and Punjab. That this interest in the northwest marches was engendered by Russian expansionism in Central Asia is obvious enough, but the fear of a Russian advance towards India, the staple of so much Anglo-Indian polemics, masked other concerns. As early as 1831, offi-

[9] *Ibid.*

cials in the Government of India expressed their anxiety that the strength andvigor displayed by the Russians might encourage some of the Indian princes to look to them for assistance in an anti-British uprising.[10] The expansion of the political control of the Government of India into the northwest could not only halt the Russian advance, but it would demonstrate to the princes the reality of British power.

A consideration of quite another kind that in the light of subsequent knowledge seems somewhat absurd, but was nonetheless quite real, was the expectation that the Indus could be used as a highway for trade into the very heart of Central Asia.[11] The belief that the Indus was navigable far into the interior needed to be proved by accurate surveys, which were resisted by the Amirs of Sind, who, not unreasonably, were suspicious of British designs. It was to get around their suspicions that the famous gift of dray horses was sent up the Indus to Ranjit Singh.[12]

But back of all these explicit arguments for involvement in the northwest mountain region—Russian expansionism, its political effect on Indian opinion, the possibility of trade—was a larger and vaguer one. This was the growing awareness that a strong political power based in the subcontinent could not be contained from expansion into the hill region; above all, that this area was integral to the political power that controlled the Indus plain.

All through the 1830s new facts and speculations fed the debate over the location of the frontier and of the extent to which the Indian government should involve itself in the regions beyond the Indus. The confidential letters of the time are filled with what can only be called a sense of destiny, of the priority of the interests of the Government of India in the areas contiguous to existing frontiers. "We must not permit the rulers of Sind to obstruct our measures," was the summary of one memorandum, which Sir Charles Metcalfe, the most prestigious of the East India Company's servants, translated to mean, "We are to go to war

[10] National Archives of India, Foreign Miscellaneous Records, No. 261, Memorandum, May 1831.

[11] National Archives, Foreign Department, Secret Proc. 25 November 1831, no. 21, Alexander Burnes, "A Geographical and Military Memoir on the Indus. . ."

[12] University of Nottingham, Bentinck Papers, No. 2760, Minute of Sir John Malcolm, 9 August 1830.

with them to compel submission to our wishes."[13] Such an attitude was not consonant, he argued, with the Law of Nations, since it was a denial of the sovereignty of the rulers of Sind. "We could do no better than by avoiding forced intimacy, for either our character is so bad, or weaker states are naturally so jealous of the stronger, or our habits are so distasteful, that no native state.. .desires connection with us." But Metcalfe's argument presupposed a balance of political forces that had vanished with the dominance of British power. There was no question of recognizing equal sovereignties, but of deciding what was essential for the interests of the Government of India. As Lord William Bentinck had put it when he was Governor-General, the adjustment of frontiers involved bringing "a new era of civilization, happiness and of blessing to this great Indian world."[14]

The new frontier policy was embodied in the Tripartite Treaty of 1838, between the Government of India, Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shuja, the claimant to the Afghan chieftainship. The Sikhs were confirmed in their possession of the trans-Indus territories including Peshawar and Kashmir, but excluded from further advances against the Amirs of Sind. For renouncing his claims to Sind as well as those to territories in the Punjab once held by the Afghans, Shah Shuja was to be recognized as ruler of Kabul and Kandahar, but not of Herat.[15] By agreeing not to enter into foreign relations without the knowledge of the Government of India or of the Sikhs, he committed himself to a close alignment with the Indian subcontinent, rather than with Central Asia. In effect, the Treaty was intended to make the Afghan plateau once more what it had been under the Mughals—part of the political life of the subcontinent. Lord Auckland, the Governor-General, was aware how high the stakes were, but he was convinced that "a friendly power and intimate connection with Afghanistan, a peaceful alliance with Lahore and an established influence

[13]Indian Office Records, Secret Letters from India and Bengal, vol. 42 (old numbering, second series, vol. 21), pp. 113-29, Sir Charles Metcalfe, Minute, 25 October 1830.

[14]National Archives, Foreign Misc., No. 261, Minute by Bentinck, 13 August 1831.

[15]C. U. Aitchison, ed., *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sannads Relating to India and Neighboring Countries*, Calcutta: Government of India, 1930, VIII, 154.

in Sinde are objects for which some hazard may well be run."[16] He was insistent that Indian, not European politics, made necessary the extension of the frontiers of influence into Afghanistan, although it was obviously of importance to Great Britain that Russian dominance not be extended throughout the area.[17]

Following the quick successes in the early stage of the First Afghan War, the extension of influence to Herat and beyond into Central Asia seemed easy, and there was talk of occupying the country up to the Amu.[18] Another idea put forward at this time was the creation under British influence of a union among the Uzbeg States of Central Asia that would be a buffer against further Russian expansion.[19] The principal exponent of this visionary scheme was Arthur Conolly, who had made journeys into the Khanates of Central Asia, and who, as part of his program for a united Central Asia, had written what must be the first historical work to show that the British in India had a special regard for their Muslim subjects. Stories had been spread among the Muslim rulers—possibly, he thought, by Hindus—that the British aimed at overthrowing them as they had the Muslim rulers in India; Conolly prepared a historical sketch showing how well in fact Indian Muslims were treated. As for the Khanates of Central Asia, the only interest the Government of India had in them was in "the existence of strong and friendly states between its borders and the frontiers of those countries."[20]

Then disaster struck in December 1841 when the uprising against Shuja Shah drove the Indian army out of Kabul, utterly destroying it as it retreated towards the Khyber pass. Auckland's reputation was also destroyed, for he had been the champion of that most unforgivable of political exercises, an adventure in imperialism that failed. Bad planning and incompetence were not even modified by any sense of heroic endeavor.

[16]British Museum, Add. Mss. 37694, Auckland Papers, F. 21, Auckland to Napier, 23 August 1838.

[17]British Museum, Add. Mss. 36,473, Broughton Corres., Vol. XIV, Auckland to Hobhouse, 15 November 1838.

[18]National Archives, Foreign Department, Misc. Records, vol. 331, Secret Newsletter, 1 July 1831.

[19]*Ibid.*, II, no. 47, Capt. Arthur Conolly to William MacNaughten, 26 December 1840.

[20]*Ibid.*, no. 67, 10 May 1841.

"Jesus of Nazareth, what disgusting stuff is this!" was the comment of General Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sind, on an attempt by one of the officers of the campaign to justify the losses suffered by the Indian army. "With the exception of the women you were all a set of sons of bitches."[21] Less profanely, this was also the interpretation of Sir John Kaye's monumental work on the war, one of those historical studies which becomes a part of history itself, shaping subsequent events by its definitiveness and authority, as well as by its assertion of a point of view that reflects the spirit of the age.[22] Kaye's condemnation of the war combines the curious blend of moralism and *real politik* that characterizes so much of nineteenth century British writing on India. Kaye castigated Auckland for an act of unprovoked aggression, but behind this judgement was the fact that Auckland's major fault was failure. The policy that had led to the war was a logical, but incautious, extension of the search for defensible frontiers that had in fact dominated official thinking for many years, and would continue to do so.[23]

The failure of the Afghan adventure did not mean the abandonment or even the substantial modification of the policy on which it was based, only a redefinition of where India's northwestern frontiers should be located. The Indus once more became the focus of attention, with Sind and the Sikh kingdoms the areas to be brought either directly or indirectly under the control of the Government of India. By 1842 the absorption of both in some form was almost a foregone conclusion.[24] The Governor-General spoke almost casually of his plans to introduce uniformity of currency and trade regulations into the whole area between the Hindu Kush, the Indus, and the sea, none of which at the time was under his control.[25] Perhaps Ellenborough did not realize the full

[21]Quoted in J. A. Norris, *The First Afghan War 1838-1842*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967, p. 450.

[22]John W. Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, London: Richard Bentley, 1851, I, 181.

[23]*Parliamentary Papers*, 1843, vol. 39, "Correspondence Relative to Sinde," p. 61, Henry Pottinger to the Gov. Gen., 8 October 1838.

[24]Sir William Napier, *The Life and Opinions of Sir Charles James Napier*, London: John Murray, 1857, II, 196.

[25]India Office Records, Secret Letters from India: Enclosures, vol. 171, no. 52, Ellenborough to Napier, 4 November 1842.

implications of his idea, as his knowledge of the geography of the area was hazy, but sixty years later Sir Thomas Holdich, an authority on the area, argued that the natural frontier of India was far into Afghanistan—a line formed by the Hindu Kush and its extensions to the hills near Herat.[26] The mountain ranges that seemed to provide such satisfactory natural frontiers here as elsewhere were as unstable and as ill-defined as the edge of the desert had been when the movement against Sind had started.

With the acquisition of this undefined territory on the western bank of the Indus began the northwest border problems that were to remain with the Government of India for a hundred years until they became part of Pakistan's inheritance in 1947. The basis of the frontier problem was that the many tribes inhabiting the great belt of mountains that stretches over 1,200 miles from the extreme north to the Arbian Sea, had been, for all practical purposes, independent of the rulers of the Indian plains. The familiar description of these tribes as predatory, for whom plundering raids to the plains were part of their way of life, is probably fair enough, but the nature of the political society had made these raids endurable to the peoples of the plain. It was the new forms of administrative power represented by the British that made the continuance of the old relationship between the hills and the plains untenable, as demonstrated by the Sind Government's decision to put down the tribal incursions along the northern borders of Sind.[27]

The stabilization of the areas occupied by the Baluchi tribes was a slow process, beginning in 1843 and not really completed until the 1890s. Throughout the years the reports from agents and officials restate the familiar theme: the inability of the rulers to control their border people. Here as elsewhere, the conjunction of the territories of the Government of India with tribal peoples with utterly different concepts of territorial control and administration led to endless quarrels. Unable to meet the demands of the authorities to keep the border raiders in check, and faced with intrigues and intratribal rivalries, the most important of the

[26]Sir Thomas Holdich, *The Indian Boderlands*, London: Methuen, 1909, p. 373.

[27]H. T. Lambrick, *Sir Charles Napier and Sind*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, pp. 275-98.

Baluchi chieftains, the Khans of Kalat, lost internal control.[28] The solution to what nineteenth century writers were fond of summarizing as "a condition of anarchy, chaos, and civil war," was not, as elsewhere, annexation of the whole area, but only of a narrow strip of territory on the north and northwest that isolated the Baluchis from contacts with outsiders. Sir Thomas Holdich, one of the ablest of the frontier officials in the late nineteenth century, analyzed the difference between the Baluchistan area and the Northwest Frontier:

> It could be traced to the difference of our actual position in reference to the borderland. In the north we were in front of the border tribes—we are so still; in the south we were both in front of them and behind them. There were no back doors on the Baluchistan frontier for comfortable and timely retreat should matters go badly in front—no hidden means of communication with unseen supporters in the vast upland plains which stretched away to Kandahar and Kabul.[29]

The search for a frontier in upper Sind had been begun almost before the war ended, with the initiative not coming from Calcutta but from the local military commander, John Jacob, and to a lesser extent, from Napier. Certainly the initiatives did not come from London. Insofar as the Government of India had a frontier policy for Sind, it was to maintain the power of the Khan of Kalat over the mountain territories to the west of Sind. In return, the Khan would restrain the tribes from invading Sind. In general, this was the view of the people with long experience in India and who, with deep and, perhaps, sentimental attachment to the old order, believed that the local rules would be "loyal" to the British. Napier's judgement on it was succinct; the "set of old bitches... do not see that the interest of every Prince within our frontier is to send us to hell."[30] Working

[28] *Alphabetical Catalogue of the Contents of the Pre-Mutiny Records of the Commissioner in Sind,* 1857, Karachi: Commissioner's Printing Press, 1931, pp. 352-55.

[29] Holdich, *op. cit.*, p. 187.

[30] Quoted in A. I. Shand, *General John Jacob,* London: Seeley, 1901, p. 125.

within Napier's picaresque framework, Jacob evolved a plan of action that was to lead to a frontier quite different from that existing anywhere else along the Indian perimeter.

The first stage in the evolution of the frontier to the west of the Sind region came from Jacob's rejection of defensive border posts. A frontier cannot be secured by such posts, unless, he said, "like the Romans in Britain, you can afford to build a wall from end to end."[31] Existing defensive works were to be destroyed, with their place taken by troops always on the offensive, seeking out the foe, not waiting for an attack. Jacob pushed his outposts into the hills, striking terror into the area, and disregarding the fact that the hill country belonged to the Khan of Kalat, not Sind. "The loss of life has been terrific," he wrote after a raid, "but it is satisfactory to know that the slain men were robbers and murderers."[32] Jacob claimed that this policy of terror was really humane, since once force had been shown to be effective, it would "excite men's better natures, till all men, seeing that your object is good... join heart and hand to aid in putting down violence."[33] The rhetoric may not carry conviction to the modern reader, but with one exception, the frontier between Sind and the territories of the Khan of Kalat was stabilized by treaty in 1854 and demarcated in 1862.[34]

The exception related to the other aspect of Jacob's border policy: his conviction that the security of India depended upon the military occupation of Quetta, with its command of the Bolan pass.[35] Military occupation would require some form of civil government, and this meant sovereignty. "The red line of the map would be pushed farther westward, and without finding so good a resting place as now." The immediate return from the possession of Quetta would be greater control over the Baluchis, but beyond this were two more enticing possibilities. One was an advance into the Afghan plateau. The other was the fulfillment of that old dream of trade through the mountains. The Bolan Pass, he

[31]Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 133.

[32]Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 140.

[33]Quoted in H. T. Lambrick, *John Jacob of Jacobabad*, London: Cassell, 1960, p. 170.

[34]*Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Provincial Series: *Baluchistan*, Calcutta: 1908.

[35]Shand, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-54.

believed, was "the natural outlet to the ocean of the commerce of a very large portion of Central Asia."[36]

These arguments were not acted upon in Jacob's lifetime, but Quetta was finally acquired in 1876 by treaty from the Khan of Kalat. Over the next twenty years more territory was acquired—from Afghanistan, the Khan, and the tribal chiefs in the Zhob river area. This created the peculiar frontier—a narrow stretch of territory under the Government of India that cut off Baluchistan from direct contact with both Afghanistan and the tribal peoples in what was to become the Northwest Frontier Province. This frontier policy, which Jacob had initiated, determined the location of the northwestern boundary by the Government of India at a later period. In the 1860s, its general location seemed to be an open question. Where was the best stopping place? The left bank of the Indus? The foot of the hills beyond the Indus? Some point within the mountains? Or, as many insisted, a line on the far edge of the Afghan plateau? In fact, the options were not as open as they seemed. The conquest of Sind had foreclosed the possibility of the Indus as the frontier; the movement into the Baluchi hills made it unlikely that the line would stop at the foothills at any point along the northwestern ranges. And the first Afghan war had shown how difficult, if not impossible, it would be to maintain Indian hegemony, after the Mughal fashion, over the Afghan plateau.

Baluchistan thus became part of the peculiar frontier structure of the Indian Empire—the second frontier, the unadministered territory between the boundary of administration that defined Sind and, eventually, the Durand Line, the delimited and demarcated boundary with Afghanistan. It was, on the whole, a satisfactory solution for the needs of the Government of India in the nineteenth century. Even in the areas directly administered, the Government's aims were fairly rigorously limited to the classic concerns of Law and Order; at the most, social amelioration, not social change, was desired. The imperial legacy in the area apparently did not produce undue strains in the first twenty-five years of Pakistan's independence. But when, in 1971, the new Government asserted, in effect, control over the area of indirect administration, strains were inevitable. The analogous case in

[36]Lambrick, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

India had come very soon after Independence, when the new Government moved to integrate the North East Frontier Agency into the general structure of administration, with the tribal peoples fiercely resisting the attempt. In this issue, the assertion of new claims, aimed at radical alteration of the social and political patterns inherited from the imperial power, the successor state faces questions of morality and legitimacy that are seldom discussed, perhaps because they are scarcely understood.

The popular belief that modern, nationalist governments in the subcontinent are markedly different from their imperial predecessor in their concern for their people is a pious fiction, not substantiated by facts; where they differ radically is in their commitment, however haltingly it may be practised, to social change. The political arrangements for an unadministered frontier, while suited to the limited social aims of the imperial power, which was in possession of the whole subcontinent, were dysfunctional for a national state basing its legitimacy on an identity of territorial sovereignty and nationality. The argument for the dismantling of the old social and political structures is derived from the most potent sources of political legitimization: necessity for survival coupled with the possession of power. These were ironically the same reasons for the creation of these political structures in the nineteenth century by the imperial power.

The Legacy of Foreign Policy

The other aspect of the imperial legacy that has special relevance for Pakistan has to do with the foreign policy of the Government of India in the nineteenth century. Here the connection is less direct than is the case with the frontier structure, with the primary legatee being not Pakistan, but India. The result has been that Pakistan has been affected by the imperial legacy in foreign policy, as mediated through the new Government of India.

The thesis being put forward here is less amenable to documentation than the one in regard to frontier structures, and requires fuller explication than space permits.[37] Essentially, the main

[37]This theme is expanded in Ainslie T. Embree, "The Diplomacy of Dependency: Content and Style in Nineteenth Century Foreign Relations in India," a paper given at the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, Conference on Leadership in South Asia, 26-29 March 1974,

argument is that the foreign policy of the Government of India in the nineteenth century was that which would have been followed by any strong government securely based in the subcontinent, and free to make use of its resources to express this power without serious challenge from any of its neighbors.

Two general characteristics of that foreign policy can fairly easily be identified. One can be labelled "expansionism," a tendency to move outward from the original base in Bengal until all the subcontinent was brought under the influence of the Government of India. In the nineteenth century only two other countries, Russia and the United States of America, experienced aggrandizement of contiguous territory on a similar scale. The motivations for this expansion of the Indian Empire were complex, but perhaps can best be summed up under the rubric: "The search for a land frontier."

As noted above, this search had led to ever deeper penetration into the northwest. What was needed was some boundary that would effectively define political control and make defense possible. This was what Sir Thomas Holdich, the explorer and analyst of the northwest mountains, had in mind when he insisted that racial, cultural, and linguistic divisions were not of primary importance in considering where national boundaries should be drawn. Peace could only be assured by a boundary that put "a definite edge to the national political horizon, so as to limit unauthorized expansion and trespass."[38] But the creation of the three-fold frontier demonstrated how complex a problem it was to find such a political horizon. Somewhat paradoxically, the very search for a stable frontier was linked with expansionism in all the three kinds of frontiers that defined the subcontinent's political reality.

The other characteristic of the foreign policy of the Government of India in the nineteenth century follows logically from the first: an unwillingness to permit genuinely independent countries to exist on the borders of the territory actually administered. This does not often find explicit articulation in official documents, but its reality is attested by the three-fold frontier, and, most undeniably, by wars and annexations. The explication of this assertion is, in effect, the history of the foreign policy of

[38]Sir Thomas Holdich, *Political Frontiers and Border Making*, London; Macmillan, 1916, p. x.

the former Government of India. It is especially the history of the creation of the third frontier zone, the Frontier of Separation. Relations with Afghanistan, with Nepal, at an early period with Assam, and with Burma, can all be understood as refusals by the old imperial government to acknowledge the genuine sovereignty of neighboring states, including their right of establishing relations with third countries. The cost of survival for Nepal was a hundred years of secluded introversion, while Burma was unable to find a formula.

The suggestion made here is that these two thrusts of nineteenth century policy—expansionism and suspicion of neighbors' sovereignty—form part of the imperial legacy of the present Government of India. To suggest, even tentatively, that they have determined to a considerable extent the foreign policy of the post-Independence Government of India, and hence have greatly affected Pakistan, may appear to be a tendentious statement with biased judgemental overtones. It is not so intended, but only to argue that the continuities of history are not easily altered. Statues of former imperial rulers may be removed and streets may be renamed, but the basis of political power, linked with geographic, economic, and social realities, cannot be so easily denied. It is often said that India has never accepted the permanence, or the necessity, of Pakistan, and that this ideological position, deeply rooted in primordial religious and cultural emotions, has resulted in a hostile relationship between the two countries. Without denying the validity of this interpretation, it can be urged that the importance of the immediate imperial legacy in defining the characteristic behavior of the dominant power of the subcontinent towards its neighbors should be given considerable weight in seeking to understand the pattern of development of foreign policy in the area.

For Pakistan, then, the imperial legacy in foreign policy is a dual one. It inherited the three-fold frontier, with Baluchistan demonstrating in a dramatic form the problems of integrating a relatively autonomous cultural region into a nation-state. The difficulties of such an integration have been compounded by the fact that they had been postponed for a century by the peculiar political arrangements created in the mid-nineteenth century. The other aspect of the imperial legacy, the Indian inheritance in foreign policy, has had more momentous consequences in the past

two decades, but possibly now has spent itself as a political reality. In any case, the "new" state of Pakistan, for better for worse, lives with realities that link it with the great transformation of politics that took place in the subcontinent in the mid-nineteenth century.

THE SEGMENTARY LINEAGE SYSTEM: ITS APPLICABILITY TO PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL STRUCTURE

CHARLES LINDHOLM

Emerging trends in politics generally and in leadership styles in particular cannot be understood without an appreciation of underlying social structures. Accordingly, in considering Pakistan's problem of dealing constructively with its frontier peoples, it will be helpful to look at the ways Pakistan's border tribes associate together in what anthropologists call a "segmentary lineage system." Such a system has within it characteristic patterns of interaction of leadership strategies and of relationships of group hostility and cooperation. Typically, mutual suspicion is high, with patron-client groups regarding each other jealously, and insisting on being dealt with as equals. In general a leader is a balancer of these contending groups and is unable to provide lasting shape and direction to all the groups' activities. These underlying social characteristics pose special problems for those concerned with developing closer and more harmonious ties between frontier provinces and the rest of the country.

In this paper, the "segmentary lineage system" is first characterized as a model in anthropological literature and then a few observations are made concerning this model's applicability and relevance to specific Pakistani political forms.

Definition of the System

Segmentary societies are a subtype of what are technically known as "acephelous" or headless societies. Such leaderless societies, which exist in profusion around the world, appear to have no internal hierarchies. Many were easily conquered by colonial powers, but others were able to organize resistance, despite the apparent absence of political infrastructure,

Organization by kinship, not by political hierarchies. Anthropological research has revealed that some acephelous peoples did have an internal principle of organization, but this did not involve stratification and rank. Organization was based on an ideology of kinship which stated that near relatives should unite in disputes with more distant relatives. Brothers should aid brothers against cousins, while brothers and first-degree cousins should act together in disagreements with cousins of the second degree. Since it looks back to the mythical founding father of the group, thus allowing the congeries of ideological relatives to unite in opposition to outside forces, unilineal descent is a prerequisite for this system. Tracing ancestors through only one line (generally the male) keeps the patterns of relationship unambiguous. Each individual in the system knows or can discover his exact geneological distance from every other individual. By knowing geneological distance, he also knows his political obligations. This is the ideological model of segmentary society; in real life the model is manipulated and kinship may be forgotten or remembered according to needs of the moment. A close relative, for instance, who has moved to a distant territory would eventually be forgotten, while a nonrelative living nearby might eventually be accepted as a long-lost kinsman. Furthermore, a relative who is a troublemaker might be repudiated, but a kin relationship might he manufactured with an individual who is economically well off. Nonetheless, manipulations always remain within the frame of the ideological model.

Implications of the segmentary kinship model. Certain properties are inherent within this system. First, alliances can only occur negatively in reaction to external threats. Secondly, quarrels within the group will tend strongly towards stalemate, since the segments involved will generally be approximately equal in size. Thirdly, since the whole society can potentially unite against outsiders, it may become an expanding system, defeating, incorporating and/or enslaving neighboring groups which lack the capacity for unified opposition (Sahlins, 1961).

The final implicit feature of the segmentary system is the lack of means for ending conflict. Once fighting has begun, the numerical equality of the opponents prohibits a severe defeat. Without the imposition of external authority to stop fighting, one would expect segmentary society to be weakened by continuous internal

quasi-guerilla warfare. This dilemma is often answered by the emergence of hereditary lineages of mediators. Such men are believed to have inherited ability to communicate with the spirit world. As holy men, they are called upon to mediate between feuding segments. Their arbitration, however, is not binding, and they have no special secular power. Evans-Pritchard's definition of the mediator is typically succinct. "We regard [the mediators] as a category of ritual experts and do not consider that they comprise in any way a class or rank. We believe their social function to be a mechanism by which the equilibrium of the political system is maintained through the institution of the feud" (1940 : 174). These are the characteristics of the segmentary society in its simplest formal operation.

Evolution of the System

The forbidding boundary regions of many Islamic states form a temporal enclave in which the evolution of the segmentary system may be viewed. Difficulty of terrain, fierce inhabitants, easy defense and the poverty of plunder, all combined to keep the border regions free from control by a centralized state until comparatively recent times. Even today boundary control is problematic in many Islamic nations.

Two types of adaption have been made to the boundary regions. Some of the inhabitants are nomadic herdsmen, others are agriculturalists. In reality, there is a continuum of activity between these two ideal types. For the sake of brevity, the intermediate conditions will be ignored and discussion will deal only with the extremes of the spectrum, i.e., pastoralism and farming as pure types.

Nomadic people follow the pattern of patrilineal segmentary society described in the model with the added variation of father's brother's daughter marriage. This unique marriage form keeps alliances within the groups of co-resident families. Pervasive mistrust of outsiders prevails in nomad camps, and a woman from outside is feared as a potential traitor. But this marriage form also delineates possible lines of schism within the group, for a man who has married his partilineal cousin may have to choose between the obligations he has as an ally to his uncle, and those he has by blood with his brothers. As an ally,

he may break off the alliance, for the iron link of kinship takes precedence over the flexible link of alliance. Such flexibility is adaptive in an ecological condition which allows for dissident elements to be easily hived off. Despite the fragmentation of nomadic society, a geneological charter is maintained, and the group can easily unite in segmentary fashion due to the mobility of the members who can quickly ride to the point of conflict.

The farmer operates under a different set of circumstances. Tied to his land, he cannot withdraw from his neighbors and kinsmen. His work stabilizes him spatially and forces him to relate to those nearby. His kinship system may be cognatic, and trace descent through both matrilineal and patrilineal lines in order to maximize kinship links. Father's brother's daughter marriage does occur among settled Islamic peoples, but Barth's data on Kurdistan and Swat indicates that the proportion is lower than among nomads of the same region (1953, 1959). If the farmer has a cognatic social structure it means that each person has a cone of kinsmen which overlaps with the kin of his neighbors. These mutual relatives will seek to mediate disputes, thus eliminating the need for a special lineage. Cognatic societies also lack the ideology of a common descent which results in a relative inability to unite against outside aggression since there is no conceptual basis for unification. Segmentary societies will therefore tend to conquer cognatic societies, all else being equal.

Some agriculturalists, however, do have a segmentary system, but nonetheless the ecological space limitation of the farmer prevents him from living up to the segmentary ideal with the alacrity of the nomad. The nomad can bring his livelihood with him to battle, but the farmer must abandon his land if he wishes to fight the enemy of a distant cousin. Segmentary nomads will therefore tend to conquer segmentary agriculturalists.

The historical result of these tendencies is the conquest of farming communities by nomads and the beginning of a class society. The senior line of the nomads, formerly first among equals in relation to its fellows, will now become an autocratic ruling elite over the span of a few generations. At first, the lineage mates of the senior line will retain their ideology of equality, but, as the senior line becomes more cognatic and spreads its lineage net to other ruling lines, and as the senior line accumulates a

surplus of wealth through exploitation of the peasant class, the position of the other lines becomes subordinate. This process is illustrated by several contemporary ethnographies (Spooner, 1969; Rosman and Rubel, 1975; Ferdinand, 1962).

In a very real sense, these modern studies pay homage to the great Muslim philosopher of history, Ibn Khaldun, who first described the process of cyclical movement in Arab dynasties. According to Ibn Khaldun, the nomadic Bedouin tribesmen united group feeling, "which means mutual affection and willingness to fight and die for each other" with religious zeal, "which does away with mutual jealousy and envy among people who share in a group feeling" to conquer the corrupt sedentary dynasties (1958 : III, 1 and 5). At first, the new dynasty is strong, because "the ruler does not claim anything exclusively for himself to the exclusion of his people, because [such an attitude] is what is required by group feeling, [and it was group feeling] that gave superiority [to the dynasty] and [group feeling] still continues to exist as before" (1958 : III, 15). But the softness of city living erodes the community of tribesmen. The leader, who formerly shared all goods in the manner of the segmentary Bedouin "becomes too proud to let others share in his leadership and control... thus the aspirations of the various group feelings are blunted." This inexorable tendency away from the tribal model and toward centralization in the person of the King leads eventually to a final stage of "waste and squandering . . . in this stage the dynasty is seized by senility and the chronic disease from which it can hardly ever rid itself and, eventually, it is destroyed" (1958 : III, 10).

The only hope Ibn Khaldun saw for escaping the sequence of conquest, decay and destruction was the arrival of the Prophet. But the advent of Mohammad did not end the cycle; rather, the ideology of the conquering tribes typically became an ideology of purification of the faith. The transformation of the Prophet into the warleader and thence into King is a common theme which runs throughout segmentary society, especially in confrontation with a state society, as Ibn Khaldun pointed out. Six hundred years later, the analysis of this great theorist of history, is still very persuasive, although the rise of the nation state and democracy in government have altered the variables.

This description of a model of segmentary society and its evolution into a class system is, of course, an ideal representation.

The next step is to apply the model to real cases to see how well it fits.

Application of the Model

The Valley of Swat, in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan, provides an exceptionally well documented, though somewhat aberrant, case study. Fredrik Barth, the well known Norwegian ethnologist and theorist, has written extensively on the region (1956, 1959, 1960). His work has been criticized by A. Ahmad (1976), M.T. Ahmad (1962) and Talal Asad (1972). We also have available in English the autobiography of the founder of Swat State (1963), thus allowing rare insight into the main actor's view of rapid change.

In the fashion described by Ibn Khaldun, the Valley was occupied by the Yusufzai group around 1515 A.D. with the indigenous population becoming tenant farmers. If the model were to be followed, within a few generations a ruling elite would have appeared which would dominate the rest of the Yusufzai. This eventuality was forestalled, however, for four hundred years by the inauguration of periodic land redistribution among the lineage segments. This policy, called *wesh*, prevented the segments from developing a land base and kept alive the nomadic kinship ideology as each segment struggled for its share in redistribution. Lacking a power base and a central authority the lineages relied on the segmentary system to pull them together into balanced units of opposition.

Despite the retention of a semi-nomadic life style, the new environment had inevitable repercussions. Space limitations and a farming economy meant that factions could no longer simply hive off. Instead, the *wesh* necessitated consolidation to compete with neighboring opponents. Two or three clans generally united under an elected leader. This individual had considerably more power than a traditional nomadic leader. His main job was to keep up the fighting potential of his group, and often an underpopulated group actively recruited new members by outright gifts of land right. Since the leader controlled these gifts, he could exercise considerable power of reward and punishment. He also was utilized as an arbitrator within the group.

Father's brother's daughter marriage almost disappeared.

Close male relatives were now in direct confrontation with no possibility of simply hiving off, as occurred in nomadic environments. Parallel cousins (father's brother's son) became the main symbolic rivals within the culture as they fought over the inheritance of the paternal grandfather. Today, the word for this relationship, *tarbur*, is synonymous with enemy. Since *tarburi* are neighbors, they usually ally with their neighbor's neighbor on the ancient principle of "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." This principle finds its origin in the doctrine of Kautilya, the classical exponent of Indian political theory: "That which encircles [the King] on all sides and prevails in the territory which is immediately adjacent to his is the constituent of the circle of states known as the enemy. Similarly, that which prevails in the territory which is separated from [the King's] territory by one [namely, by the enemy's territory] is the constituent known as friend" (1923 : VI, 2).

This principle of alliance, when acted upon, has a strong tendency to create two opposing blocs within a group on the pattern of a checkerboard. Internal opposition presses towards eventual fissioning. This splitting process, however, is offset in numerically weak groups by the fear that a split would mean absorption by stronger rivals. Tension is natural between neighbors, but it is negated on tactical grounds. This follows the segmentary rule of unification in opposition and the tendency toward equality of opponents. Kautilya also discussed this strategy: " . . . in the absence of an [ally], one should ingratiate oneself with one's neighboring enemy . . . a powerless king should behave as a conquered king toward his enemy" (1923 : VII, 1).

The shift in production technique thus allowed the rise of autocratic clan leaders and forced the unification of segments into more cohesive groups. Membership in the clan could now be sold in return for military support. The relationship between close male relatives became tense. Yet beneath these changes the paradigm remains unchanged. The autocratic leader does not hold an hereditary office. He depends on consensus as did his nomadic predecessor. Newcomers into the lineage become patrilineal kinsmen through manipulation of geneological memory. Tarburi still unite against opponents if the occasion demands. The social structure continues to be based on opposition of equals, exacerbated by the forced proximity of the oppos-

ing elements and the *wesh* system.

This structure stands in need of a mediating element which is supplied by the class of *Stanadars*, who are holy either by descent from the Prophet (*Sayyids*) or by personal learning, austerity and miracle working (*Akhunds*) (see A. Ahmad). Their lands were on the border zone between the units of *wesh*, thus creating a buffer area between rivals. They were also given land as gifts and as bribes. Their land was not subject to redistribution, and Saints developed personal followings from their land base. The *baraka* of the Saint (holy power, resembling the Polynesian category of *Mana*) was considered hereditary, though some sons were more Saintly than others. *Baraka* showed itself only in action. A Saint with many clients, known for his generosity and fairness, and with a large land base therefore had great *baraka*. As the mediator class, Saints were expected to pursue a holy life, avoid fighting, ostentation, and secular power. Despite these prohibitions, it was a man of Saintly lineage who united Swat after four hundred years of "ordered anarchy."

Badsah Sahib was the grandson of a revered Swati Saint, Saidu Baba, who was born in 1794 of poor non-Pathan peasant parents. Saidu Baba left his home as a young man and studied with a Sufi order. He then retired from the world and lived as a recluse for twelve years, subsisting only on bitter bread. This severe discipline won him the title of *Akhund* so that he was beseiged with pilgrims when he returned to Swat. Naturally, a holy man of such great repute was in demand as a mediator. His position was improved by the encroachments of the British, who were threatening the border region. Saidu Baba called together the lineage leaders and warned them that they must unite against this external opponent. This appeal was successful, and his candidate was named the leader of the confederation. Saidu Baba was asked to lead himself, but reportedly refused. This is quite in line with his structural position as arbitrator which prohibits the holder from taking political power on pain of losing *baraka*. If the mediator is a participant in a secular power struggle, then his ability to mediate is forfeit. However, Saidu Baba provided the locus for the Swati army, which defeated the British in 1863.

After Saidu Baba's death, his role was taken by Miangul, the younger of his sons, who lived up to the austere ideal of Saintly behavior. He became the mediator for all disputes, but he could

not be considered a secular leader since his word was accepted by consensus, based on his *baraka* and saintly demeanor. His position was certainly aided by continued British pressure on the region.

When the younger son died, Swat again disintegrated into factionalism. Eventually, Badshah Sahib, the eldest son of Miangul, killed his two parallel cousins to emerge as the heir apparent. He fought many battles with his younger brother before uniting with him against the invasion of the Nawab of Dir. In this fight, the younger brother was killed, leaving the Badshah alone as the inheritor of Saidu Baba's great *baraka*. Unlike his predecessors, Badshah Sahib explicitly denied that he had any Saintly powers. Yet his conduct was simple and exemplary in the traditional manner of the Saint. His miraculous escapes and victories and his own sense of destiny made him appear more than human to his following. His insistence on denying his Sainthood allowed him to avoid the dilemma of Saidu Baba, who could not assume power because of his religious role. By denying his *baraka*, Badshah Sahib cleared the way ideologically for his transformation of Swat into a centralized state under his own personal authority. Aside from his own close relatives, the Badshah's major opponents on his rise to power were not landlords, but other religious leaders, who had personal followings of landlord factions. The landlords themselves were unable to organize opposition to the Badshah without a religious leader to unite them. Mutual mistrust, the lack of a personal peasant following and most especially, the lack of a legitimized hierarchy, combined to keep the landlords divided and unable to produce independent leadership from their own class.

Badshah Sahib had great positional strength as Saidu Baba's successor, and he parlayed this into power through adroit generalship, diplomatic skill and good luck, combined with the society's structural need for a centralized organization to oppose the continued aggression of the British and their allies, the neighboring princely states. His first act on assuming power was to exile all Saints not holding property, thus eliminating the class which had given rise to his own grandfather. He then stopped the *wesh*, undercutting the power of the clan leaders who had derived their strength from their function of coordinating land redistribution. This did not eliminate the clan leaders. According to Ahmad,

the clan leader "seems to have adopted the methods of his counterpart, the landlord in the Panjab plains. He maintains his influence by keeping the more important officials pleased with him. . . .This enables him to help his men even if they are in the wrong and thereby to have a group of staunch supporters" (1962: 45). The clan leaders now are reliant on the favors of the bureaucracy for their position. The Badshah's close ties with the emerging Pakistani government and his judicious use of modern technology also were vital factors in consolidating his gains.

The evolution of Swat is a very well-documented case. It is not perhaps the most representative case, but the anomalies of the region are offset by the quality of the data available. Certainly Swat and its companion states of Dir and Chitral form a special enclave in the frontier region due to their particular ecological and political setting. The basic model outlined here has, however, been successfully applied to many different tribal Moslem societies analogous in their setting to the high mountain Pathans and to the desert Baluch and Brahui. These studies include work on the Sanusi of Cyrenaica, documented by Evans-Pritchard (1949), the Kurds of Iraq, documented by Barth (1953), and the Berber of Morocco, documented by Montagne (1973) and Gellner (1969a, 1969b). Many other studies could also be cited to show the applicability of the model beyond the confines of Swat to other societies based on a segmentary ideology. Use of the Swat situation as an illustration is felicitous in one particular respect. The Swat region with its economy of stable farms and landlord patrons closely resembles the economy of the Pakistani "mainstream," thus allowing a certain ease of comparison which would be impossible if the analysis had been of a society of nomads, oasis dwellers, or egalitarian subsistence agriculturalists.

To restate, the basic outline seen in Swat shows an egalitarian, segmentary stratum ruling over a peasant base with a religiously sanctioned mediating force which develops into secular leadership in confrontation with a state. The problem to be faced now is the relation of this model to the state system itself.

The Mughal Empire as Segmentary State

The border areas which pose problems for Pakistan's national integration had retained their egalitarian, segmentary character

throughout the period of Mughal rule. This paper does not have scope to deal with the historical permutations of politics as the Turko-Persian mode engaged in a dialectic with the segmentary and egalitarian Afghan-Mongol mode (Khan, 1959), but, a quick resumé of the practices of the Mughal Empire can provide insight into both the transformation of the segmentary system and the persistence of segmentary structure.

The Mughals came to power in 1526 by defeating the Afghan chieftains who controlled the remnants of the Delhi Sultanate. For the Afghans the Sultan was "a primus inter pares, occupying no inaccessible or sacrosanct position" (Saran, 1941 : 34) and this, indeed, was also the ideology of the Mughals. Babur was followed only for his successes and he was abandoned when he failed. Sher Shah, the Afghan chief, managed to rally opposition to the Mughals and oust them from Delhi, but he accomplished this by acquiescing on the Afghan ideal of equality between segments. "The Afghan polity was based on the conception of the Kingdom being tribal property... this system was not the least altered or modified by Sher Shah" (Saran: 62). Calling on his fellow tribesmen to unite in opposition to the invader, he took the position of mediator. "He was constantly reminding his Afghans that it had been their feuds and quarrels which had brought about their downfall, and really did succeed in arranging that, when they had a private quarrel, they did not start a private war, as they used to do, but applied to him for a settlement of the disagreement" (Prawdin, 1963 : 118). It is quite possible that the Afghans might have staved off the Mughals indefinitely had not Sher Shah's successor (chosen by Afghan nobles) alienated the tribesmen with his pretensions of superiority.

Once the Mughals recaptured Delhi, Akbar attempted to break the power of his own chiefs and transcend the boundaries of the segmentary system, by entrusting local Rajputs with powerful positions and making them his personal dependents. His abortive attempt to institute a state religion was related to his aim, as was his use of an administrative apparatus, inherited from Sher Shah, which concentrated all decision-making power at the center. "There was no branch of the administration which did not receive his attention," even though, "he had to keep in mind the feelings of his servants" (Qureshi: 1966 : 40 and 101). According to Saran, the Mughal government had almost no authority over the states

and their administrators and "any interference on Akbar's part would have been resented as an encroachment on their rights and privileges... all [the states] possessed full internal powers" (129-130). Thus, despite the concentration of decision-making power on the King, the states, as co-equal segmentary blocs, ran by themselves. The job of the King was essentially to mediate, dispense justice, protect the innocent and prosecute the corrupt. "For rulers worship consists in the dispensation of justice and the improvement of the realm" (Akbar, 1894 : 253).

Thus, even at its peak, the Empire had its roots in the concepts of the egalitarian society from which it had sprung. These roots are clearly revealed in the pact Humayun had signed with his followers, in which he agreed to accept the advice of the nobility without fail. They, in return, swore loyalty. Only through specifically giving up all kingly prerogatives was Humayun able to hold the fidelity of his men and eventually to defeat his rebel brother, Kamran, thus securing a base for the reconquest of India (Prawdin: 113).

The concept of the God-King, the absolute ruler, which Akbar promoted, was an attempt to break through the limitations of Humayun's pact and the segmentary mode. He was certainly inspired by the autocratic, centralized political structures of Turkey and Persia. But this type of polity can only reach its full flower when scarce resources are easily controlled. The scattered and sparse resources of Afghanistan were not susceptible to the Persian mode, and India also proved resistant to the centralized control of resources.

The persistence of the segmentary style may be seen in the continuation of the mansabdari system as the mechanism for governing the Mughal conquests in India and recruiting an army. This system, founded originally by Sher Shah, made all state officials responsible for training and equipping a private army drawn from the peasantry of the jagirs which the officials administrated. In the mansabdari system the rank of the officers was defined in terms of the number of soldiers produced (Aziz: 1945). Thus the army was a segmentary bureaucracy of separate but equal units, each under a personal leader. "It was a sort of compromise between tribal chieftainship and the feudal system of levying troops" (Srivastava, 1957: 102). Further evidence may be seen in the Mughal administrative system of opposing bureaucratic

functions (the financial, with the Wazir as head, balanced by the military, led by the Bakhshi), the system of shifting capitals and continuous travel by the court, and so forth.

Meanwhile, on the local level, a strict system of taxes extracted huge surpluses from the peasantry. Internally, the village continued to be self-regulating and was interfered with only when taxes were remiss or in cases of brigandage. The government bureaucracy, with its conspicuous consumption, was sharply differentiatted from the peasantry, and expenditure proliferated as the system expanded to accommodate new nobility and court appointees. The necessity for conquest to provide new revenues for operation overextended the Empire, leading eventually to internal revolts and the "senility" discussed by Ibn Khaldun.

The weakened state of the Empire facilitated the Western colonial encroachments. As the Mughals collapsed, the segmentary mode reasserted itself in an unmasked form as equal elements warred with one another. After the British takeover, the structure was again disguised beneath a national political system, but it continues to exist in all its essentials into the present, including the emphasis on the personal mediator-leader and the concommitant problem of succession.

Application of the Model in Modern Pakistan

Though the reality of power in lowland agrarian Pakistan is in land, people associated together for action on the basis of a segmentary kinship ideology. The main unit of action is the *baradari*, which "includes all persons related by blood through the male line for about five or six generations" (Wilber, 1964 : 123). Allies become fictive kinsmen. *Baradari* is also used to designate, in general terms, class groupings. As in tribal regions, *baradari* tend to line up against one another on a segmentary basis. Villages are often divided between equal warring factions. "Not infrequently, the rivalry is so intense that the situation resembles a feud, each side going about prepared for assault and even carrying arms for 'defense' " (Wilber : 147). For a more peaceful picture of segmentary Panjabi peasant society, see Eglar (1960). Like the Swati Khans, the Panjabi landlords attempt to gain new followers by providing hospitality and showing strength and pride (*izzet*).

This is not to say that the Panjab is exactly like Swat. On the

contrary, the cognatic tendency of Swat has been carried much farther in the Panjab, with most marriages being outside the village, parallel cousin marriage rare, and the word for mother's brother a term of endearment. Unlike Swat, the Panjabis have long been settled on the land, and the landlords have a standing army of peasant dependants to call upon in times of trouble. Thus the forces mobilized in opposition will not only be co-equals, but also the many dependents of each segmentary elite. Opposition has assumed a class character as all elements of the rural society are compelled to mobilize to protect the personal interests of the landlord. This process is certainly occurring in Swat as well, now that the *wesh* has been eliminated. Despite these developments, the Panjabi pattern remains one of segmentary opposition, if the positions of faction leaders are the only ones considered.

Like all segmentary systems, this system needs arbitrators. The Saintly mediators of the tribal era have been replaced by another hierarchical structure which fulfills exactly the same function, that is, the bureaucracy. Disputants look to the bureaucracy and through the bureaucracy to the Great Patron who stands at the end of every line of influence. Like the Saint, the government will arbitrate. And if one bureaucrat does not reach a satisfactory decision, then another will be sought who is closer to the source of "justice."

Modernization does not break this system down. Rather it simply adds new elements which are capable of mediating. Hamza Alavi, the Marxist theorist, has noted the peculiar quality of the post-colonial state: "The state is relatively autonomous and it mediates the competing interests of the three propertied classes—the metropolitan bourgeoisies, the indigenous bourgeois, and the landed classes—while at the same time acting on behalf of all of them in order to preserve the social order in which their interests are embedded" (1973: 148). He attributes this autonomous mediating function to the interference of the British, who allegedly overdeveloped the bureaucracy in relation to the economic base. But the intrusive hierarchy is not an external imposition. It is a modern version of the traditional mediating class only slightly camouflaged by western trappings. The state in a segmentary society has always been "relatively autonomous" in the sense that it rests upon a base of opposing elites and not upon the masses

and in the sense that any mediating body must be autonomous in order to maintain its structural position.

The wedding of the bureaucracy and the military also may be illuminated by structural analysis of the segmentary society. As has been shown, Saints and mediators gained secular power by the organization of a jihad against the corrupt center. This historical cycle united the Saintly bureaucrat and the military general into a single individual. Prior to colonial inroads, the bureaucracy and military were one, with the civil and executive departments of the Mughals regulated by means of a military organization (Saran : 168). Qureshi has argued that "the Mughal [military] government can be defined only as a bureaucracy" (102). Colonialism turned this unity into a duality to protect itself. In postcolonial times the underlying pattern has re-emerged in the persons of Ayub Khan and, less obviously, in his successor, Zulfiqar Bhutto.

Before looking at the careers of these two men, it is important to clarify terms. Our usage of the term "mediator" implies a structural position within a segmentary society. This term does *not* account for the personality of the individual holding the office, nor does it predict his every activity. The history of segmentary society shows strong individuals striving to break the boundaries of segmentary opposition and impose their own will upon the competing elements. But, as long as the basic premises of the structure are not altered, this personal struggle can bring only temporary success in the establishment of short-lived dynasties. Segmentary ideology and the segmentary political structure impose constraints which the leader may struggle against (given an appropriate personality and setting) but which he may not transcend. Here again, our theory has been anticipated in the dialectic of Ibn Khaldun. When Pakistani leaders are discussed in terms of *structural* qualifications for office and in terms of structural constraints on their activity, it is not to suggest that the person equals the position; rather, the point is that the position *limits* the person.

When General Ayub Khan took power in Pakistan, he was generally welcomed with gratitude. Many in the elite were tired of the party and communal factionalism which had culminated in the death of the deputy speaker of the East Wing's Provincial Assembly. According to Herbert Feldman, "When Ayub Khan . . .

assumed office, not a single dissentient voice was heard.... In the genuine and nationwide sense of relief felt in those days of political turmoil and unrest, the welcome offered to Ayub Khan was virtually total and utterly sincere" (1972 : 296). Ayub was seen as "a colossus of justice bestriding the corrupt world of Pakistan" (Sayeed, 1967: 94).

Shils (1962) and others have argued that the military often is obliged to take over third world countries in order to prevent national disintegration. In this theory, the army is viewed as the only truly national entity capable of integrating the new state. This argument has little validity in Pakistan. As Jahan has shown, the military elite which took power in 1958 "was far less national than the political elite in its recruitment pattern... during the civilian regime both policy makers and the support groups were more nationally recruited" (1970: 283-85).

Wilcox claimed that "the lack of a leader *in the central position of authority* created the illusion of a power vacuum which General Ayub could claim was his by default" (mimeo : 38). But this does not resolve the problem of why Pakistanis greeted a dictatorship with cheers instead of protesting until elections were held—especially since the elections would certainly have installed a government more national in character and perhaps forestalled the communal violence which was later to divide the nation. Further, why should the absence of an obvious central leader cause such panic among Pakistani elites that they would accept a dictatorship?

These questions, which recur in discussions of other third world states, are often answered by reference to the lack of institutions in the new nation, which leads to a focus on a central, charismatic, patriarchal figure as a transitional unifying element. Loyalty to the leader can silence factionalism. "Personal relationships are at the heart of loyalty and motivation; formal political institutions which are not well established count for relatively little" (Wriggins, 1969: 242). Ayub Khan is interesting because he does not appear to have the element of charisma as it is usually understood. Some observers, in fact, have seen him as the very converse of charismatic. Wriggins, for example, characterizes Ayub's regime as "deadly dull" (1969 : 187). He did have a certain following, based on his ability to negotiate arms shipments from the United States, but these followers were certainly not awed by

his personality. Yet Ayub stepped easily into the shoes long vacated by Jinnah, and the factions welcomed him as a savior.

The answers to these anomalies may be found in the model which has been presented. Party politics is distinctly inimical to a system built on a segmentary base. Such a system depends on a stalemate of opposition between many factions, whereas party politics implies at least a temporary victory. Party politics also requires party unity based on bargaining, rewards, and ideological commitment, whereas the segmentary society defines itself by inheritance and "primordial" loyalties.

Ayub also fitted the image of the traditional mediator. Charisma in the Pakistani context is not discontinuous, but rather is ordinary and mundane; not dogmatic, but compromising (Gellner, 1969). The orientation is not towards change but toward stability and a balance of forces. This is the sort of "charisma" manifested by Ayub... the charisma of the mediator.

Ayub assiduously aimed at projecting an image which would suit his conservative role. He promised to go about his work "in a moderate and rational manner" (Ayub Khan, 1967: 79). As Feldman says, Ayub presented himself as "in essence, a conciliator, a man ready to compromise and to come to terms...it had long been evident that he was not a man to press convictions..." (1932: 5). The Pakistani elites hoped that he would mediate their interests and accept donations from all, without favoritism.

Once again, it must be stressed that Ayub's mediator role did not preclude activity on his part. Certainly he had a vision of Pakistan which he tried to implement under the guise of reform. But the major political change of his regime, the "basic democracies" scheme, hardly threatened the status quo. In fact, it gave a pretense of democracy while at the same time keeping real political channels in the hands of the bureaucrats. His economic policies were another matter. These did threaten the elites and contributed to his eventual overthrow.

Besides having the proper image, Ayub also had the important structural advantage of being a native of a boundary area between two important opposing groups. His birthplace was Hazara, where Pathan and Panjabi culture come together in uneasy mixture. As a native of this ambiguous district, Ayub Khan was in the proper "outsider" position to mediate between the tribal and peasant interest. His attempts to overcome this marginal territorial

political base also worked to his detriment, as shall be shown below.

A third vital factor in Ayub's rise to power was his positional strength as head of the army, coupled with his intuitive understanding of the historical role of the bureaucracy. He is quoted as calling the bureaucrats "our children," which would quite literally be true for a tribal arbitrator. Certainly he was immediately prepared to invest the bureaucracy with the major responsibility for running the country and introducing economic change so long as he remained at the center of all lines of communication and patronage. The "congestion at the top" of the Pakistani bureaucracy lamented by Goodnow (1964) is hardly accidental. It coincides with a definite policy stressing high level decisions in order to maintain the authority of the top echelon, especially that of the President. Slowness of decision making is not considered a liability in this system, which is operating for position maintenance, not for efficiency. Putting off decisions is positively valued. A decision eliminates options and is to be avoided in a polity based on temporizing and immobility. Low rank clerks are bribed, not to make decisions, but to pass one buck sooner than another. Bribery is understood in the tradition as payment to the mediator. The well-publicized disciplinary actions against bureaucrats were very likely motivated not by righteous indignation over corruption, but rather were warnings to members of the hierarchy not to take too much responsibility in decision making. The overblown and inefficient bureaucracy fits well with the segmentary structure which rests upon personal arbitration at the center.

Finally, the liberation struggle had also left a legal precedent which aided Ayub. Pakistan, from its inception, had granted extraordinary powers to the center, as evidenced by Jinnah's role as governor-general. In giving himself such power, Jinnah was acting in accordance with segmentary politics with its fear of parties and need for a personal mediator.

If Ayub filled all the structural prerequisites for segmentary "leader," why then did he fall? The general argument given by Ziring (1971), Wilcox (1969), and Jahan (1970) is that lack of progress, social injustice, and national disunity led to his downfall. These reasons certainly appear sufficient, but they are only surface manifestations of deeper contradictions. To understand the underlying causes it is instructive to analyze the nature of the so-

called "mass movement" which ended in Ayub's overthrow.

"Maintenance of the traditional power structure actually reinforced the apathy of the masses" (Ziring: 190). The participants in the mass movement were therefore not the masses. Muneer Ahmad's data (mimeo) shows the demonstrators to have been mainly professionals and para-professionals, students and members of the elite urban middle class who felt they were not getting their due under Ayub. This impression is statistically validated by Burki (mimeo: 1972), who used arrest records to demonstrate that the movement overwhelmingly consisted of disgruntled students and lawyers who felt they were cut off from political influence.

Ayub was vulnerable to such agitation because he had lost his moral position as disinterested arbitrator through his heavy-handed attempts to develop a personal power base. He had allied himself through marriage to several Pathan chiefs, including the Wali of Swat, son of the Badshah, thus discrediting his position as mediator between the Panjabis and Pathans. He had also arranged alliances with newly wealthy industrial families who had enriched themselves through his economic policy. His sons had dropped out of the army to become industrialists in their own right. One son, Captain Gohar Ayub Khan, had managed to amass quickly a fortune of over four million dollars in US currency after his retirement from the army. During this period the rumor was current that Ayub planned to crown Gohar king, thus finalizing the superiority of the Pathan-industrialist combine (Feldman: 306).

By allying himself openly with these two segments of the power structure, Ayub had made a fatal error. He had become identified with certain factions, thus totally compromising his position as mediator. He had overtly given his allegiance to interested parties in a misguided bid to strengthen his own power base.

The situation was exacerbated by other factors. New elites had arisen during the modernization process. Particularly important was the professional class which operated the technology of the "new" Pakistan. But these middle level personnel were oppressed by the generalist bureaucracy which kept an iron grip of its prerogatives. The new elite saw its technical expertise utilized without sufficient recompense in access to channels of power. Ayub, who had already committed himself to the industrialists and the

Pathan landlords, could not cut into the gains of his allies to allow room for these new elites in the segmentary system. Rather, he employed the time honored formula of waiting and hoping that the problem would vanish. But his own position had been too deeply eroded by mistrust to permit the success of a mere delaying action. The new elites, sensing disenchantment among the power blocs, began agitation to bring Ayub down and to install another mediator.

It has been correctly noted that Ayub was deposed by an inner circle of military men who felt that he had lost his capacity to rule. This picture is not, however, an argument against the thesis presented here. In this society the military, in a structural sense, equals the bureaucracy. Both serve the structural function of mediation. Ayub lost his capacity to rule *because* he had compromised his position. If he had not done so, there would have been no reason for his ouster. Naturally, the military did the actual work of booting Ayub from power. Ayub had proven himself to be an inadequate leader of the segmentary military cum bureaucratic Pakistani state. He was replaced by the same institution which had given him birth in the first place.

Many observers of Pakistani politics have noted that violent protest seems necessary to change regimes. The nature of the segmentary society can clarify the causes of these recurrent agitations. As studies of tribal groups have shown, segmentary organizations only coalesce in opposition. The same is true of the Pakistani state, though in this case the opposition is internal. The segmental units can only gather to overthrow the corrupt arbitrator if they are stimulated by violence, which serves as the spark to ignite the warring elements and unite them in violent protest. This violence occurs *not* because of stagnation in the economy and in society; stagnation and stalemate are the valued goals of the leadership and elites of segmentary society. Rather, the "mass movement" only begins when the mediator is viewed as compromised and some elite blocs feel cut off from the channels of influence.

The same system can be seen at work in the election and activities of Zulfiqar Bhutto. As Feroz Ahmad notes, (1973) Prime Minister Bhutto was strongly supported by the very elements which had backed Ayub: the military and the bureaucracy. State capitalism, which is the present administrator's version of socia-

lism, favors the bureaucracy since it places even more economic power in their hands than had Ayub's policies, which favored his allies, the industrialists. Bhutto's call for an "industrial war base" and a "nuclear deterrent" (Bhutto, 1969: 52-53) reassured the military. The ease with which Ayub was abandoned shows the positional rather than the personal nature of Pakistani political leadership. Once he had "betrayed" his position, Ayub inspired no loyalty whatsoever. He was discarded while an adequate replacement was sought.

Not surprisingly, Bhutto was opposed by those who had profited most from Ayub. The big industrialists realized that his victory threatened the breakup of their empires. The tribal regions saw him as the exclusive representative of lowland interests. In the election, however, this opposition was ineffective. The industrialists had no popular base and could not gain allies, and the other blocs looked forward to the dismantling of the industrial empires and a spreading of the spoils. The tribes, in true segmental fashion, split into rival factions which negated one another.

Prime Minister Bhutto's real margin for victory in 1971 came in the Panjab. In this area, the elections proceeded in an interesting way. The large *baradari* lined up in opposition, as usual. However, the younger members of almost all the *baradari* appear to have campaigned for Bhutto, thus making an alliance at a higher level while at the same time maintaining opposition locally (information based on interviews and personal observations—very little has been published on this subject). This operation may not have been a conscious effort on the part of the *baradari* to keep power. Indeed the young men might consider themselves rebels working for a radical cause. The fact of the matter is that the same landlord elements continued to control the elections even though fathers and sons may have opposed one another. The peasants, seeing the "radical" sons opposing their landlord fathers and hearing the radical rhetoric of the PPP's political machine believed, that they could move against the vested interests. They voted overwhelmingly for Bhutto and his party.

After he gained his position, Bhutto acted in accordance with expectations. He stripped the industrialists of power and opened business opportunities for the landlords and bourgeoisie. Some

land reform has been legislated and implemented, but it has been argued that the ceiling is so high that it will not affect a significantly large proportion of cultivated land (Sanderatne, 1974:133).

Within the party, Bhutto continues to hold autocratic control over appointments, with the top positions going to representatives of elite interests. Ahmad (1973) claims that this personal rule is to ensure control over the monied classes, but he forgets that arbitrariness is implicit in Bhutto's role as mediator. The leader must have the power to give or withhold patronage at will in order to avoid becoming aligned too closely with any one faction. Democracy within the party would cut off options, destroying the random quality which is at the core of Bhutto's power. He must continue to play a game of balance, constantly alternating favors with punishment, while at the same time watching to be certain that all lines of communication end with him. Above all, he must remember that he is only a positional and replaceable element within a structure. To imagine himself in control, as did Ayub, would be fatal hubris.

Present Difficulties in the System

The economic problems of Pakistan, after the Bangladesh debacle, are profound, but since they do not directly relate to the thesis being put forward, they may be left aside. Regional communalism, however, does have to do with segmentation in a large sense. Ayub Khan, by virtue of his birth in Hazara, was in a favorable position to mediate between tribal and peasant elites. Prime Minister Bhutto, as a Sindhi, may be seen as a link between the lowland landlords and the urban bourgeoisie. The Sind stands between these two regional entities of plain and town, but it is far from the hills and deserts of the tribesmen. Prime Minister Bhutto *has often been* mistrusted by the tribal elite, who desire autonomy. The center combats this trend by two methods. One is by calling attention to the external enemies of the state in the hope of stimulating a jihad mentality; the other is by playing off one tribal leader against another through judicious shifts in favoritism. But if a strong religio-political leader arises in the tribal area, these measures will be of little avail. The call for a jihad against the center certainly has as much

historical force as a Pakistani jihad against a militarily superior India.

Perhaps the most important threat to the present system is not as spectacular as either economic collapse or war; it is the idea of democracy and the vote. Pakistan's political parties have indulged in radical rhetoric, but the returns for the masses have been negligible as yet. The peasant class is certainly long accustomed to impotence, and if election promises are not fulfilled, the peasants may retreat again into passivity. The segmentary state has no place for the laboring class since it is founded historically on the exploitation of that very class. Thousands of years of rule by overlords has given the cultivators an attitude of natural servility and inferiority, with the elite segments viewed as protectors, not oppressors. Should political rhetoric fail to change reality, the peasant may turn once more to the landlords for protection.

But a vote, even if it is only for a chimera, exercises a powerful psychological effect. The promise is more important than the reality, since the promise is one of self expression. Once the promise has been made, the consciousness of the masses is subtly altered. Stalemate, immobility and oppression will no longer be satisfactory as the peasant begins to understand the possibilities of the ballot. The party system puts a severe strain on the capacities of the segmentary state. Conscious or unconscious subterfuges of the elite, such as the vote splitting by Panjabi landlords, will aim to reconcile the contradiction imposed by the vote. If these subterfuges continue to be successful, the result will be a loss of faith in the possibility of true democracy. Such a loss of faith is the precondition for violentre volution.

The evolution of peasant consciousness is certainly the most important single factor in the future of Pakistan. No one can predict if the course of the future will be chaotic or peaceful. Whatever time may bring, the architects of change must not be misled to believe that shifting of elites is a solution. Even the best of hopes will inevitably be subverted by the endless cycle of dynastic decay which Ibn Khaldun described so clearly. The only change which has a hope of transcending the circulation of elites would be a change at the very base, a demystification of the people to an understanding of community. This means, in turn, a complete destruction of segmentary ideology.

Recapitulation

I have presented a model of segmentary society as illustrated by anthropological fieldwork among acephelous groups. I have presented a very tentative bridge from such societies to a type of modern state. Empirical data at the tribal level appears to validate the model. Since data on the application of the model within the state is nonexistent, rather than attempting to derive the model again, I applied the model of the structure of tribal politics to the best documented level of state politics, the politics of the Presidential Office. My hope is that use of this model clarifies some problems at this macro level and will stimulate further empirical research to either prove or disprove my hypothesis.

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CONTINUITIES IN BORDERLAND POLITICS

STEPHEN RITTENBERG

Modern party politics in the North-West Frontier Province started with the independence movement. Rudimentary elements appeared as early as the pre-World War I decade, but the real beginnings of a sustained, province-wide political system date from the spontaneous popular upsurge following the Peshawar disturbances on 23 April 1930. The nationalist movement left an indelible imprint on the province's public life in the succeeding 17 years, fixing politics into definite patterns which have remained relevant to provincial affairs long after independence. Thus when Yahya Khan reinstituted competitive electoral politics in Pakistan in 1969, what emerged in the NWFP bore a striking resemblance to what had existed during the independence movement. An understanding of present-day politics in the province should begin, therefore, with its pre-1947 antecedents.

It is only natural to expect some continuity since little more than a quarter century has elapsed since the end of the British Raj, but political life in the Frontier Province has shown an unusually high degree of conservatism. The visible manifestations of this can be seen in the basic issues, leadership, and alignments which have emerged since 1969. More fundamentally, these elements reflect enduring structural features in the local society. The traditional socio-political order which molded the nationalist movement still possesses great vitality. The province has not been impervious to change, but the transformation of the old order has not proceeded far enough to put public affairs on a significantly different footing from that prior to 1947.

The following discussion is based on material derived from two sources. The part relating to the pre-1947 period is the

product of research on the independence movement in the NWFP between 1930 and 1947. The observations about post-independence politics are based on impressions formed while pursuing that research in Pakistan in 1973-74. The independence movement remains an alive and vital experience for the province's inhabitants, constantly referred to, both as a historic event and in relation to contemporary affairs, in the press, public meetings, coffee house discussions, and *hujra* (village community centers) conversations. Anyone working on the nationalist movement cannot help but be aware of the continuity in the province's politics for the links to the system opened up in 1969 constantly and forceably intrude on his attention.

Underlying the Frontier's political life is the ethnocentrism of its single largest ethnic group, the Pakhtuns.[1] They perceive of themselves as a separate, unique people. They claim descent from a single ancestor, Qais, alias Abdur Rashid, and are able to prove it to their full satisfaction, with genealogical tables. For the earlier generations, these contain a large fictional element, but they are important because they give order to the Pakhtuns' social organization. There are, as well, various legends which carry the Pakhtuns' distinctive pedigree back to the lost tribes of Israel.

The Pakhtuns are a tribal people, internally differentiated into a hierarchy of units of progressively smaller size from the ethnic group as a whole down to the individual families. Each is a patrilineal descent group theoretically issuing from a single progenitor. Each is related to all others through blood ties as determined by the position of its putative founder in the genealogical pyramid which spreads out from Qais. Unless a person can fit into the descent tables, and Pakhtuns do not generally allow fictive branches to be grafted on to their genealogical tree, he is ethnically speaking beyond the pale.

The Pakhtuns' distinctiveness extends to their institutions, culture, and values. Their tribal organization sets them apart from their Indian neighbors as does their traditional system of politics. The polity, in turn, is related to a unique pattern of

[1]This is the term the people themselves use. It will, therefore, be the term used in this essay even though "Pathan" is the name which appears most commonly in the literature on the Frontier.

traditional land ownership.[2] The Pakhtuns appropriated most of the Frontier by conquest, and with some exceptions, make the land their exclusive possession. Title was held by the individual tribes, with their members entitled to a portion as determined by descent. The right to a share was a prerequisite for participation in the *jirgas* (councils) which were the institutional centers of public life. Two consequences followed from this land system which remain relevant today, even though it has been drastically altered. First, since possession of land was necessary before a man could have a voice in public affairs, it became an essential element in the definition of who was a full-fledged Pakhtun. Secondly, Pakhtuns came to identify a certain area as being collectively their own. They called it *Pakhtunkhwa*. Its boundaries were ill-defined, but the concept did provide a territorial expression to their ethnocentrism. This was reinforced by their separate language and literary traditions, their characteristic customs, and a distinctive code of values called *Pakhtunwali* or simply *Pakhto*. One Pashtu writer has described the last as "the *kalma* [basic tenet of faith] in which are embodied all those things—their national soul, historical greatness and national traditions—which are considered basic and essential to their way of life."[3] Finally, Pakhtuns consider themselves heirs to a unique historical past, one in which they were often pitted against the rest of India.

All these elements have combined to give Pakhtuns a distinctive identity, with a strong sense of ethnic pride. Hand in hand with this has gone an ethnic chauvinism reflected to their feelings of cultural superiority and their prejudices against non-Pakhtuns. These attitudes provided the milieu in which the Frontier Congress, a vigorous Pakhtun party committed to winning political recognition for their ethnic particularism, flourished during the independence movement. Its successor parties, most recently the National Awami Party (NAP), have continued to work toward the same objective since the formation of Pakistan.

[2]The best available description of the Pakhtuns' traditional socio-political organization is Fredrik Barth, *Political Leadership Among Swat Pathans*, London School of Economics Monograph on Social Anthropology, no. 19, London: Athlone Press, 1965.

[3]Qayyamuddin Khadim, *Pakhtunwali*, Kabul: n.p., 1331 A.H., p. 10. (Pashtu translation.)

The most dramatic form of the Pakhtuns' ethnic assertiveness has been the demand for Pakhtunistan, which in Pakistan, means an independent, sovereign state. Individual Pakhtun politicians and splinter parties favored a separate nation throughout the nationalist movement, but the Frontier Congress did not champion that goal until spring 1947. This advocacy of Pakhtunistan by the Congress was a tactical maneuver and, as such, an admission of weakness. By mid-1947 its political pre-eminence in the province had disintegrated, and public opinion had swung heavily in favour of the Muslim League and Pakistan. With its ministry paralyzed by a civil disobedience campaign, the Viceroy concluded that its victory in the 1946 elections was no longer an accurate gauge of political sentiment and that a further test of public opinion was required to decide the province's furture. At the same time, the Indian National Congress leadership was showing signs of deserting it by acquiescing in partition.

Frontier Congress leaders sought to salvage their position by re-emphasizing the basic ethnic impetus behind their party. They attempted to capitalize on the Pakhtuns' parochialism by recasting their party's program in the most extreme form of ethnic nationalism, the demand for an independent state, but by the time Pakhtunistan was adopted on 22 June 1947 as the party's official goal, this had ceased to be a realistic possibility. Lord Mountbatten's partition plan specified that the future of the NWFP would be decided by a referendum limited to the alternatives of Pakistan or India. The Fontier Congress boycotted the vote since it did not include the option of independence. In effect, by espousing Pakhtunistan at this juncture, the party was conceding the inevitability of Pakistan, and was trying to lay the groundwork for its subsequent political revival in the new state. Since independence the Pakhtunistan issue has remained, so far as the dominant strain of the Frontier Congress' successor parties were concerned, less an ideological commitment than a tactical means of regaining political power.

The demand for outright secession has obscured the more basic issue of Pakhtun autonomy, which the nationalist movement first raised and which remains today a crucial question in Frontier politics. The Congress itself had little attraction for Pakhtuns since its character reflected that of Indian groups

from which they felt racially, religiously, and culturally separate. On its own, the party obtained only a tenuous foothold in the Frontier's towns, where it drew its members disproportionately from the province's tiny Hindu and Sikh communities. It acquired its influence in the Frontier only after allying with the Afghan Jirga, an indigenous organization which emerged from the villages of Peshawar Valley in response to Pakhtun grievances and aspirations.

The Afghan Jirga had been started in September 1929, but it was built upon an earlier movement, the Anjuman-i-Islah-ul-Afaghinia, which worked for the social and educational uplift of Pakhtuns. Officially, the "anjuman" abstained from politics, but its leaders vaguely envisaged the reunion of the Frontier with Afghanistan into a greater Pakhtun homeland. They frequently spoke of Pakhtuns and Afghans as one nation and of the Afghan emir as their king, and their Pashtu journal, *Pakhtun*, took the royal Afghan emblem for a cover symbol in its first two years of publication beginning in May 1928.[4] On the surface, this suggests the espousal of what later was the Afghani form of Pakhtunistan. But, in fact, the political objectives of the nationalist movement in its early phase were not clearly thought out. The Afghan Jirga, for instance, also spoke of fighting for independence within the framework of India.[5] Behind the contradictions, however, lay the indisputable fact that provincial politics already had a strongly parochial orientation. For the Pakhtuns, the attachment to Afghanistan had been the traditional symbol of their independence, while they had had little prior involvement in Indian politics.

The exigencies of civil disobedience forced the Afghan Jirga into an alliance with the Indian National Congress which culminated in a formal merger in August 1931, but while outwardly it became part of the Congress, it retained its autonomy. Its leaders actually downgraded the Congress label in favor of Khudai Khidmatgar, the name of its quasi-military volunteers, since this was invested with religious and ethnic symbolism peculiar to Pakhtuns and also helped to insulate the provincial party from the communal propaganda leveled against the Congress

[4]As examples of the prevailing political attitudes in 1928-30 see, *Pakhtun*, July 1928, November 1928, March 1929 and April 1929.

[5]*Ibid.*, October 1929.

proper. The use of names suggests the relationship between the two parties. The Congress High Command gave the Afghan Jirga leaders complete control of its Frontier branch, conceding to them a high degree of organizational autonomy, and allowing them to act independent of, and even contrary to, its instructions on many issues. Most important, it tolerated a regional brand of nationalism.

Provincial party thinking was reoriented with the alliance toward the goal of an autonomous Pakhtun state within India. Afghanis were still viewed in the special, favourable light cast by their common ethnic background, but the Frontier and Afghanistan were presumed to have different political futures. The most cogent description of the party's vision for the future was given by Abdul Qaiyum Khan shortly before he deserted the Muslim League in 1945.

> We shall be a free sovereign unit, in alliance, however, with other sovereign units of Indian subnationalities, voluntarily surrendering part of our sovereignty for common ends and the greater welfare of the country and reserving our right to walk out of the Indian federation if we so desire.[6]

It was widely assumed that the Congress accepted the principle of Pakhtun autonomy. There was, in fact, no written commitment, but Congress leaders themselves gave credence to this belief by their tolerance of the Frontier Congress' semi-autonomous party status and by their public statements. Asaf Ali, for instance, told a conference in the NWFP in September 1938 that the Congress foresaw a "beautiful future in which both the settled districts and tribal areas could enjoy autonomy and security within India."[7] After World War II, Gandhi stated that his goal had always been to save the Pakhtuns for themselves, not for India.[8]

Its espousal of regionalism ensured the Frontier Congress of the loyalties of Pakhtuns until 1947 when the religious passions

[6]Abdul Qaiyum Khan, *Gold and Guns on the Pathan Frontier*, Bombay: Hind Kitab, 1945, p. 72.

[7]*Lahore Tribune*, 20 September 1938.

[8]D.G. Tendulkar, *Abdul Ghaffar Khan*, Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1967, p. 428.

generated by India's communal crisis momentarily swept aside their ethnocentrism. Frontier Congress leaders responded by advocating the most militant possible brand of autonomy, Pakhtunistan, in hopes that by sharpening their party's ethnic image they could cut through the religious aura which had enveloped politics. As soon as independence arrived, they moderated their extremism. They declared their loyalty to their new country at a provincial party meeting on 3-4 September 1947 and re-interpreted Pakhtunistan to mean internal freedom within Pakistan.

> This new state will comprise the present six Settled Districts of the North-West Frontier Province and all such other contiguous areas inhabited by the Pakhtuns which may wish to join the new state of their own free will. The state will enter into agreement on defence, external affairs and communications with Pakistan.[9]

Within months they drew back even further. Abdul Ghaffar Khan told the Pakistan Constituent Assembly in February 1948 that Pakistan was a settled fact and that Pakhtunistan meant only an autonomous unit on a par with the other provinces of Pakistan.[10]

The issue of Pakhtun autonomy was never seriously faced in Pakistan's first two decades. Successive governments tried to handle it by suppressing its advocates and by integrating the NWFP into the unified province of West Pakistan. Neither approach achieved its intended end. The many years the old Frontier Congressmen spent in jail only bolstered their reputations as the true advocates of Pakhtun interests. The One-Unit Scheme instituted by Ayub Khan generated deep resentment in the former Frontier Province, giving Pakhtun nationalists a major grievance to exploit and providing them with allies among similarly disaffected Baluchis and Sindhis. Thus, when free elections occurred in 1969, regionalism was still a potent and potentially explosive question, and its advocates in NAP a powerful political force. Both remain so today, four years after Zulfikar Ali Bhutto first wrestled with the problem of Pakhtun autonomy.

[9]Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 451.
[10]Quoted in *ibid.*

To counter the Frontier Congress' ethnic nationalism during the independence movement, the Muslim League stressed religion. An appeal to Islam created some sense of identity among Pakhtuns with their Indian co-religionists, but as a means of challenging their parochialism it had a limited political effectiveness. It was useful only as an instrument for achieving temporary Muslim solidarity in a time of crisis. It could not serve as a long-term integrative force which would focus Pakhtun loyalities on the Indian Muslim "nation." By relying upon religion the League placed itself at a grave disadvantage to its rival on two counts. First, since religion was an integral part of Pakhtun society, it was natural for the Frontier Congress to have an Islamic complexion. Secondly, the League was asking Pakhtuns to give their first loyalities to the Indian Muslim community on the basis of their religion, yet Islam formed but one subsidiary facet of their identity when they defined themselves vis-a-vis other Muslims. Ordinarily, the religion they shared with Punjabis and Sindhis meant less to them than their ethnic differences. Since the Frontier Congress pre-empted the issue of Pakhtun nationalism, it also precluded for these reasons the possibility of a viable religiously based challenge to its political position until 1946-47.

Islam, nonetheless, had certain traditional functions in the Pakhtun polity which ultimately were of benefit to the League. It was the one force capable of binding the normally factious Pakhtuns together politically and militarily. By extension, it was the only force capable of inducing Pakhtuns to identify with a community broader than their ethnic group. For either to happen, two conditions were essential. There had to be a threat, or the credible appearance of one, to Pakhtuns as Muslims. In addition, leadership had to pass from Pakhtun tribal chiefs who commanded factions to religious men who transcended them. Throughout the century of British rule, for instance, tribal wars regularly assumed religious coloration under the inspiration of religious men such as the Mad Mullah, Hadda Mullah, Mullah Powindah, Haji of Turangzai and Faqir of Ipi, whose names appear in British records as the most troublesome and inveterate of hostiles. In both cases, the unanimity built by saintly men on religious issues was inherently short-lived and unstable. Once the danger ended or the religious leader

was discredited, the united front disintegrated, and Pakhtuns returned to thinking of themselves in terms of tribe, clan and faction.

Both of these patterns were re-enacted in 1946-47. The Frontier Muslim League was less a political party in those years than a movement sustained by the religious passions unleased by India's communal crisis. Although secular politicians provided the formal leadership, it was the efforts of the province's religious authorities, led by the Pir of Manki, who had emerged as the League's most respected figure in the Frontier, that were crucial for the League's success. The party still displayed the structural weaknesses which had characterized it since its inception, but with its religious appeal it was able to weld together people representing the entire range of the province's political, economic and ethnic interests. The looseness of the party's organization and the vagueness of its program were assets in this effort. People were able to overlook their mutual differences and to work for their own interpretation of the millenial state of Pakistan. The wave of communal disturbances which marked India's last year as a colony also accomplished in a few months what years of political efforts by the League had failed to achieve. It overcame the tenacious hold of the Pakhtuns' ethnocentrism and forced them to give precedence to their identity as members of the larger Indian Muslim community. In the end, however, religious nationalism failed to live up to expectations as an integrative force in the NWFP. True to traditional patterns, the League's ascendancy in the province was ephemeral. Once religious nationalism failed to live up to expectations as an independence resolved the extraordinary religious crisis on which it fed, the party's broad coalition rapidly fragmented into its disparate, conflicting sub-groups, and the Pakhtuns' parochialism reasserted itself.

Issues aside, there has been a remarkable stability in the pool of political leadership in the NWFP, other than in the area added in the past decade when the province's boundaries were redrawn to incorporate the former princely states of Swat, Dir and Chitral, which had been outside the venue of provincial politics before 1947. In the rest of the province sheer attrition—retirement or death—and the inability of some men to keep pace with changing conditions have guaranteed some turnover.

Furthermore, even though there may be continuity in possession of power, leaders have different degrees of influence than they or their fathers had before 1947, and often in different parties. Despite these changes, however, political power in the six districts of the old NWFP has shown more of a rearrangement within an existing political elite than of an alternation in its composition.

Most political leaders fall into one of two categories. One consists of men who had obtained their start before 1947. They have had varying success in perpetuating their political authority, but as a group they are well-represented in the province's main political parties. NAP exhibits the greatest conservatism both in terms of total number of old politicians still active in its ranks and in terms of the constancy of its pre-1947 leaders. Beginning with Abdul Wali Khan, behind whom looms his semi-retired father, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, and continuing down through its provincial, district, tehsil and village office-bearers, one can find numerous men who have held decisive positions of influence for 30 years or more. Other parties display a similar trend. Abdul Qaiyum Khan, the leader of the Muslim League, and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus, the head of one branch of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam, represent the tip of the iceberg in their respective parties. The other category of leaders includes those for whom politics has become a family profession. Sons and other relatives of old nationalist leaders are active at all levels in all the parties. To cite but one example, the Pakistan People's Party which purports to represent the greatest break from the past among Pakistan's political parties, had as its provincial leader, the late Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, and as its present chief, Nasrullah Khan Khattak, both sons of secondary leaders in the pre-independence Muslim League.

The continuity in political leadership is equally apparent if one uses the 1970 elections as a yardstick. The frequency with which members of the pre-1947 political elite, or their sons or other relatives, both stood as candidates and won is striking. This is as true for those who ran as independents as for those with party labels. In the most extreme variation on this pattern, some seats have taken on the character of a family possession. For instance, in Hazara, Raja George Sikandar Zaman represents the same area as did his father, grandfather and great-uncle,

dating back to 1937. Similarly, Inayatullah Khan Gandapur, the former Provincial Chief Minister, represents the same area of Dera Ismail Khan as his father did for 10 years before independence.

The province's political organizations have shown less conservatism in their composition, but strong resemblances to the independence movement still remain. Along with its mantle as the party of Pakhtun interests, NAP inherited the Frontier Congress' geographic spread, though on a much reduced scale. The political vagaries of the years since independence have only marginally reduced its hold on its predecessor's core area, Peshawar Valley. In Bannu Tehsil of Bannu District, which served as the Congress' secondary base in the south, its popularity has dropped off more sharply, but it remains well-entrenched. The most precipitous decline has occurred in Kohat District, a teritary party area where the extensive grass-roots support the Congress once commanded has largely been dissipated. On the other hand, NAP has failed to improve on its predecessor's weak position in Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan. It also has not made significant inroads in the province's urban areas, retaining the predominantly rural complexion of the Congress. NAP has also emulated the most distinctive structural feature of its predecessor, the organizational split between the regular party structure and the volunteers who, organized on military lines, have a considerable degree of autonomy from the party's "civil" side.

The Muslim League also bears the imprint of its pre-1946 history, but not of what it was at its zenith in 1947 when India's communal crisis distorted normal political alignments. It retains those characteristics it displayed in the decade before that year when it was the weaker of the province's two parties. With its strength heavily dependent on Hazara District, where its primacy has never been challenged since it was first established in the late 1930s, it remains more influential in the province's outlying districts than in Peshawar and Mardan, where it draws its support from a coalition of anti-NAP interests whose ranks have been significantly depleted since 1947. It also commands some of its old popularity in the province's urban areas. Organizationally, it has failed to overcome the deficiencies which plagued it throughout the independence movement, even in 1946-47. Except in Hazara, its party structure is neither well-

organized nor deep-rooted. As a result, it is at as much of an institutional disadvantage to NAP as it was to the Frontier Congress before 1947.

Even some of the changes which have occurred in the province's parties could be predicted on the basis of the pre-1947 alignments. One example is the activities of the provincial ulema, many of whom worked with the Frontier Congress until 1946-47, when communalism caused the relationship to break down. Their assistance was particularly important to the party in the province's southern districts where religious sentiment was stronger and a straight ethnic appeal less effective than in Peshawar Valley. Since 1969 the relationship of the ulema with NAP has taken a different shape, but one of equal influence on provincial politics. NAP was hurt most seriously in the 1970 elections by competition from the Jamait-ul-Ulema-i-Islam (Hazarvi) which cut into NAP's natural constituency, especially in Kohat, Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan where it ran a poor fourth. Two years later the old alliance between secular Pakhtun and Islamic divine was restored when NAP and the major faction of JUI (Hazarvi) formed a coalition to govern the province.

In the Hashtnagar area of Peshawar District, the current friction between the two major tribes—the Mohammadzais, who own most of the land, and the Mohmands, who serve as their tenants—began even before the independence movement. But while kisan conflict was an intrusive fact of political life before 1947, it was not the decisive determinant of party alignments, for the bulk of the Mohammadzais and the Mohmands both supported the Congress, in spite of their grievances against each other. Since the late 1960s however, when tenant problems became acute, tribal and political divisions have coincided. The Mohmand kisans have deserted NAP in large numbers, while formerly pro-Muslim League Mohammadzais have united with their old enemies to protect mutual economic interests.

More was involved in the durability of the province's political leadership than the commanding presence of a few individuals or their chosen successors. It is attributable to the enduring importance of the province's traditional socio-political order and to the underlying structure it has given to party politics since

1930. The independent movement should be approached as a study in the politics of ethnicity and of status. Its most pronounced features were that its internal divisions corresponded to the province's ethnic cleavages and that its main source of leaders was the traditional elite where authority derived to a high degree from family prestige and factional following.

Pakhtuns were the primary ethnic group in the province. They had monopolized land ownership, set cultural norms and directed traditional affairs over a large part of the Frontier for over four centuries since their original conquests in the region. It was only natural that they would play an authoritative role in the independence movement and turn it into a vehicle for their own ethnocentric interests. Their political mastery was, however, inherently divisive in view of the province's demographic make-up. While Pakhtuns formed a large majority in the adjoining tribal agencies, they accounted for only about two-fifths of the NWFP before 1947. A small majority of the province's inhabitants were non-Pakhtun Muslims while a small minority were non-Muslims. These different groups were not spread evenly throughout the NWFP. Certain regions can be identified as Pakhtun and others as non-Pakhtun. Major political cleavages during the independence movement corresponded to those zones. Ethnic differences cut through the province in two ways. They set its two outermost districts, Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan, apart from the other four, and they divided urban from rural areas.

Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan are geographic extensions of adjoining regions of the Punjab rather than integral parts of the Frontier. Ethnically and culturally both have a polyglot population, with no one group constituting the dominant element in their make-up, although enough came from, or assimilated to, a Muslim Punjab background to make that the prevailing cultural pattern. In both, Pakhtuns formed a minority, less than one-twelfth in Hazara and about one-fourth in Dera Ismail Khan before 1947. In Hazara, they have largely abandoned the concept of Pakhtunwali and the Pashtu language for Punjabi ways and dialects. In Dera Ismail Khan, their assimilation has been much less pronounced.

The distinctive complexions of the two districts set them apart politically from the rest of the province before 1947. Ethnic

antagonisms, in short, minimized the possibility of their accepting the political leadership of Pakhtuns. This problem proved insurmountable for the Frontier Congress. As the party of Pakhtun interests, it was unable to secure a strong foothold in either district. Its civil disobedience campaigns had virtually no repercussions in Hazara and evoked a minimal response in Dera Ismail Khan. It made a poor electoral showing in Hazara before 1947 while in Dera Ismail Khan it ultimately resorted to the expedient of supporting Jamiat-ul-Ulema candidates to overcome the liability of its own name. In neither did it develop the extensive grass-roots organization which characterized it elsewhere. The League was the beneficiary of the Congress' alienation of the two districts, becoming the representative of the Frontier's non-Pakhtun Muslim regions, particularly Hazara, where it acquired a permanent political base. It had difficulty expanding into the Pakhtun areas, but at least its religious ideology was not an automatic bar, whereas the Frontier Congress' more restrictive Pakhtun appeal precluded it from crossing the province's ethnic barriers in the opposide direction.

The first people in the NWFP to be imbued with nationalist ideas, the small urban intelligentsia, were disqualified from serving as the province's nationalist vanguard by the sharp divisions which existed between town and countryside. The Frontier towns had decidedly non-Pakhtun characters, for Pakhtuns consciously avoided them out of contempt for urban life-styles and culture. Thus, few of the urban educated elite were Pakhtuns and even those who were had adopted habits which tainted them in the eyes of the rural population. The same ethnic and cultural differences which isolated the urban professionals and literati from the agrarian masses also caused them to resist rural leadership. They were as unwilling to subordinate themselves to people of different ethnic origins as were the Pakhtuns. The result was an urban-rural dichotomy which ran throughout the independence movement.

Neither the Frontier Congress nor the Muslim League found an adequate permanent solution to this division. The Congress's advocacy of Pakhtun interests estranged the inhabitants of the towns; while the League's religious appeal found a receptive audience in urban areas but made little headway in the Pakhtun countryside during most of the independence movement. Each

managed to overcome the division momentarily, but only in a time of crisis when the rural-urban differences were overshadowed by a shared opposition to an outside group. In 1930 the Congress' civil disobedience campaign against the British created a temporary commonality of interests. Nonetheless, the agitation had distinct urban and rural components which ran along complementary yet separate lines. The next year, the common front broke down, depriving the rural-dominated Frontier Congress of the aid of most of its former urban confederates when civil disobedience began again in December 1931. In 1946-47 the Muslim League seemingly unified town and countryside against Hindus and the Congress, but even at its peak, its position in the Pakhtun areas was tenuous, and once a semblance of normalcy returned, it melted away.

In spite of all that has been said about these ethnic divisions and the role they played in provincial politics, the fact remains that the Pakhtuns were the key to the course of the independence movement. The Congress was the pre-eminent provincial party as long as the Pakhtuns supported it, and the Muslim League supplanted it only when their political loyalties shifted. They dominated the province's political life in general, and in Mardan, Peshawar, Kohat and Bannu they controlled it completely, even though sizable numbers of non-Pakhtuns also lived in those four districts.

In the regions they had conquered, the Pakhtuns created a society in which they formed a privileged, landed elite presiding over a heterogenous group of lower classes composed of remnants of the earlier inhabitants and immigrants from outside the Frontier. Those people in time adopted Pakhtun values, customs, and speech, fusing into the dominant culture around them. Relations between the social classes continued with a minimum of disruption even under the British. When the independence movement began, Pakhtuns still owned about four-fifths of the land of the province's four central districts while the non-Pakhtun subordinate classes continued to serve as their tenants, laborers, artisans and servants.

The latter traditionally had no independent political existence. Lacking a separate economic base, their range of political options was restricted to choosing between Pakhtun patrons. As clients they had no part in the making of political decisions. Their

function in the polity was to provide the manpower to implement whatever course their Pakhtun chiefs chose to follow. They performed the same basic role in the independence movement. Very few men of the lower classes rose to a position of stature in either party even at the village level. They provided the bulk of the rank and file, especially in the Frontier Congress, but Pakhtuns usually held the reins of leadership.

Both parties were directed by members of the rural Pakhtun elite, the Khans. Some of them were educated, even westernized, but this was not essential for political advancement. Men with little or no schooling were to be found at every level in both parties, and in some areas overwhelmingly so because of the Pakhtuns' general educational backwardness. They tended to share two socio-economic characteristics. In the first place, they usually owned large holdings of land, the key to power in the Pakhtuns' polity. Frederik Barth's description of the system in Swat is valid for Pakhtuns elsewhere as well.

> Land forms the basis for the whole system of organization in Swat. Quite apart from the profits it supplies in the form of rent, its owner, by his mere possession, gains authority and control over numerous persons. The whole population of Swat is directly dependent on land in some form or other; and non-landowners can only gain access to it through agreements with landowners. The ownership of land is thus a direct source of political influence. An increase of land holdings implies an increase in such influence; indeed, the possession of extensive lands is a basic requirement for any kind of security in a position of ascendancy.[11]

The second characteristic of this rural elite was that its members usually belonged to families of high status occupying influential positions in their tribes' internal affairs. There were, of course, exceptions, more in the Muslim League than in the Congress, but as a general rule traditional standing was the main prerequisite for the exercise of political leadership in the independence movement.

It logically followed that party alignments reflected the factional

[11]Barth, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

divisions in the Pakhtun polity. At the heart of Pakhtun politics was the pervasive rivalry, known as *parajamba*, among landowning Khans. This rivalry could assume a number of variations, but its most common and structurally predictable form was between *taburs*. The term literally means patrilineal first cousin in Pashtu, but it has lost its purely kin connotation and come to stand for cousins between whom there is enmity. Rivalries were institutionalized in the form of factions called *gundis*. In some areas the orientation of those traditional groupings was purely local. Elsewhere, village factions coalesced into political blocs covering regions as large as that inhabited by a clan or a tribe.

These divisions served as the bedrock upon which the Congress and Muslim League rested in the Pakhtun areas of the province. Traditional rivals commonly joined opposite parties. Party branches in villages, and even larger areas, were frequently controlled by single *gundis* or combinations of *gundis* which were traditional allies. Wherever a faction opted for one party, its rival was likely to gravitate to the other for that reason alone. At higher levels in the independence movement, it was common for traditional opponents among the Pakhtuns' leading Khani families to serve in a leadership capacity in the Congress and Muslim League in the regions inhabited by their respective tribes. This tendency was manifested in its most striking form in the frequency with which cousins appeared in key positions in opposing camps. This did not occur in a random manner. The pattern which generally prevailed was for the junior branches of the Khani families to support the Congress while their senior, and usually more wealthy, relatives sided with the Muslim League.

As a result of the intimate connection between political behaviour and Pakhtun social patterns, values associated with the traditional polity were transferred to the independence movement. Political organizations, especially the Frontier Congress, tended to be viewed by many as *gundis* writ large. People remained constant in their loyalty to their parties because it was the honorable thing to do. As *Pakhtun*, the Frontier Congress' journal, put it in a discussion of political defections, "It is against the principles of *Pakhto* for a man to leave his own group. The Pakhtuns of old times always remained steadfast in

their loyalties."[12] In light of the frequency with which traditional factions controlled local party units, this attitude did not require any transference for many Pakhtuns. Where party and faction coincided, the distinction between them blurred to a point where allegiance to the former was synonymous with loyalty to the latter. Hence, political parties tended to have an inherent stability unrelated to ideological preferences or the political issues of the day.

As has been stressed, religion was the primary mechanism built into the traditional polity for overcoming the Pakhtuns' factionalism in times of crisis when unity was needed. Given that role, it was inevitable that religious men should have constituted the one acceptable alternative source of leadership among Pakhtuns to their own tribal elite. Those men can be grouped into two, sometimes overlapping, categories: those whose status depended on the office they held, and those who had inherited religious sanctity. The former included mullahs and ulema, and the latter Seyds and *astanadars* (hereditary spiritual leaders). They were mostly non-Pakhtuns by descent, but their religious status invested them with a special role in the Pakhtun polity which carried over to the independence movement. They often participated in politics like Pakhtuns, but more important, their piety allowed them to transcend Pakhtun rivalries to act as mediators and unifiers.

Socio-economic conditions and traditional values have not changed enough since 1947 to alter the foundations of provincial politics. All the factors discussed above are still operative to some degree, more than a quarter century after independence. The ethnic divisions between the four Pakhtun districts and Hazara and Dera Ismail Khan still persist, as do those separating urban areas from the countryside. The power of the rural elite is still intact, and political careers still depend heavily on land ownership, tribal status and factional backing. Political alignments still reflect factional divisions. Religion and religious leadership remain important. It is no wonder, therefore, that political affairs in the North-West Frontier Province bear so striking a resemblance to the independence movement.

[12] *Pakhtun*, 14 September 1945. (Translation from Pashtu.)

ECONOMIC CHANGE IN BALUCHISTAN: PROCESSES OF INTEGRATION IN THE LARGER ECONOMY OF PAKISTAN

WARREN SWIDLER*

This paper is an examination of economic changes in Baluchistan brought about by the introduction of new technologies and of the ways in which local economies are being integrated into the national economy of Pakistan. The specific focus is the Brahui-speaking communities in Northern Kalat and Quetta Districts. Data collected in this region is presented in an historical context, detailing the rise of Brahui polity, land acquisition, its tenure and use, traditional microeconomies, and the changes wrought by irrigation technology. Village and nomad integration into the national economy are treated in terms of the structural changes and emerging alternatives in local economies which provide natural routes towards national integration.

Introduction

The subsistence economies of Baluchistan are a function of the interplay between natural environmental factors, the technologies of camp and village, and the historical processes which shaped polity and land tenure. The types of communities which are seen today in Baluchistan are complex expressions of these factors which extend far back into the early occupation of the area and which have been modified over time by raiding and plunder, by conquest and submission, by changing fealty and suzerain relations, and by the development of local technologies.

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From the beginning of recorded history,[1] the evidence is clear that Baluchistan was always, and continues to be, a very heterogeneous area; multilingual (9 spoken languages in the area), multi-ethnic (Baluch, Brahui, Pathan, Jat, Hindu, Dehwar, Hazarra Mongol) and multi-community. There continue to exist today 5 main types of settlement: (1) Nomad camps raising animals for subsistence; (2) Transhumanthamlets which combine the herding of animals with cultivation; moving in an alternating pattern from the highlands to the Kachhi plain; (3) Settled villages engaged in cultivation with irrigation systems; (4) The market towns; and (5) Administrative centres. These present-day communities, mainly of Brahui and Baluch tribesmen, continue today to exist side by side, and, as one would expect, capital, labor and produce flow amongst them in patterned ways. Forms of land tenure and land use, the recruitment of labor, the patterns of crop production and distribution, marketing, the generation of capital as well as savings and credit, are all processes which involve all five community types and are explicable only by reference to particular historical events and to present-day dynamics which take place among them.

It is no longer possible to view communities in Baluchistan as isolable and pure types—the analytic tool born of the strain toward neatness in arranging complex and all too often erroneous data. On the ground, people are engaged in complex micro-economies where the factors of multiple resources, of family type and size, of household budgeting and authority patterns, inheritance and residence, are all operative in determining economic choices. The ongoing contribution of anthropology to the economics of development continues to be the detailed documentation of village and tribal economies (which involve more complex and rationalized ways of making a living than was earlier understood) and the effects of national development on village economic structure. Naturally, the effects of national economic events take on greater importance the more complexly integrated are village and nation-state. But the effects of village change on national distribution patterns and development schemes must also be considered, for as Dalton states:

[1]Walter Fairservis, "The Origin, Character and Decline of an Early Civilization," *American Museum Novitates*, 2302, 1967, p. 23.

> Modernization consists of displacing local dependence with external dependence on markets and by so doing integrates the village community into the region, the nation, and through foreign transactions, the rest of the world....Integration means two-way transactional flows which create mutual dependence between villages and national markets and government.[2]

Such patterns of transactional flow are emerging very clearly in Baluchistan today where the integration of village communities into the national economy is proceeding with great speed. The introduction of modern irrigation technology is changing Baluchistan from a marginal area with highly variable resources from season to season and from year to year, to one of predictable and dependable productive capacity. Adaptations to marginality with low-energy technologies were very much a part of the cultural repertoires of the peoples of Baluchistan.[3] Effective resource management cross-cut residential communities in response to the availability of resources and labor. Moreover, there was not only a change of personnel among communities, there was also the well-documented pattern of whole communities changing their resource base over time.

Machine-well irrigation has brought a proliferation of cash crops into the marketplace. Because of increased production and the development of rail and road transportation, markets throughout Pakistan are becoming more and more accessible. In Smelser's terms, "structural differentiation" (the process of change in traditional economy and society induced by modern activities) is just beginning to take place, where impersonal market forces and contractual relationships have not yet completely displaced local dependencies among kinsmen.[4]

The Rise of Brahui Polity and Land Tenure

The land acquisition and allocation patterns in Baluchistan

[2]George Dalton, *Economic Development and Social Change*, New York : The Natural History Press, 1971, pp. 28-29.

[3]Warren Swidler, *Technology and Social Structure in Baluchistan, West Pakistan*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1968.

[4]Neil J. Smelser, "Mechanisms of Change and Adjustment to Change," *Industrialization and Society*, eds. B.F. Hoselitz and W.E. Moore, Mouton; UNESCO, 1963, p. 35.

cannot be separated from the very social and political forms from which they derive. Although Kalat, the Brahui region, was marginal to the great historical events of the Iranian Plateau and the subcontinent, it was not isolated from them as the record of conquests and expansion shows.[5] Under the impact of great waves of conquests and attempted conquests, the borderlands developed their own petty chiefdoms. The Brahui Confederacy organization took shape during the 16th century when Babur conquered the Sultanate of Delhi (1526) and made forays against Kalat. His attempts to control Kalat were ultimately unsuccessful. His son Akbar's march on Kalat 50 years later resulted in retreat. Apparently the tribes of Kalat had stabilized Confederacy organization under a local ruling family, the Mirwaris who are said to have "ruled" Kalat for 12 generations. During the reign of Akbar, however, Sibi was conquered and assessed for revenue.

In the late 17th century the Mughals again marched against Kalat but were defeated by Mir Ahmed, then Khan of Kalat and titular head of the Brahui Confederacy. His descendants, the Ahmedzais, were the Khans of Kalat from this time until the accession to Pakistan in 1948.

The basic structural features of the Confederacy tribes emerged *pari passu* with the rise of Ahmedzai power. By the time Nadir Shah of Persia conquered Delhi in 1739 bringing Mughal rule to an end, the Brahui Confederacy was strong enough to supply men-at-arms to his fighting force. In return, the Brahuis received the lowland plains of Kachhi, then ruled by the Kalhoras of Sindh, as blood compensation for the death of Khan Mir Abdullah. One half of the territory went to the Khan as crown lands while the other half was divided among the tribes of the fighting force from Sarawan and Jhalawan, given by the Khan

[5]Contact includes: the peoples of the Achaeminid Elamite Kingdom, Indus Valley Dravidians, Alexander the Great's army and what it could carry to the Punjab of Hellenistic Europe, the Sewas of Sindh, Sassanian Persia, Arabs, Scythians, Partians, Turks, Ghaznavid Afghans in the 11th century, successive waves of Afghans and Mongols in the 13th and 14th centuries, the Mughals Babar and his son Akbar, Nadir Shah of Persia, and finally the coalition of Brahui Tribes and the development of the proto-state (Khanate) in Kalat. The Khanate remained in the hands of the Ahmadzais through British Partition until the New Instruments of Accession to Pakistan in 1955.

in two categories: *gham* (lit. sorrow, obligation) lands, and *jagir*, revenue-free grants. *Gham* lands were allocated by the Khan proportional to the number of fighting men supplied by each tribe, with the stipulation that these tracts be used to raise crops to support the men of the fighting force in the field. As community property of each tribe, they could not be alienated or sub-divided by anyone. One-twelfth of the income was collected by tribal chiefs and submitted to the Khan as revenue just to remind the tribes of the conditions for its use. *Gham* lands could be confiscated by the Khan for failure of a tribe to meet its quota obligations or for any other form of insubordination.

Jagir, or revenue-free estates, also granted to the tribes and subdivisions, were made according to sectional representation of the fighting force. The *sardars* and their related sections took the most fertile areas and with *karez* (*qanats*, or underground water channels) began the cultivation of fruits, grains and fodder crops for their horses. Their holdings to the present day in Kachhi show distinct gradations of tribal status: the leading tribe of the Sarawan contingent has lands at the top of the Bolan and Nari rivers while the holdings of other tribes are below. The tribes of Jhalawan received only lands bordering the mountains which separate the highlands from Kachhi because they were not adequately represented in the decisive battles in Kachhi.

Thus tribal land tenure can only be explained as originating with the Khan and assigned to the tribes for sectional distribution through their chiefs. Once land was assigned to the tribes as *jagir*, no revenues were paid to the Khan thereafter. The Khan's "crown lands" were worked by a Persian-speaking population known as Dehwars (lit. village dwellers). Through the Khan's alliance with Nadir Shah, the highland Brahui tribes were able to obtain stable control of Kachhi and the *Jat* cultivators living there. The Brahuis now had grazing areas for their animals during fall and winter and more land for cultivation through the year. The resource base was greatly increased and the stage was set for further internal political development.

In the later part of the 18th century, when Nasir Khan the Great took the Ahmadzai throne, the Khanate entered a period of fluorescence. By this time, Kalat was subordinate to the Abdalli court of Kandihar where the treaty called for an annual

payment of Rs 2,000 to the Abdallis and to provide and maintain 1000 soldiers at the court in Kandahar. An act of insubordination by Nasir Khan by refusing to come to the Kandahar court when he was summoned led to the negotiation of a new treaty in which the Brahuis would no longer pay tribute nor maintain a force at Kandihar. Nasir Khan's developing strength vis-a-vis Kandahar was further shown by the other conditions of the treaty requiring that the Afghans remain aloof from the internal affairs of Kalat, that Kalat would provide a fighting force *only* when the Afghans fought outside their kingdom and that the Khan would be provided money and munitions. The treaty was sealed by a pledge of loyalty from the Khan to Kandihar and the marriage of the Khan's niece to Ahmed Shah Abdalli's son.

Nasir Khan was then able to turn his attention to the structural development of the Khanate. He solidified the fighting force of the Confederacy into the Sarawan regiment, the Jhalawan regiment, and a special regiment directly under his own command. He chose one tribe each from Sarawan and Jhalawan (which probably dates the beginning of a tribal ranking) to lead the Confederacy and to be responsible for recruitment from their respective areas. He established a bureaucratic structure by creating offices to handle the Khanate's affairs: A Prime Minister (*wazir*) concerned with internal and foreign affairs, a Revenue Officer (*vakil*) responsible for the collection of revenue from crown lands, tribute and blood compensation, a Central Administrator of Kalat (*darogha*) who directed the Dehwar cultivators on crown lands, through *naibs*, or Brahui deputies. And finally a *shaghasi* (equivalent to an ADC) who organized durbars and the chiefs' seating arrangement according to their rank. In addition to these paid officers he created two councils, one whose members were nominated by the Khan (his close kinsmen) and included the two chiefs of the tribes of Sarawan and Jhalawan; and the second council composed mainly of elders who served in nothing more than an advisory capacity. Members of the first council, or their representatives, were to remain at Kalat at all times along with one-twelfth of the number of soldiers raised by each tribe (*gham-i-lashkar*). With his new treaty with Kandahar and the stabilization of the northern and eastern border, he was then able to move against Kharan, Makran,

and Las Bela including the port of Karachi.[6]

By the time the British came on the scene in the mid-19th century, the models of alliance treaty as well as land allocation and use were well established. The weak link in the developing Khanate was in the relations between the Khan and the tribes, for the Khanate was not an organic bureaucracy which incorporated them. The tribes were the Khan's fighting force and received land grants for supplying men-at-arms, and for maintaining political allegiance. No revenues were paid to the Khan by the tribes, and no Khanate structure extended down through tribal ranks. The British were able to use this inherent structural weakness when, in the early part of the 19th century, they needed a buffer zone between Afghanistan and the Indus plain against Russian power and a weak power base in Persia. In order to move against the throne in Kalat, the British needed safe conduct and supplies from Sindh to Kandahar through the Bolan Pass. While the Khan guaranteed their safe passage, he was unable to control the *sardars* and could not fulfill the conditions of the treaty. On their return from Kandahar, the British undertook a punitive expedition against Kalat and the Khan, refusing to surrender, was killed. Kalat was then dismembered, Sarawan and Kachhi being annexed to Kabul and administered by the British, but the revolt of the *sardars* finally led to the return of these areas to Kalat, and a submission treaty by the new Khan. The new Khan was granted an annual subsidy of Rs 100,000. Subsidies for the *sardars* were contingent upon their loyalty to the Khan and the maintenance of internal peace. While British administrative innovations were few, their internal intriguing was often sufficient to undermine the weakly developed political integration between the Khan and the tribes. But the *sardars* were still encouraged to settle disputes by traditional procedures, through "*sardar's* circles" when intratribal, and *jirgas* when disputes were intertribal. However, all *jirga* decisions were subject to review by the Political Agent. When the British established a cantonment in Quetta on a permanent basis, Quetta replaced Kalat as the center of Brahui administration. The Khanate was thus sealed off from the rest of the border, losing control, under Paramountcy, of all territories strategic

[6]Gul Khan Nasir, *Tarikh-e-Baluchistan*, vol. I, Karachi: Publisher not known, 1952, p. 97.

to British interests. The uplands of Sarawan and Jhalawan and most of Kachhi were left in the hands of the Khan and the *sardars*, and the Khanate continued to function until shortly after Partition in 1947.

The day after Partition, the Khan declared Kalat an independent state and did not formally acceed to Pakistan until 1948. The terms of accession were of a new and alien order from the kind of allegiance treaty that had regulated external politics for hundreds of years in the past. Treaties between chiefdoms had been essentially pledges of loyalty to a foreign suzerain, in exchange for internal autonomy and a share of the spoils. The terms of such treaties varied through time and reflected the ever-changing power balance between chiefdoms and foreign suzerains. But accession to Pakistan was of a different order and over the eleven-year period between the initial accession in 1948 and the New Instruments of Accession in 1955, new threats to land tenure and internal autonomy were emerging.

In the eyes of the tribesmen, the One Unit policy of 1955, which brought an influx of Punjabi administrative officers, undermined the economic and political structure of Baluchistan. The role of the *sardars* as arbitrators in disputes, adjudicators, and enforcers of tribal law was usurped, and attempts by the tribal elites to continue their traditional roles was considered a threat to the government.[7] When Ayub Khan limited ownership of irrigated lands to a maximum of five hundred acres and of unirrigated lands to 1,000 acres, tribal landholdings were challenged and the traditional system of land tenure was clearly incompatible with the new system. *Jagirdari* was to be abolished without compensation to land owners,[8] and while such reform may have been necessary and equitable in such areas as Sindh and the Punjab, where huge tracts of land are owned by few individuals, it was considered by many tribesmen inappropriate and inequitable in Baluchistan for two main reasons. First, as we mentioned earlier, most tribal lands were still held collectively by members

[7]For a detailed treatment of political organization among the Brahui and the role of *sardars*, see N.B. Swidler, *The Political Structure of a Tribal Federation: The Brahui of Baluchistan*, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1969.

[8]Khalid B. Sayeed, *The Political System of Pakistan*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967, p. 96.

of the tribe, having been assigned to them by the Khan as *jagir*, or revenue-free grants. "Ownership" was defined as shares of produce from various and scattered tracts of land. Where land had been consolidated through exchange, sale and purchase, by one individual or a group of closely related men, it was done through the original *jagir* holdings. Secondly, since no tax revenue had been collected on *jagir* by the Khan, there was strong resistence on the part of the land owners as well as tenant cultivators to pay taxes to the Pakistan government. To this very day the courts of Pakistan are strangling with land cases and litigation challenging *jagirdari* and the complex distributions inherent in its nature.

Present-Day Types of Community

The Nomad Camps. The nomadic communities of Baluchistan raise animals as their subsistence base, migrating in an alternating pattern throughout the year between the highlands in spring and summer, and the Kachhi plains in fall and winter. Sheep and goats provide milk and milk products, meat, wool and hides, which are also sold in markets and villages during late spring when grasses are drying. The cash derived from sale is used to buy food (wheat flour, tea and sugar, lentils and sometimes vegetables) and equipment and sundries they themselves do not make (pots, pans and other household goods, cloth, tobacco, *nass* and cigarettes). Camels are used only for transport, as draught animals where wheat is planted, and on rare occasions sold in market.

Informants estimate the nomadic population of the Brahuis to be between fifteen and twenty per cent but such figures, along with other census data, are unreliable. At the present time all grazing territories are accessible to any nomadic section of any tribe, but the sections generally keep to areas which have been their traditional grazing grounds. As cultivation areas increase, grazing becomes more restricted and it is not unusual today to find sections of different tribes camping next to each other.

The yearly migration, utilizing the resources of both ecologic zones, is a *natural* feature of nomad technology and, as one would expect, schedules of migration are patterned and regular and responsive to the availability of pastures, water, and harvest

labor in surrounding villages. But the economy of nomads is a precarious specialization. There is a constant attempt to adjust balances between the availability of grasses, the numbers of animals that can be supported by them, and the numbers of humans required to manage them and be sustained by them.[9] Management techniques, where animals serve as both food and capital, are highly complex, with little room for error. Flocks are subject to quick decimation if pastures are dry or water is sparse. Thus the migration route and the contacts which nomads have with villagers is crucial to this way of life. At the same time, the growth potential of the flock is great, with yearly increases as much as 40 per cent if pastures are adequate and the animals are managed properly.

Labor requirements for the management of animals is determined by culturally defined work performances and by the productive capacity of grazing animals. The animals, which are considered to be owned by male household heads, are worked by household members in small elementary families. Work duties are strictly determined by age and sex so that a basic number of family members, in the right age and sex categories, is essential, though not always realized. Each tent-household has its own hearth and prepares its own meals. The nomadic camp comes into being on a contractual basis combining the stock holdings of member households into one or more flocks. Composed of lineage or section members, as well as relatives by marriage, the camp community creates a labor force which is both sufficient for herding and milking, and permits other essential activities to be performed, such as driving stock to market and performing harvest labor in local villages when animals are dry. By increasing the labor force, the camp community provides the opportunity to engage in the elaborate hospitality system which serves to transmit information about available pastures and water and the location of other camps. Thus the camp serves as a mechanism to create the most expedient and manageable grazing unit, an adaptive response to the technological requirements of sheep and goat raising within

[9]For a detailed treatment of nomad adaptation, see W. Swidler, "Some Demographic Factors Regulating the Formation of Flocks and Camps among the Brahui of Baluchistan," *Perspectives on Nomadism*, eds. W. Irons and Neville Dyson-Hudson, Leidon : E.J. Brill, 1972.

this particular habitat. Since labor needs vary with the productive capacity of sheep and goats through the year, the camp also serves as an adjustment device to accommodate the separate cycles of herding and milking, harvesting, and labor opportunities in surrounding communities.

Some basic aspects of the interplay of economic and other cultural factors in flock management must be mentioned if change is to be understood.[10] Various cultural practices serve to siphon off a family's holdings when they grow too large to manage well. One is the dispersal of animals on loan to villagers and other nomads. This provides some insurance against decimation due to local drought or disease. In addition, traditional ties of friendship and trade are strengthened. Another is through the marriage of a son and the concomitant anticipatory inheritance, in which the son receives his share of animals to set up an independent household and thereafter relinquishes his right to inheritance at the father's death. A third way is through sale of animals and conversions to other forms of capital, such as land and wells or jewelry, carpets and the like. There are also cultural obligations of payments in cash and animals to members of the lineage and other groups on occasions of "joy and sorrow" (*shad-i-gham*) such as births, circumcisions, engagement, marriage, and death—all of which serve to adjust the number of animals within tolerable limits. When stock holdings dip low, family consumption declines and greater care is taken in management, or, the nomad may contract to borrow animals from those whose stock has grown too large, and to retain a share of the progeny. It is difficult to determine the minimum number of animals for the support of the family because of the ready access to cash from the sale of animals and from day labor. Moreover, some nomads plant small tracts of dry-crop wheat; some sections hold rights to produce on *jagir* tracts and retain tenant cultivators. But in most cases, the amount of cereal crops produced is not sufficient for the year and wheat flour must be purchased.

It is clear from the foregoing discussion that nomad economy is systematic and consists of a more mixed resource base than

[10]For details in Brahui flock management, see W. Swidler, "Adaptive Processes Regulating Nomad/Sedentary Interaction in the Middle East," *The Desert and the Sown*, ed. Cynthia Nelson, Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1973.

was previously understood. Traditionally, each of the activities of herding, the raising of cereal crops and migrant labor and its own cycle and nomadic movements were patterned to accomodate all three. Changes in any one factor have important consequences for the others and new balances must be established.

The general increase in cultivation in settled communities has resulted in greater labor and harvest opportunities for nomads. Especially over the past five years, drought has forced many nomads into closer association with villages through their contacts with relatives and trading friends, and has also moved them into towns to work as day laborers, road workers, and *chaukidars*. Because of new and increased ways of deriving cash income, many nomad communities are losing young male members. In some camps, the number of animals is decreasing because of supplements of cash received from sons working outside. Such diversification of nomad activities and the decrease in available camp labor for herding and migrations and for driving stock to market, jobs usually performed by young men, now place severe constraints on nomad economy and its capacity to adjust to the requisite balances in nomadic life.

Restrictions on grazing through the increase in cultivated areas and government reserves has focused nomad attention on the acquisition of land. Many nomad groups are purchasing land from other tribes and constructing small hamlets to serve as summer headquarters for cultivation. The land purchased is held collectively by all the descendants of a section. Thus section members are now being concentrated in one area, instead of dispersed throughout different camps. This process of sedentarization resembles that of the presentday transhumant hamlets which settled down many generations ago and practiced a mixed economy of herding and farming which was stable until the introduction of tube wells. As the Brahuis put it, "*Mulk mass, māl karé.*" "When land is cultivated, the stock wealth disappears."

The Transhumant Hamlets. The transhumant population of the upland plateaus live in permanent hamlets during the spring and summer, and migrate with their animals to the Kachhi plains in fall and winter. They are engaged in a dual system of subsistence where herding and cultivation are combined in an

intricate balance of alternating food resources throughout the year.

Tenant hamlets consist of relatives who trace descent in the male line and hold a specific kind of tenancy contract (called *latbandi*) with tribal owners. Under the terms of the contract, the cultivator has complete freedom of choice in crops planted and in the organzation of production. These contracts are not seasonal, nor do they refer to the temporary cultivation of one crop (as in the form known as *buzghaRi*). They were contracted generations ago and are heritable in the male line.

The tenant supplies seed, draught animals, agricultural implements and labor. He may, if he wishes, sell his right, lease it, or engage a sub-tenant (*buzghaR*), without permission from the tribal owners. In the case of sale, members of the same small kinship group have the first right of purchase while the second right is held by cultivators of bordering fields, usually more distantly related kinsmen.

Hamlet households are of two main kinds: Those with no access to wells and who raise wheat and melons on dry tracts and migrate to Kachhi with their animals in early autumn, and those with access to wells who can raise wheat in two varieties as well as melons, onions, potatoes and spices. They too, until very recently, migrated to the plains to graze their animals and to take part in the sorghum harvest.

The recent introduction of diesel machine pumps, replacing the Persian wheel, is a serious threat to the stability of transhumant economy. In the past, when grain reserves were becoming depleted in early spring, the flocks were in milk and could provide sustenance until the wheat harvest in June. Now, with cash reserves from the sale of crops, and the ability to produce enough wheat to last the year, fewer people are migrating to the plains and animal holdings are being converted to more land and irrigation.

New labor demands have resulted in subtenancy contracts with men without access to wells, as well as with villagers from neighboring areas. New types of productive units are being formed wherein an entire lineage (*azīz*) pools its land holdings and works them as a corporate unit (as *jam* lands) with one water source. Capital for the purchase of the machine and digging the well is raised through partnerships with an investor

who is often a Pathan of Baluch enterpreneur from Quetta, known to the villager from prior market dealings. The most common contract is drawn for a period of ten years, where the net profit is divided into half for the investor and the other half is divided amongst the land holders according to their shares. At the end of the ten-year period the machine belongs wholly to the land owners. Since investors are usually trusted friends, and market contacts as well as a source of credit, the Brahuis prefer to deal with them rather than take advantage of government loans. Brahuis believe that such loans are hard to get without influence, and that in making conditions for repaying, the government is not as responsive to their overall economic needs as are businessmen. The machine partner is not an impersonal investor. His contact in town and his knowledge of market information provides an essential link to the market economy without which Brahui cultivators would be at a disadvantage. Moreover, the investor's profit comes from shares of actual produce whereas government loans require fixed payments at fixed interest rates. Credit is now arranged through town merchants or *dalals*, contractors who buy crops on fixed consignments.

Machine wells also change traditional labor patterns. Although the family continues to remain the major recruitment group for workers, new labor demands and greater diversification of labor have resulted from increased productivity. Sub-tenancy contracts have increased as well as day-labor, providing more work opportunities for villagers with very small holdings and those who have sold their tenancy rights in the past. Day-laborers are often recruited from nighboring villagers; groups of Pathans have been seen pitching tents around the wells to hire out their donkeys to haul earth from newly dug wells. Nomads now pitch tents in the compounds of their relatives by marriage and augment the family labor force. Many sons, and younger brothers, who in the past had left the village to apprentice, for example, as lorry drivers in Sukkur or Karachi are now returning, along with pensioned government and levies workers, to reactivate their tenancy rights.

Increased productivity and the closer contact with national markets has also resulted in greater diversification of economic specialization within the village. Each machine complex has a

hired "driver," a man who tends the machine night and day throughout the year and is paid on a monthly basis. Young men are dispatched to towns on a regular basis to purchase oil and parts for diesel pumps. Many more small village stores are opening providing supplies and sundries which in the past were available only in nearby market-towns. Carpenters and tinkers (*LoRi*) are now moving into small villages where formerly they lived either in larger *sardār khel* villages or in Kachhi.

The use of animals in Brahui economy is also beginning to change. Before diesel pump irrigation the transhumant villager was engaged in a dual subsistence economy, combining herding and cultivation in an intricate balance throughout the year. Without developed irrigation the transumant villagers could only raise one small wheat crop through the year. Grain reserves were depleted by early spring but the flocks were then in milk and could provide sustenance until the wheat harvest in June. Now, with double cropping patterns, wheat is available for home consumption throughout the year and there is less reliance on milk and milk products. Fewer people are migrating to Kachhi for the winter months, and those animals that are kept in the highlands are predominantly goat flocks which are fodder fed through the winter. In some cases, one or two shepherds will take the animals to Kachhi, permitting many families of a village to remain in the highlands for the winter.

Settled Villages. Settled villages, many of which are *sardār khel*, comprise kin groups which hold tracts of land flung far and wide as *jagir*. Now, sections of tribes hold rights to produce from specific tracts of land, divided down to the constituent households of a particular line. Ownership in this context refers to shares in an estate where the "corporation" is recognized as having rights to specific shares of produce by virtue of membership in the descent group. These proprietary rights may be held by many individuals in the same tracts of land and since their holdings are far flung, an individual will hold a proprietary share in many different tracts of land both in Sarawan and in the lowlands of Kachhi. Each householder then has a right to a share of the produce by virtue of his genealogical status in the tribe, as described earlier. Current holdings represent lineage expansion and consolidation of the estate over time. These

traditional proprietary rights entitle the holders to rents (tithes might be better) from tenant tribal cultivators in the amount of one-fourth of the crops grown on dry tracts (*khushkābe*) and one-sixth from irrigated tracts (*selaba*).

The settled villages are fed by perennial water sources, either in the form of springs, or *karez*. The productive capacity of these villages require larger labor pools than the families can produce. Many tracts are leased to sub-tenants who retain one-third to one-fifth of the crops which they themselves cultivate. The more seed and tools provided by the tenant, the greater the percentage of the crop retained. Where a proprietor's own land holdings in the village are small due to fragmentation by inheritance or sale, a man and his sons may work as tenants on the land of another proprietor. Wheat is the staple crop and is consumed in the village while onions, potatoes, apples and other fruits are the main cash crops and are bought by local contractors on consignment. Lucerne is raised as a fodder crop and when mixed with wheat chaff provides feed for bullocks and camels. Double-cropping in the highlands is made possible only by irrigation, and while most villagers could sustain themselves through the winter, their interests in Kachhi bring them to the plains for the winter. Their holdings in sheep and goats are few and contribute nothing to the family income.

Specialization within highland settled villages is not highly developed (though more so than in transhumant villages). The only economic specialists are Hindu shopkeepers, a carpenter, some *loṛis* who repair tools, a barber, a washerman, and servants of the leading families. Each receives shares of the cereal produce on a biannual basis from their clients. The specificity and integration of economic statuses is not unlike the *jajmani* system so widespread in the sub-continent. The specialists are usually non-Brahui, representing a table of organization that reflects an earlier stage, when Brahuis first occupied Kachhi and incorporated the resident Jats with their caste-like specialization. Many Jats returned to the highland villages with their *jajmans*.

Highland settled villages usually have more contact with government offices than do other types of settlement. There is usually a primary school in the village along with an office of agriculture or animal husbandry but many villagers report that

government workers are more often in town than in their village. Cases of unresolved conflict are more readily brought to the Tehsildar especially when *sardārs* do not reside in the village.

With the distribution of lands cultivated in the village divided down to the constituent households of a section, the cooperative patterns in working a *kārez* are beginning to break down. *Kārez* maintenance requires cooperative labor and unchallenged distribution of water shares. The installation of diesel pumps has led to a neglect of the *kārez* and a new source of conflict among landowners.

The integration of new resources cannot be divorced from the politics of *sardār khel* villages. The very structure of near equality among closely related lineages which proved so functional for defence and predation in the days of the Confederacy now presents many problems for village organization and unity when new resources are introduced. Where the *sardār* himself or his sons or brothers are not resident in the village (since their base of operation is in Quetta or Mastung) the absence of formal leadership at lower levels results in constant squabbles and factionalism. As one *sardār* put it,

> It is very difficult for those people [*sardār khel*] to solve their own problems. Even some of my *sardār khels* cannot use authority because people won't listen to them because they have got suspicious motives. Politically, the village has deteriorated since we left.

When Village Aid was brought to Baluchistan in the 1950s and villagers themselves had to contribute land and labor for communal schemes, the lack of village representation created weak links between the village and Aid workers. With each household working its own resources and in the absence of the *sardār* representing communal interests, the introduction of new techniques and new funds was forestalled. A villagers' own English version of the situations puts the problem graphically:

> Once MAK, he was Director of Village Aid—he used to be DC also in Kalāt—he came to my farm and I asked him why nothing had been done in K. He said he wasn't to blame because

> everybody is *sardār* in K, so nobody listen to the other person and you [*sardār*] are never there. In the Village Aid system the local population had to contribute half, but who was going to contribute the half in K.? Even now I have to go and dictate before a certain problem is decided. The problem is not with the sections there, but with the individuals. Sometimes the son is in one party and the father in the other. They fight more about representing me than anything else! If I'm not there and two people fight, somebody has to intervene and then the other people say, "Why did *he* intervene"? And then they go against him and they all come to me. If I don't solve it they go to the Tehsildar or to the Chairman [of the Union Council].

The widespread introduction of diesel pumps within the last few years has further contributed to the dissolution of cooperative labor patterns. Water rights are now determined by machine partners as more and more *kārez* become dry. In some cases section land has once again become consolidated due to increased irrigating capacity, where each landowner's share is determined by how much land he has in the vicinity of the machine, not by traditional shares in the lineage collectivity.

The Brahui Use of the Kachhi Plain

Formal organization for the production and distribution of crops was an adaptation to the productive capacity of the Kachhi plain. Precipitation is extremely low, averaging 3 inches per year, but because of its rivers and topographical features, it is capable of year-round cultivation and supports a larger per square mile population than the highlands. To the Brahuis it is truly a land of paradox. Although it is Brahui territory, the majority of the year-round inhabitants are Jats. The Brahui are resident only during fall and winter. While rainfall is scarce most of the year, it is "visible" on every horizon as a mirage and no area is higher than 500 feet above sea level.

The rivers derive from the northern territories that fall just within the monsoonal rain shadow, producing rushing water courses during specific times of the year that are channeled in a successive series of dams (*gandhas*). Six main river courses

run north to south across the 100 mile plain. Without them, Kachhi would be a wasteland and could not produce the abundant sorghum crop which the Brahui depend on during this time. All cultivation depends on harnessing the flood waters when they come in July and August. The Nari, the largest of the six rivers, flows constantly for six to eight weeks in July and August, and with the help of some rains in the fall, it is possible to produce three major harvests during the year. The *sanwanri* harvest—sorghum, the pulses *mung* and *mot* and sesami—that integrates all communities is reaped in November, December, and January. Other harvests will not be considered here, since the Brahui are not resident for them.

The organization of production and distribution is a complex system and depends to a large extent on nomad labor for harvests. In July, under the supervision of a resident Brahui *naib* for each village, the Jat cultivators construct huge embankments across the dry river beds to catch and divert the careening torrents of water to bordering fields. When, after several weeks, the fields are sufficiently irrigated, the dam is broken and the water races to the next dam down the line. Along the Nari river alone, some fifteen or twenty such dams control the flood waters by successive use, and require stable cooperation among Jat and Brahui workers and by the various tribes holding land along its banks. In this way, day labor is provided for the transhumants and nomads throughout the winter months. If the dams break, or the river change its course, an entire area may be without crops that year.

The elaborate hierarchy of economic offices with centralized authority which has evolved around these resources continues to serve as the table of organization. The year-round resident Brahui *naib* is the supervisor of the work crew composed of Jat families, organized into groups of twenty families represented and directed by a *rais*, himself a Jat. At the sorghum harvest, nomads and transhumants come to the villages of Brahui proprietors with whom they have alliances in the hills. The *naib* allocates harvest workers and is responsible for their placement in specific fields. Since both nomads and transhumants are now dwelling in tents with dry flocks just about to drop their young, the sorghum crop provides fodder for their animals, and grain for bread. Harvest work is essential for the Brahuis in this transitionary period when milk is not yet available. When Kachhi

grasses are particularly sparce, the herders are sometimes forced to purchase rights to stubble grazing (*naR*), with money borrowed from resident Hindu shopkeepers and money lenders. Other sustaining activities include serving as sentries at the threshing area, renting camels to transport crops to the rail line and truck routes, selling *mōt*, onions and potatoes, which they brought from the highlands. The money derived from these activities is used to buy clarified butter, sugar, *guR*, tea and oil.

The elaboration of production and the flow of goods and services is shown in the following diagram:



These fixed obligatory payments reflect the table of productive organization. Specialist shares come from both the owners and tenants shares. Many smaller shares are not represented above, such as the man who brings wood to the *naib* (*dāyā*), the accountant's assistant, among others. The owners sell grain to the local Hindu merchants who sell the grain to Sukkur and Karachi. In past years, when all the land was collective, the Hindus would conduct the distributions (*batāī*) and keep records for the Brahuis. They also acted as middlemen between the Brahui *botars* and the Jat cultivators.

In *sardār* villages, one-fourth of the sorghum is taken by the *sardār* for organizing the work schedule. There are also two special funds which demonstrate corporate aspects of Kachhi

villages: *dekharch*, which is used to improve lands, build the dam, etc., raised from the sale of grazing rights and from tenant contributions, and *jam* funds which are kept by the *sardār* for entertaining guests, posting bonds, for blood compensation payments, and important events, such as the Sibi horse show.

Assessments for government revenue are still going on. During Martial Law all *jagir* lands were confiscated and the rights of *arbabs* and *raises* were abrogated. There were limitations placed on the extent of holdings and all other lands were confiscated. The owners considered *batāī* as the land owner's share of produce, not a tax. After appeals were made, the government decided to reinstate *batāī* and become part-owner and was thus entitled to a share of the produce. With land reforms, many Jats are now beginning to claim ownership of land which they traditionally worked for the Brahui owners. They do not want to pay *botari* and government tax as well (*sarkari*). In one instance, because of this confrontation, the Brahui owners decided not to plant crops that year, and when the water came, they hit the next dam with such force that it broke, as did all the dams down the Nari River. There were no crops anywhere in the area that year.

The integration of Kachhi economy into larger economic processes has not been studied in detail. The economy is complex, with three principal harvest periods during the year, and many crops: sorghum, pulses, sesami, wheat, barley, some cotton, sugar cane and melon. Sorghum is the largest and most important crop on the plains and the only one which integrates the economies of settled villagers (the Jats), landed Brahuis (who return to the hills for the spring and summer), transhumants, and nomads. Hindus make up the largest portion of shopkeepers. *Naibs* are Brahui and *arbabs* are Jats. The interests of both land owners and traditional tenants are well represented. With the proximity of the railroad, running from Karachi via Sukkur all the way up to Sibi, thence through the Bolan Pass to Quetta, many crops are now being grown in greater quantities for distant markets. The pulses *mung* and *mōt* are sent to Karachi, the Panjab via Lahore. Sorghum grain is mostly used locally and ground into flour for bread (*dōdī*), while the stalks are sucked for their sugar content, the leaves and ears, after grain has been removed, providing fodder for camels, sheep and goats.

The effects of capitalization in the highlands on Kachhi economy has not yet been studied but some directions in which change is taking place suggests themselves:

1. The widespread use of machine wells in the highlands allow for double-cropping which can support villages throughout the year. Thus, fewer and fewer transhumants now make the trip to Kachhi, resulting in a reduced labor pool for the sorghum harvest.

2. We would expect greater emphasis placed on the other crops, especially the pulses oil (*sīrī*) and sesami. Harvest labor is reduced and can be performed by resident Jats.

3. Labor requirements might shift from Brahui harvest workers to Jats who can now bring in relatives from Jacobabad and other areas of upper Sindh who, in the past, could not compete with Brahui harvest workers. At the same time, Jats, especially those with close ties to Brahui owners, are now leaving their plains villages and moving into Brahui highland villages to serve as occupational specialists. Highland villages are now experiencing population growth and economic diversification.

4. Revenue assessments and land reforms might increase the number of Jat landowners and render Brahui proprietorship uneconomical. Challenges to the tribal land tenure system will further weaken the relationships between the three kinds of communities and undermine the inclusive and elaborate social and political structure which was part and parcel of the economy of Kachhi. The elaboration of economic specialists and authority statuses on the plains had been an adaptive response to the ecology of the plains as well as to tribal organization, and we would expect vast changes in Kachhi economy if and when tribal tenure is abrogated. To my knowledge, there have been no studies of Kachhi villages.

Summary and Conclusions

The frontier areas of Pakistan are not homogenous. They include among others, Swat Pathans, Peshawri Pukhtuns, Marri and other Eastern Baluch, Brahuis and the western Makrani Baluch. In this paper, some of the consequences of changing technology in three types of communities among the Sarawani Brahuis, and the developing patterns of economic linkages between Brahuis

and others both in Baluchistan and outside have been examined. The focus was on the structural changes and emerging alternatives in local economies, since it appears that outside resources are selectively incorporated.

The changes in technology now being brought into Baluchistan have important consequences for tribal economy, and social and political organization. In tribal life, economy and political organization are inextricably interwoven. Present-day land tenure derives from the structure of the Confederacy and tribalism. This model of organization continues today and tribesmen understand what position they occupy within the land tenure and political allegiance system. Throughout history, the Brahui maintained an autonomous "proto-state," with a supporting tribal Confederacy.

British paramouncy, while regulating Kalat's external relations, had little effect on internal economic and political organization. Accession to Pakistan marked the beginning of challenge to the tribal system, since it is modeled on landlord/peasant relations in other parts of Pakistan. Tribal tenure defined rights to produce in many different types of shares and could not be extricated from allegiance and protection.

Nomad adaptation requires balances between animals, grasses, and the human population that can be supported by them. Curtailment or change in migration routes will result in disequilibrium. Labor requirements are sex specific and change with the availability of milk from the flock. The nomad is responsive to three main activities that have separate yearly cycles: herding, growing wheat or harvest work in surrounding villages, and migration labor in towns. The nomad economy is systematic and consists of a mixed resource base.

With the increase of settled communities, the nomads' grazing areas have become restricted. Local descent groups are now buying or taking land to construct hamlets and raise cereal crops. Greater increase in settled communities will result in greater labor and harvest opportunities for those nomads without land.

Transhumants are engaged in a dual system of subsistence in which herding and cultivation are combined in an intricate balance throughout the year. The introduction of diesel pumps for irrigation has made double-cropping possible, with many

individuals remaining in their highland villages during fall and winter and not going to Kachhi. The stability of transhumance is now threatened by land capitalization and landed interests which tip the balance in favor of landed estates. Now labor demands have resulted in greater diversification of labor, increase in sub-tenancy contracts, the restructuring of productive units around the local descent group, and the return of workers and pensioners to their natal villages. There is greater access to capital through partners and closer associations with markets through machine partnerships and the sale of cash crops.

Settled villages have greater contact with local government through schools, agriculture, animal husbandry offices, and district officials. These villages, especially the *sardār khel* villages, are often resistant to economic change because village land is now individually held while the political system remains adaptive to communal holdings in a *kārez* system. Increased well cultivation may recreate communal holdings generated not by genealogy but by proximity to wells and economic expediency.

The use of the plains was essential to Brahui economy. Formal organization for the production and distribution of crops was a response to the productive capacity of the plains and tribal holdings. Land tenure required close cooperation between tribes and among tribesmen and Jats. Economic specialization was highly elaborated and integrated both Brahuis and Jats. Without village studies on the Kachhi plains only possible changes in Kachhi economy can be suggested.

The implications of intensive cultivation are, for the most part, clear. The herdsmen's or farmer's strategies are part of a complex whole involving many types of resources. The risk factors are viewed within the whole and not just measured by increasing yields per acre. But now the flow of capital is from town to village. The widespread sinking of artesian wells run by diesel machines, as well as tube wells in some areas, has raised serious questions about the continued availability of water. What will happen to entire valleys when artesian wells and acquifers dry up? Will new resource complexes require new population size and composition not yet stabilized, thus rendering them brittle in the face of population change? Will transhumants no longer be able to shift back and forth between herding and cultivation? The answers are in the future and the crucial questions are yet to be asked.

BRAHUI POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND THE NATIONAL STATE

NINA SWIDLER

Introduction

The difficulties associated with the assimilation of tribal peoples into the national state is a recurrent theme in post-war nations. Such people do not easily make the transition from tribesman to citizen. They seem more than content with the old ways; indeed, they often actively resist national assimilation. Characteristically, tribal peoples are considered the most backward sector of the national population, suffering disproportionately the burdens of poverty, illiteracy and illness. Bringing such people into the mainstream by the eradication of hereditary privilege, by land reform, education and the utilization of a more productive technology are frequently expressed aims of new governments. These efforts have met, however, with considerable resistance from tribal people. The particularistic loyalties characteristic of indigenous political structures evidence a surprising vitality, with the result that relations between the government and tribal people become strained, even confrontational.

The failure to supplant local allegiances with national loyalties has been explained in various ways. One explanation is found in what is regarded as the very nature of tribal society. This theory of tribalism places great emphasis upon the influence of the past on the present, with tribal cultures being considered inherently conservative. This approach is frequently associated with what has been called the "glue theory" of colonialism, which suggests that the force of indigenous tradition is the prime cause of tribal separatism. Colonialism is seen as an ephemeral condition, artificially sticking peoples together. With the departure of the colonial power, the pieces fell apart, each seeking its separate past (Cohen, 1969: 198-99). Versions of this

approach, albeit vastly more subtle and sophisticated, have been common in economics and political science, especially during the 1950s.

Other scholars have suggested that the continued or increased saliency of tribal identity is not a manifestation of the residue of the past, but rather a contemporary response to new or changing political contexts. This phenomenon has been called retribalization by Cohen (1969: 2). In the same vein, Barth (1969) has proposed substituting the term ethnic for tribal, as an indicatior that older symbols and political forms are in the process of being adapted to the political interests of groups in the national state. He argues that increased awareness of ethnic or tribal identity comes as the result of increased interaction with other groups on the emergent national context.

In this view, tribal or ethnic cleavages are the result of multiple factors, some of which relate to the past, some of which represent an adaptation to present problems and concerns. Consider, for example, the distinction tribal/Punjabi, which has considerable currency in Pakistan today. The tribal borderlands and the Punjab lack a common pre-colonial history. Colonialism reinforced the earlier historical divergence by pursuing regionally different policies with direct administration in Sind and the Punjab, nominal military control or restricted areas in the Northwest Frontier and paramountcy in most of Baluchistan. The various colonial relationships are not in themselves important, but the consequences, such as differing rates of literacy and isolation from the independence movement, are. The sources of tribal ethnicity and anti-Punjabi feeling pre-date the creation of Pakistan. The contemporary expression of this cleavage, however, is a response to the present political context and present inequities in the distribution of skills and resources.

The theoretical differences between scholars who assign great weight to historical factors and those who take the contemporary setting to be more critical is bridged by Clifford Geertz (1973: Chap. 10), whose concept of primordial attachments gives equal attention to past and present. Primordial attachments are based on what he calls the "cultural givens," axes of personal and group identity such as genealogy, language and religion, which develop a heightened saliency in the enlarged and differentiated population of a national state. Geertz' con-

cept accounts for the particular strength of these attachments, implying they are something more than just a new ethnicity, while at the same time placing them firmly in present context.

Concepts such as retribalization and primordial attachments focus on the sources of collective identity and the resymbolization of the criteria of group membership and exclusion. The group itself is then viewed as a kind of interest group which operates in the regional or national arena, pursuing its interests as against those of other like groups in a pluralistic struggle. The picture is more complicated, however, when ethnically distinctive groups with functioning political structures are incorporated into states. The problem, then, is not merely one of developing new national ties, but of encouraging a shift in political allegiance. It was to aid in understanding and analyzing political systems that include two or more political structures in significant interaction that F.G. Bailey (1969: Chap. 8) developed the concept of encapsulation. In Bailey's analysis, an encapsulated political structure is one that controls significant resources and is not fully integrated into the larger political system; it has some degree of autonomy which is maintained because the costs of forcible integration are too great or because the larger unit lacks the resources to penetrate and replace the encapsulated structure. Encapsulation is based on political structures of differning scale, and relatively harmonious interaction between the two appears to be dependent on each being able to force the other to observe its areas of autonomy. Bailey's type cases—political processes on village and tribal levels vis-a-vis colonial and later national governments—indicate national environments are particularly productive of encapsulation situations. Each political structure is on the one hand constrained by the existence of the other, and each provides potential resources for the other. A distinctive feature of encapsulation is that each political structure operates with different normative and pragmatic rules. There is thus a high potential for misunderstanding and hostility when the representatives of such structures interact with one another.

There are, then, two lines of analysis appropriate to a discussion of relations between the central government and tribal political structures. One focuses on value differences, referring, for instance, to the different expectations associated with the

statuses of citizen and tribesman. The other focuses on formal tribal structures and processes of articulation with the encapsulating government.

An analysis which takes both of these dimensions into account is particularly important in considering national-tribal relations on the western border of Pakistan, where there are three major tribal-linguistic groups : Pathan (Afghan), Baluch and Brahui. All are organized into kin based groups, real or fictive, based on the patrilineal principle. Land rights are associated with these king groups. Prior to 1947, all of them had been only nominally integrated into state organizations.

Ethnic boundaries in the border have always been relatively permeable. Pathans have become Baluch, Baluch have become Brahui, and so on. A wide range of variation in cultural detail within the major groups and a high degree of bi- and multi-lingualism among adult males tend to blur categorical distinctions. For reasons that will be discussed later, Pathan groups are, however, more closed than Baluch or Brahui.

The distinction between Brahui and Baluch is problematic. Those tribes incorporated into the Kalat Khanate (Brahui Confederacy) are generally considered to be Brahui. The Marri and Bugti tribes claim Baluch identity, and historically emphasized their distinctiveness, resisting incorporation into Kalat. The Baluch-Brahui problem is further muddled by the fact that some of the Brahui tribes were only marginally integrated in the Khanate. The behavior of the Mengals, for instance, resembled the Marri-Bugti. Furthermore, there are Baluch groups such as the Maggasys, who settled in Kachhi and have an ambivalent status vis-a-vis all the highland tribes. The areas of Kharan, Makran, and Las Bela were sporadically incorporated in Kalat, but under the British they made relatively successful claims to separate status. Tribal organization in these three areas is generally absent, but local landed elites are intermarried with the tribal elites.

Pathan, Baluch and Brahui all manifest primordial attachments, yet the history of their relations with colonial and national governments differs significantly. The encapsulation of Brahui and Baluch tribes has occurred with less intractable conflict. This is somewhat surprising in light of the status of Kalat-Pakistan relations at independence (Wilcox 1963:

144-52). The extent of accommodation to the reality of the national state in Baluchistan is particularly striking compared to the difficulties in the more intransigent Northwest Frontier Province. Historical precedent could be cited to explain these differences; the Pathans have always resisted outside influences, while the Brahui on the whole have accommodated to them. However, since no society is merely the captive of its past, useful explanation must be sought elsewhere, namely in the capacity of the encapsulated group to maintain the authority of traditional leaders while at the same time permitting them to function as political brokers between national and tribal systems.

Brahui Political Organization

It is difficult to transform tribesmen into citizens because these two statuses entail different concepts of the political community, different systems of duties and privileges, different ideologies of recruitment to the political elite and different concepts of personal responsibility. A brief examination of Brahui tribal organization demonstrates the depth and importance of these differences.[1]

The Brahui political community is a tribe, membership in which is expressed genealogically. Although this implies that membership is based on birth, the genealogical idiom is in fact stretched to assimilate outsiders who accept the authority of the chief, or *sardar*, sharing in the collective privileges and duties (*shad-i-gham*) of their adopted tribe. Primary tribal segments (often called clans in the literature) maintain the tradition of separate origin. It is common allegiance to a particular *sardar*, that defines tribal boundaries.

Brahui political organization is built upon two principles, hereditary authority and a personal bond of allegiance in which protection is exchanged for loyalty and the provision of non-specified goods and services on request. The *sardar* is obliged to make himself available to his tribesmen, to hear disputes and petitions when they are brought to him. Each tribesman has the right of direct appeal, and a good portion of each day the *sardar* is in residence is spent holding court. Although the political

[1]See N. Swidler (1969) for an extensive analysis of Brahui political organization.

bond is personalized, responsibility is collective. The family, lineage, or in some cases the whole tribe, is held to be accountable for the behavior of individual members.

There are three levels of leadership within the tribe. The sardarship is held by the senior line of the senior *takkar* (primary section). Senior lines in each of the other sections are headed by a *takkari*. The *takkaris* have little authority in their own right, and function primarily as the *sardar*'s administrative staff.[2] In addition to these hereditary positions, there are also locally based informal leaders, "*sardar*'s men," who may in some cases be more influential than a *takkari* as a result of their special friendship with the chief. The *sardar* maintains his central position by cultivating a personal network of lower level leaders. He is free to expand or contract this network, acknowledging new relationships or repudiating old ones at will.

The federation of Brahui tribes in the Kalat Khanate established procedures for interaction across tribal boundaries. *Sardari* lines comprise a highly intermarried aristocracy which has on occasion acted collectively to defend ruling prerogatives. The authority of each *sardar* is greatly enhanced by his ability to protect his tribesmen in their relationship with members of other tribal units.

The procedures of the chief's court are informal. The court serves as a public arena in which the *sardar* performs his role. His superior status is affirmed physically; he is seated on a chair with the tribesmen on the ground in a semi-circle around him. He is expected to behave somewhat autocratically, as this is an indication of his ability to be powerful and protective.

The range of petitions brought to him reflect the multi-functional nature of the office. As mediator he hears disputes. As the administrator of an ethnically complex tribal territory, he receives petitions from job seekers, young men wanting admission to the local government college, complaints from shopkeepers trying to collect bad debts, etc. He is often requested to intercede on behalf of any tribesman who becomes involved in a court case. When disputes involving participants from

[2]Brahui tribal units vary considerably in size. In the larger tribes of Jhalawan there is evidence that *takkaris* have more authority than is the case among the generally smaller tribes of Sarawan.

different tribes arise, he is expected to meet with the *sardar* of the other tribe to arrive at a joint decision.

One of the more spectacular inter-tribal cases which occurred during the course of fieldwork illustrates the adjudication process. It happened that two co-wives ran off together with another man, who belonged to a different tribe. Some co-resident relatives of the husband hired a taxi and travelled some 30 miles to the paramour's chief. They asked him to locate the three runaways and to meet with the husband's chief to settle the case before blood was shed. The paramour's chief sent for the runaways and had the man jailed. The wives were confined in the chief's family quarters. The chief then went to the husband's community to meet with the other *sardar*. A problem arose as to which *sardar* would call upon the other, a question of rank precedence. This was resolved when one *sardar* successfully claimed the status of host on the basis of traditional ranking in the Khan's court.

When the two *sardars* finally met, each attempted to get the other to assume primary responsibility for mediation. Eventually the husband's chief agreed to arrange a settlement. Animals and grain were taken from both families as bond for keeping peace in the future and the wives were returned (against their will) to their husband. Had he followed traditional norms, the *sardar* would have refused to take the women back, and would have arranged marriages for them outside the tribal area, probably in Sind.

This case illustrates several characteristics of tribal adjudication. The mediation process is not fixed in time and space. It occurs when the chiefs meet, and in cases where bloodshed is a real possibility, *sardars* will travel and meet for as long as it takes to arrive at a decision. Mediation procedures can be initiated rapidly and are not halted until a decision is reached. The decision itself is tailored to the particulars of the case; in this example, to the willingness of the injured husband to take back his wives. Implementation of the decision is a collective responsibility; the families of both men are drawn into the case by the taking of security for future good behavior.

Sardars maintain a relatively lavish style of life compared to ordinary tribesmen. The revenue sources of the *sardar* are extremely complex, with great variation in the form and frequency

of assessments from tribe to tribe. *Sardars* traditionally had the right to collect *malia*, or "contributions" from their tribesmen. In some tribes this was a uniform payment, often one sheep, or a fixed sum of money from each married man. In some cases *malia* was an annual payment, in others it was collected irregularly, and some *sardars* did not collect it at all. In many tribes, particularly in Jhalawan, some *takkars* were exempted from *malia*.

The assessment of tribal revenues is legitimized by appeal to the past. The obligations are particularistic, based on what one's father paid, rather than being shared equally by all tribesmens. Collection tends to be arbitrary, and *sardars* have the additional right to make special collections in unusual circumstances. In recent years, some *sardars* have levied special assessments on portions of their tribes to finance land cases. Instances in which *sardars* or their close relatives solicit voluntary contributions that are spent on vacations in Karachi are not unknown. It is difficult to make a distinction between the personal estate of a chief and the revenues attached to the office.[3] He is free to use both as he chooses.

Relations with Local Officials

The tribesman's knowledge of the national government tends to come through the radio and through contact with local officials, most of whom occupy the lower rungs of the bureaucratic hierarchy. The national government is particularly vulnerable in the lack of fit between what officials are supposed to do and their actual behavior on the job. This is a problem for all governments, but the comparisons that the tribesman draws between his own system and the Pakistani government make the problem particularly acute in Baluchistan. The government attempts to reach tribesmen through vernacular radio, public meetings, and the local press, but these propaganda efforts tend to be heavily idealistic. In radio skits, for example, government officials are portrayed as high-minded, almost saintly, in their devotion to the public good. When it turns out that some officials take bribes, that favoritism is common, and that most

[3]Most *sardari* families have comparatively extensive landholdings amassed over the years of the Khanate. Many are still held collectively.

officials exhibit feelings of social superiority, then the tribesmen become cynical about the public norms espoused by national politicians.

The comparison drawn between the behavior of the politicians and the tribal leaders is in a sense unfair. Since favoritism, graft, and corruption are illegal, officials convicted of such practices are subject to punishment. Analogous behavior exists in the tribal system, but it is quite acceptable due to different normative expectations. Favored relationships with *sardars* are highly valued, and a community which counts a special "*sardar*'s man" among its residents regards him a special resource, a man with influence to be used by others. When the limits of chiefly authority are so vague, there is little structural space for concepts of graft or misuse of office. The mechanisms which constrain the behavior of *sardars* are so informal that they often appear non-existent to outsiders.[4]

Differences in political values and role expectations are exacerbated by the quality and background of lower level government workers. Most local government officials—those in the educational, medical and agricultural services, as well as the administrator—are not native to Baluchistan. This is, of course, related to the low literacy rate in the area rather than to government policy, but it does present problems.

Language is a barrier, since the officials usually know Urdu, not the local language. While adult males frequently speak more than one language, Urdu is not used as a language of choice or convenience in any except governmental contexts. Locally prominent men were in the process of developing some facility in it in the early sixties, and as more children attend school, the linguistic problem will perhaps diminish, but as elsewhere in the subcontinent, it is a complex issue.

More important is the fact that many tribesmen perceive that local officials are not really committed to providing services to the local population. The perception is perhaps justified in the

[4]The most important constraint is the family's interest in adequate role performance. *Sardari* families have been known to pass over the eldest son in favor of a more promising younger brother, and even on occasion to replace an unsatisfactory incumbent in a "palace coup." Tribesmen have demonstrated dissatisfaction by passive resistence which, given the lack of administrative staff, effectively vitiates implementation of unpopular policies.

majority of cases. To explain this situation, it is necessary to examine the constraints placed upon local government workers. Virtually all the government people interviewed were more concerned with where they were sent rather than with career advancement.[5] Most of them regard a posting to Baluchistan as undesirable, with the more isolated stations avoided at all costs, but even locations such as Mastung, a sizeable town close to Quetta, had not been sought by most of the officials assigned there. Officers appear to believe that "good" postings are made as a result of connections or "pull," and that "bad" ones are punishments. They appeared dubious about desirable postings being granted as a reward for good work, or that able people are sent to difficult ones in order to help the people. There is a feeling that one error of judgement brought to the attention of superiors weighs more heavily than several years of competent service. They are thus likely to devote a good deal of time and energy to the cultivation of personal relationships with those who might be able to exert influence in subsequent postings. Since they are extremely concerned about the records submitted to the central or provincial governments, they feel that the risks associated with client-centered service programs far outweigh the possible rewards.

A government doctor posted to Baluchistan provides an illustrative example. He was unhappy about his assignment because he and his wife felt socially isolated, although there was a substantial government colony in the middle-sized town. He described himself as coming from a modest Pathan background and lacking connections. Being quite committed to upward mobility, he tended to emphasize the difference between himself, a modern professional man, and local people who were backward and ignorant. He was in charge of the local hospital and required to keep records on admissions, treatment, discharges and deaths. He saw himself as having to walk a thin line with regard to this records. He was concerned about the possibility that malingerers would take advantage of the free bed and board provided for the sick. On the other hand, he was very sensitive about the ratio of deaths to admissions. A high death rate might reflect adversely on his professional compe-

[5]This may be an artifact of the Baluchistan posting, and not characteristic of officials in other areas.

tency. He thought this was unfair, since local people tended to seek his help only when illness became grave. He confessed that he found himself turning away patients who were either too sick or not sick enough. At the time of this discussion, only two of his 28 beds were occupied.

It is tempting to dismiss this case as atypical, a reflection of personal character failings, but it is valid to look at it situationally. The bureaucratic bind of the doctor is not exceptional. Known to his superiors largely through his records, he wants to provide the most flattering ones possible in the hopes of a better posting. He is faced with a medically unsophisticated clientele, tribesmen who have had little contact with the theories and practices of Western medicine, and his complaint that he is used as a last resort is valid. His patients not only make his job difficult, they threaten his future.

The same type of complaint is made by other officials. Magistrates point out that easily settled disputes are handled tribally: only the most intractable or violent cases, or those involving non-tribal people, get taken to local courts. Social isolation is a characteristic complaint of all officials. Low salaries make graft more tempting in all positions. In short, a number of factors combine to bring out the worst in local government workers posted to Baluchistan. The tribal perception that most officials are indifferent, hostile or corrupt is valid enough, but this poor performance is due more to situational rather than to personal factors.

Sardar as Middlemen

It is apparent, then, that there are numerous areas where divergent political values and role expectations lead to mutual misunderstandings between government and the tribes. The most common types of interaction in fact tend to reinforce the negative stereotypes each has of the other.

The situation is one of potential danger for both government and the tribes. The avoidance of undesired confrontation is dependent upon effective channels of communication. Since at present both sides lack adequate understanding of the other's system, inappropriate responses are inevitable. In a situation of encapsulation what is needed is the development of the role of a political middleman, who would have the ability,

so to speak, to keep a foot in both camps. Such an individual must be allowed to function in both systems with at least minimal legitimacy granted by both.

Brahui *sardars* have the capacity to function as middlemen, though not all are willing to assume this role. Since Brahui leadership statuses are either inherited or achieved as a resident within the tribe, it is virtually impossible for middlemen to be introduced by government from outside tribal society. And a tribesman selected for special treatment by the government is distrusted because his background is inappropriate to his new status. In fact, the few tribesmen who seek such roles are almost always of questionable background, since the aspiration itself is inappropriate in the tribal context. Such men have no legitimacy in the tribal system and can be maintained only through government support. The presence of these "government chiefs" actually emphasizes the divergence of tribal and government political structures.

From the tribal perspective, however, the *sardars* are ideally suited to such a role. They have been accustomed to dealing with impinging political structures since the rise of the Khanate in the early eighteenth century, and they have maneuvered in elite arenas which are relatively inaccessible to the ordinary tribesman. The wide status gap between them and tribesmen permits them to have a very different lifestyle. When they join the government in elective or appointive office, their tribal loyalties are not called into question.

Sardars have contact with a wide range of local and national officials, since amicable relations, especially at the local level, are in the interests of both. Tribesmen expect *sardars* to be able to channel some of the local resources their way, and a *sardar*'s ability to deliver a low level job such as forest guard or road worker to one of his people is dependent on his government contacts. From the officials' point of view, cooperative relations with local *sardars* minimizes the possibility of embarrassing incidents. However, *sardar*-official relationships tend to be limited to instrumental concerns. Off the job sociability is rare, and when it occurs, there is considerable status strain in relationships. Both parties wish to avoid social contexts in which they might find themselves in a formally subordinate position.

The Pakistani government appears to have demonstrated considerable ambivalence over using *sardars* as middlemen. This is entirely understandable, as it allows *sardars* to control to a large extent the new resources moving from government to tribal areas without any sacrifice of traditional authority. From the government's point of view, acknowledging a *sardar* as middleman seems to increase his power and authority. Government interest would be better served by the emergence of a new, more autonomous middleman role, but, as noted above, this is difficult in tribal society.

The position of the government is further complicated by the fact that not all *sardars* are willing to take a middleman role. Some have actively resisted any activity believed to undermine tribal autonomy. The government has taken various punitive measures against such chiefs without much success.

Conclusion

Brahui political organization is characterized by the capacity to respond rapidly and sensitively to discontinuous input. Authority is centralized in the office of the *sardar*, who had a monopoly on the right to issue binding decisions. The decision-making process may be initiated from above by the *sardar*, who can command the presence of tribesmen requesting the services of the chief. The primary political task is adjudication, with the goal of the mediation process the re-establishment of disrupted relationships. Since its aim is thus primarily the restoration of the *status quo ante*, Brahui political organization is administratively underdeveloped and implementation of the *sardar*'s decision is the collective responsibility of involved kin groups.

The government of Pakistan, on the other hand, is bureaucratically organized. Committed to change, it offers services oriented toward this goal. The majority of Brahui are not opposed to government services as such, nor are they unduly resistant to change. The evidence clearly indicates an openness to economic development when it is self-initiated. In this, the tribesmen generally support the middlemen activities of their *sardars*, on the assumption that they share common interests.

The strength and vitality of the state of Pakistan, at least in the "tribal" area, is largely dependent upon the mediation of the inherently particularistic tribal bond with national ties. An attempt to forecast future developments along this line seems foolhardy, given the multiplicity of factors contributing to unpredictability at the center, and the problems of economic development. It seems worthwhile, nevertheless, to indicate some of the factors which might contribute to a lessening, if not a resolution, of tribal-national tensions.

Most important is the fact that while primordial attachments characterize the whole border area, they do not have the same significance for all tribes. For the Pathans, the ties of blood and land are essential to their political system, which is based on local egalitarian councils and characterized by an absence of fixed leadership statuses, to a degree that is not true of other tribes.

As Charles Lindholm points out, Pathan society is segmentary, organized by "...kinship, not political hierarchies." Cultural emphasis on egalitarianism and political autonomy is expressed, as Barth (1969: 120) has argued, in the institution of the council (jirga), the public forum in which all adult males have an equal right to be heard. Decisions are public and consensually based. Pathan political autonomy is best seen as the right to enter into and terminate alliances. Segmentary societies tend to generate some elaboration of codes of honor and public display, and the Pathans are certainly no exception. Thus the system can generate leadership based on personal attributes and kin position, but it does not support the formation of a stable core of followers.

A Pathan who enters government service acknowledges the legitimacy of the hierarchical state. Thus, from the start his status as a middleman is hedged with problems. His dilemma is something more than the common one of manipulating two systems with diverse normative sets; for Pathans, the systems are mutually contradictory. Furthermore, both constituencies are aware of the contradiction. Both seek definitive signs of allegiance, making exclusive claims to loyalty, and both are inclined to believe that it is virtually impossible to hold the two allegiances in balance. The result is that neither group of supporters is likely to grant much trust, and the Pathan middleman devotes much of his energy to balancing off competing claims.

The historical depth of the "Pathan problem" is attested to in the essay in this volume by James Spain. The remarkable intensity of resistance to anything more than minimal accommodation to a superior power seem best explained by the core values which are the source of Pathan identity. Barth suggests that when Pathans cannot actuate their values of egality and political autonomy they tend to redefine their ethnic status. He cites the example of Pathan landlords who migrated to the Indus plain and became subordinate to centralized power:

> Such landlords are trapped in a social system where the pursuit of Pathan virtues is consistently punished, whereas compromise, submission and accommodation are rewarded. Under these circumstances, Pathan descent may be remembered but the distinctive behavior associated with the identity is discontinued. To the extent that such groups retain the Pashto language, they run the risk of ridicule; they are the ones scathingly referred to by Pathans as speaking but not doing Pashto, and retaining the pretence of being Pathans is not rewarded (1969: 123).

Similar examples exist in Baluchistan. Many tribal units contain sections claiming Pathan origin which are assimilated to Baluch or Brahui language and culture.

The vitality of Pathan core values is maintained by denial of ethnic status to groups of Pathan descent who are unable to maintain political autonomy. In this situation the integration of Pathans in the national state requires a radical resynthesis of Pathan identity.

The sources of Brahui identity are more diverse. An individual's pedigree, his demonstratable kin links, are a primary source of personal identity and status. Political identity derives from acceptance of the *sardar*'s authority. Land rights are associated with political allegiance, but distinct economic groups based on proprietary and tenancy rights did not develop among the Brahui, largely due to the persistence of the collectively held proprietary right which developed in earlier nomadic times. Personal honor is not based upon political autonomy; it is derived from the acceptance and support of a political system based on status differentiation.

A Brahui tribe is a political, rather than a cultural unit. Leadership is centralized and secular, which makes the prospect of national integration somewhat more promising in Baluchistan than in the Northwest Frontier Province. The tribes and their chiefs already evidence considerable variation in tolerance of accommodation. Some *sardars* have held high government office, and tribesmen have been increasingly willing to send their children to school and to participate in economic improvement programs. Such activities are associated with growing participation in the national economy. Village autonomy will be attenuated as educated village children seek non-agrarian employment and cultivators increase their income through greater productivity and more cash cropping.

It would seem expedient for the government to support a pattern of accommodation in which tribal and governmental structures are allowed to co-exist. Historically, the *sardars* have demonstrated considerable awareness of group interests vis-a-vis the Khan and the British. At the same time, there are longstanding differences within the group. A government threat to aristocratic status and privilege may elicit a unitary response, but a threat to an individual *sardar* may be ignored, as is demonstrated by the ability of the government to remove an uncooperative chief. Such acts are often resisted within the tribe itself, but the dissension does not often spread to other tribes.

Another factor which could contribute to a peaceful and voluntary national accommodation is the emergence of a growing middle class, consisting of the more prosperous cultivators and small-scale entrepreneurs. Such people, having a direct stake in national economic integration, are likely to see their own interests increasingly located in the national sector. Many of these were drawn into the Basic Democracies, which introduced new resources into the local areas in the form of money for collective improvement schemes as well as for individual loans. Competition for control and allocation of these resources was minimized because *sardars* and *takkaris* were incorporated, usually at the high tier council levels, while union and tehsil councils were largely comprised of men from the emerging middle class. Although *sardars* were extremely influential in Basic Democracies elections, still the desire to build new links between citizen and government were realized to some extent in Baluchis-

tan, even though the civic tie was mediated by tribal allegiances. The Basic Democracies experience is an indication that co-existent political structures is a viable option for Baluchistan.

A word of caution is appropriate here. The factors discussed above all imply increasing differentiation within the tribal area. The division of the population into class-like segments carries with it the possibility of greater alienation and disaffection on the part of the poorer tribes. Furthermore, the economic status of the tenant nontribal Jats in Kachhi is an issue that will have to be faced eventually. Even if co-existent political structures are tolerated by the national government, peaceful accommodation will not be easily attained. If, however, the *sardars* manage to maintain their economic base and relative status, and if enough tribesmen continue to experience gains in material standards of life, there is reason to be hopeful.

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PUSHTUNISTAN: AFGHAN DOMESTIC POLITICS AND RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

LEON B. POULLADA

In discussing the problem of Pushtunistan many writers and observers overlook the domestic perceptions of Afghan leaders and the constraints placed upon them by internal apportionment of political power between the tribes and the central government. It is, in fact, these domestic considerations that explain to a considerable degree the continuation of the controversy.

The Nature of the Dispute

The Pushtunistan dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan basically concerns the status of several million Pushtun tribesmen whose mode of life ranges from the completely nomadic to the sedentary and who inhabit a region east and south of the Durand Line. The people themselves are variously referred to as Pushtuns or Pakhtuns because their principal language is Pakhtu or Pashtu (depending on regional dialect). They are also often known as Pathans, an indicized version sanctified by British usage and popularized in the romantic tales of the Northwest Frontier of India by Kipling. The Pushtuns, as we shall call them, are divided into a rather perplexing number of tribes and sub-tribes but do have a commonality of language, religion, custom, and history.[1]

The genesis of the problem pre-dates the Durand Line but the drawing of this line in 1893 made the problem acute and projected it into the 20th century because of its arbitrary division of the Pushtun tribes between Afghanistan and what was then British

[1]Sir Olaf Caroe, *The Pathans*, New York: Macmillan, 1958.

India.[2] The ruling dynasties of Afghanistan have been of Pushtun stock and therefore bitterly resented and resisted what they considered to be an amputation. As a result successive Afghan governments have taken every opportunity presented by fluctuations of power in the Indian sub-continent to assert claims for the autonomy of their "brethren" across the Durand Line.

Modern inquirers into this vexing controversy are often mystified by the differing nature of Afghan claims. This is sometimes the result of failure to distinguish between the official Afghan government position and the demands advanced by unofficial propagandists, extreme nationalists, and political advocates of a "Greater Afghanistan." Government control or influence over the communications media in Afghanistan also makes it very difficult to determine when a certain claim is official, officially inspired, or merely the opinion of the writer. Taken as a whole, Afghan claims have ranged from mere expressions of concern for the welfare of the Pushtun tribes with no territorial claims, to vociferous irredentist claims for reunification of all Pushtuns under the Afghan flag and annexation of the territory occupied by them. Indeed these more extreme claims have even included assertion of rights over Baluchistan, an area inhabited by non-Pushtun (although ethnically related) tribes. This would give landlocked Afghanistan access to the Arabian Sea.[3]

On the other hand, if we examine meticulously only the *official* pronouncements of the Afghan government we must note the remarkable consistency with which three basic themes recur. These are: (1) A demand for self-determination for the Pushtuns living east of the Durand Line; (2) Insistent denial that Afghanistan desires any territorial expansion; and (3) Repeated assurances that Afghanistan wants the dispute solved only by peaceful means and that negotiations should take place between Pakistan and the leaders of the Pushtuns themselves.

The fluctuations in the nature of the Afghan claims become

[2]Louis Dupree, "The Durand Line of 1893: A Case Study of Artificial Political Boundaries and Culture Areas," Report of a Princeton University Conference, 1961.

[3]A. Rahman Pazhwak, *Pakhtunistan*, London: Afghanistan Information Bureau, 1957, p. 27 *et seq.*

more comprehensible if they are viewed within the political context of the regional balance of power existing at the time the claims were advanced. Thus, when British imperial power was virtually unchallenged in India, Afghan claims tended to be quiescent or at least muted. This does not mean that the Afghans ever became reconciled to the fate of their Pushtun "brothers" living east of the Durand Line. Quite the contrary, Abdur Rahman in the 19th century and Habibullah in the early 20th century continued to exert their influence, subsidize, and extend sympathetic help to the trans-border tribes even at the height of British power in India. King Amanullah, even on the occasion of signing the 1921 treaty with the British, stated bluntly in his speech to the British representative that the treaty could "not be one of friendship but only of neighborly relations" so long as Britain oppressed Muslims, in particular the Pushtun tribes whose affinities to Afghanistan were well known. Similarly in 1931, King Nadir Shah, newly installed on the throne after a civil war, made it clear in his speech to Parliament in September of that year that the fate of the Pushtun tribes in what he called the "Free Frontier" (Sarhad-i-Azad) were of special concern to the Afghan government.

In spite of these periodic expressions of continued interest and concern for the Pushtuns east of the Durand Line during the period of firm British rule in India, a certain *modus vivendi* had developed between Afghanistan and British India with regard to the Pushtuns. But as the British hold on India loosened, Afghan claims were revived and intensified to a high point during and after the 1947 partition of the sub-continent when the new nation of Pakistan was passing through periods of internal weakness or strain. Although it is possible to trace the variations in the nature and intensity of Afghan claims as tactical moves on the South Asian political chessboard, it is nevertheless true that the fluctuations in the nature of these claims make it difficult to examine objectively the validity of the Afghan position.

The Pakistani position in the dispute is a good deal clearer. Pakistan asserts that the Durand Line is an international boundary; that all inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of Pakistan are its exclusive concern; and that in expressing concern over the "Pakistani" Pushtuns, Afghanistan is not sincere

on at least two counts; first, because the Pushtuns on the Pakistan side are much better off both politically and economically than their cousins on the Afghan side; and second, because Afghan claims are merely a cloak for territorial ambitions and for an outlet to the sea. Pakistan thus views the status of the Pushtuns on its side of the Durand Line as a matter exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of Pakistan and therefore not a proper subject for international concern. It refuses to negotiate the matter at the conference table, much less submit it to international adjudication.[4]

The Historical Setting of the Dispute

The complexity of the issues involved in the Pushtunistan dispute cannot be appreciated without some understanding of the historical circumstances which produced it. In a sense, the roots of the controversy are deeply imbedded in the soil of South Asian pre-history. The Pushtuns are ancient tribes about whose origin scholars disagree[5] but it seems fairly certain that they already inhabited the eastern highlands and mountains of what is now Afghanistan when Alexander's armies passed through that area to invade India in the 4th century B.C. Pushtun residence in this inhospitable area is therefore of long standing. Throughout history the Pushtuns have been known as fierce, independent, and warlike guerilla fighters and predators on the more "civilized" inhabitants of the plains. History records that the Pushtuns successfully resisted efforts to conquer them by Persians, Greeks, Indians, Kushans, Huns, Mongols, Mughals, Arabs, Turks, and Britons. It would be difficult to match such a record for intense love of freedom anywhere in the world.

The strategic position of the Pushtuns athwart their mountainous "land of insolence"[6] commanding the principal passes between Central Asia and the rich Gangetic plains of India gave them a control of military and trade routes which enabled

[4]Dupree, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[5]Sir W.K. Fraser Tytler, *Afghanistan*, London: Oxford University Press, 1950, summarizes the various theories about the origins of the Pushtuns. See p. 47 *et seq.*

[6]A term aptly coined by Carlton Coon in *Caravan: The Story of the Middle East*, New York: Holt, 1961.

them to extract tribute and political concessions from the empires which surrounded them. In modern times this strategic position became of particular importance in the context of the geopolitical expansion of the Russian and British empires in Asia during the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries.

Since Peter the Great's reign (1628-1725) Russia coveted a warm water port on the Indian Ocean, and in the 19th century, this ambition brought it into conflict with British imperial positions in Persia and India. For nearly two centuries these two great powers hovered over Afghanistan sparring for position, and the general outline of its history is pertinent to the current controversy.[7]

By a coincidence of history, the British decision to change from traders to rulers and to extend their domain in India was taken at approximately the same time as the Russian decision to expand their empire southeast into Central Asia. The battle of Plassy, which made the East India Company the virtual ruler of eastern India, took place at about the same time (1757) as the Russians built Orenburg in the Urals as a base for their conquest of the Central Asian Khanates.[8] From that moment the Russian and British empires seemed headed for collision in Central Asia as they extended control over the intervening territory. Only the rising power of Germany drove Russia and England into the accord of St. Petersburg in 1907 and brought about a respite to this imperial struggle.

Our primary interest, however, is not with the fascinating account of this confrontation of empires in the Asian heartland, but with its effect on Afghanistan and, more specifically, on the Pushtun problem. The warlike Pushtun tribesmen became an important pawn in the "Great Game" because they lay directly in the path of British expansion. If a line is drawn from Calcutta to Orenburg (the starting points respectively of British and Russian moves towards each other) it will be seen that Kabul, Afghanistan's capital, is approximately midway. By 1869 the Russians had performed the startling feat of extending the Trans-Caspian Railroad across the wastelands from Krasnovodsk to Samarkand, subjugated the independent khanates of Khiva, Bokhara, and Samarkand, and reached the Oxus River border-

[7]Lord Curzon, *Russia in Central Asia*, London: Longmans, 1889.

[8]Sir Olaf Caroe, *Soviet Empire*, London: Macmillan, 1953.

ing on northern Afghanistan. The British having absorbed Sind, and having wrested the Punjab from the Sikhs, had crossed the Indus and stood at the Khyber pass, the southern gateway to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan thus found itself caught in a vice between the two great powers. Its protection was shrewd diplomacy, which it used effectively to play off Britain and Russia against each other. It also counted on two great barriers to halt the imperial advance. One was the towering Hindu Kush range in the north; the other was the "prickly hedge" formed by the Pushtun tribes in the south. Encouraged by the Afghan government, the warlike Pushtun tribes became an instrument of Afghan foreign policy and a scourge to British administration of India for nearly a century. Eventually, British and Russian expansion ended in long-range stalemate with the Russians stalled on the Oxus and the British entangled in the "prickly hedge" of Pushtun tribal resistance. In the end, Britain and Russia found it more profitable to compose their differences and join forces against the Kaiser's Germany. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, signed at St. Petersburg, was a typical high-handed European power settlement made without regard for the interests or sensitivities of the Asian peoples involved. It provided that Russia was to keep all land north of the Oxus which had been taken from Afghanistan; Persia was to be divided into two zones of influence, Russian in the north and British in the south; and that Afghanistan was to be outside the Russian sphere of influence and Britain was not to occupy or annex any part of it.[9]

Neither the Persians nor the Afghans were invited to the conference and though the Amir of Afghanistan protested vigorously against this agreement, which in effect made Afghanistan into a buffer state, his objections were brushed aside.

The Anglo-Russian detente did not solve the problem of the Pushtun tribes; they turned the tables on the powers which had tried to use them as tools in their quarrels. The tribesmen had become confirmed in a way of life which placed a premium on disregard for the organized processes of governments. Their nuisance value had been held in esteem for so long, their delinquencies either encouraged by subsidies, bought off by bribes,

[9]G.P. Gooch, *British Documents on the Origin of the War (1914-18)*, London : H.M. Stationery Office, 1926-38, vol. IV, p. 618.

or punished by excessive measures so often, that they had become social outlaws. They had developed their own ingrown society with their own code of honor (the Pushtunwali), their interminable blood-feuds, their own standards of impeccable hospitality to strangers and fierce revenge to enemies, as well as their own internal tribal government. Individual loyalty started with the immediate family, the clan, the sub-tribe and the principal tribe. Other tribes shared but little in this loyalty; Afghanistan and British India even less, except to the extent that they purchased it temporarily for some specific purpose. The Pushtun tribes thus defied Afghans and Britons alike with relative impunity. If pursued too closely, offending tribesmen could always find refuge on the other side, although of course the burden of pacification and administration fell far more heavily on the British, who had to overcome the disadvantages of religion and race in addition to the political and cultural problems involved.

The British never succeeded in completely pacifying or winning over the loyalty of the Pushtun tribes. Exasperated and frustrated by this prickly hedge which harassed their administration of northwest India and made British influence in Afghanistan tenuous and perilous, the Government of India wrestled with the tribal problem and alternated between "forward" policies which attempted to push British influence into the tribal areas by force or "masterly inactivity" policies which involved withdrawal to more secure positions in the plains. The proud Pushtuns, safely ensconced in their mountains, met the forward policies with ferocious guerrilla warfare and simply smiled with contempt at the periodic withdrawals.[10] In the end British administration contented itself with a policy of containment and reprisal.

For all intents and purposes, the tribal areas were quite autonomous. British writ did not run up to the Durant Line; it stopped at the administrative frontier just outside the settled areas protected by British military cantonments.[11] Tribal incursions into the administered areas were punished by reprisals, withdrawal of subsidies, and other forms of political and

[10]Peter Mayne, *The Narrow Smile*, London: Murray, 1955.

[11]Dupree, *op. cit.*, quoting the Simon Commission: "British India stops at the boundary of the administered areas." See also essay by Ainslie T. Embree, above.

economic sanctions. But in a somewhat indefinite zone which straddled India and Afghanistan and comprised several million inhabitants, the Pushtun tribal customary law held undisputed sway. With some minor modifications this was the situation up to 1947 when the British turned over the area to the new state of Pakistan.

On the Afghan side, too, tribal policy consisted largely in leaving the tribes to their own devices except for the fact that Afghan rulers, themselves descended from tribal blood lines, maintained an active interest and influence among the tribes through the religious sanctions of Islam, family connections, the payment of subsidies, settlement of tribal groups north of the Hindu Kush and the perennial offer of sanctuary to fugitives who had incurred the wrath of the British for hostile activities in India.[12]

From the above it may be seen that the politico-social organization of the tribes, taken as a whole, fulfilled many of the requirements of a "nation." They occupied and "governed" a fairly well-defined territory from which they successfully excluded other claims of authority; they possessed substantial ethnic and linguistic unity, shared the same religion, followed the same customs, had the same family and clan structure, and possessed their own music, dance and art forms. In short, they displayed the homogeneity of social and political institutions usually regarded as indices of nationhood, and in time developed a feeling of political cohesion which gave rise to Pushtun "nationalism."

The idea of Pushtun nationalism becomes important when we later consider two factors which fuel the Pushtunistan issue in Afghanistan. The first is the concern of Afghan Pushtuns that their "brothers" East of the Durand Line should not be absorbed and submerged by the far larger number of Punjabis, Sindhis, etc. Pushtun values, traditions and identity would then be destroyed. This, of course, is a familiar irredentist theme but that makes it no less important if we are to understand the motivations and emotions behind the Pushtunistan problem. It helps to explain, for example, the violent Afghan reaction to the "One Unit" scheme in Pakistan. It also explains why Afghan political leaders cannot afford to disregard such emotionally overcharged views in trying to maintain their delicate power position in which

[12]Fraser-Tytler, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

very substantial support from the Pushtun element within Afghanistan is of paramount importance. Pushtun nationalism is thus both an important foreign policy consideration and a powerful internal political constraint on Afghan leaders. This point is elaborated in the last section of this paper, but we should note in passing that the ideological content of Pushtun nationalism has been kept alive among the intelligentsia and the masses by the writings and speeches of philosophers, poets, and politicians such as Najibullah Khan, Adbur Rahman Pazwak, Abdul Hai Azia and Mohammed Maiwandwal on the Afghan side and by Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Wali Khan and others on the Pakistan side.

The Treaty Question

The status of the Pushtuns on either side of the Durand Line is often put in terms of the various treaties and agreements which were negotiated between the British Government and the Afghan sovereigns. In order to understand the Afghan position we have to keep in mind the historical antecedents outlined above and examine the treaty question in the light of the historical and socio-political situation of the Pushtuns.

The treaty question begins with the agreement negotiated in 1893 between the Afghan Amir, Abdur Rahman, and the British plenipotentiary, Sir Mortimer Durand.[13] Pakistan's position is that the Durand Line, delineated in the 1893 treaty, is a valid international boundary subsequently recognized and confirmed by Afghanistan on several occasions; that the Durand Line terminated Afghan sovereignty over the territory or influence over the people east of it; and finally that Pakistan, as a successor state, derived full sovereignty over this area and its peoples. Pakistan insists that in any event, the question of self-determination for the Pushtuns was foreclosed by the British-supervised plebiscite held in 1947 in the Northwest Frontier Province in which 99 per cent of the votes case were in favor of joining Pakistan. The tribal areas too expressed their assent through

[13]Sir Charles Aitchison, ed., *A Collection of Treaties, Engagements and Sanads Relating to India and Neighbouring Countries*, Calcutta: Government of India Central Publication Branch, 1929-33, vol. XIII, no. XIII, *Persia and Afghanistan* (pub. 1933).

special Jirgas (tribal councils).[14]

The Afghans reply is that the 1893 treaty was obtained through duress, and therefore the line drawn pursuant to that treaty is invalid; but, in that, in any case, before and after the signing of the treaty, the British recognized a special Afghan interest and influence among the Pushtun tribes east of the Durand Line. They insist that the Durand Line was not conceived as an international boundary but simply as a line demarcating British and Afghan zones of influence. Afghanistan, they argue, has no territorial claims east of the Durand Line but is simply championing the self-generated drive for self-determination of the Pushtuns, and that it has a right to do so based upon ties of kinship, history, religion, race, and language. As for the 1947 plebiscite, they argue that it did not satisfy the requirement for self-determination, since it was boycotted by a substantial part of the Pushtuns, and it was a unilateral act taken without Afghan consultation or consent. They point out that it provided the population with only two choices, join India or join Pakistan, where it should also have provided options for autonomy or joining Afghanistan or independence. The approval of the tribal Jirgas was obtained by offering as choices only a "yes" or "no" ratification of the plebiscite decision to join Pakistan. The Afghans further argue that Pakistan was not a successor state to Britain but an entirely new state carved out of British India. Whatever treaty rights existed were therefore extinguished.[15]

The primary legal issue raised by the parties is the validity of the 1893 treaty. Under existing international law, a treaty is in many ways analogous to a contract between individuals. It is a well recognized principle both of domestic and international law that duress can invalidate an agreement. But the law also recognizes that there are degrees of coercion, and that it is not enough merely to show that negotiations were conducted under pressure or constraint. The question is whether the compulsions are of such quality and quantity as to substitute the will of one of the

[14]Donald Wilber, *Afghanistan—Its People, its Society, its Culture*, New Haven: HRAF Press, 1962, p. 184. See also essay by Stephen Rittenberg, above.

[15]Pazhwak, *op. cit.*, p. 147 *et seq.* In support of this, Afghans point to the admission of Pakistan into the UN as a "new" state.

negotiators for that of the other, thus destroying the element of free consent which is required for a valid agreement.[16]

There is ample historical evidence to show that in negotiating the 1893 Durand Line agreement, Abdur Rahman, the Afghan Amir, was operating under severe pressures from various directions. The British controlled Afghanistan's foreign affairs as a result of the Second Afghan War. The Russians had been nibbling away at his western borders. Rebellions were seething within Afghanistan. The British controlled commerce and transit of arms and ammunition into Afghanistan through India, and there had been veiled threats of embargo. One of the recurrent "forward" policy drives was pushing new roads and a railroad into the tribal areas up to the Afghan border. The record is fairly clear that the British wanted a demarcation and put strong pressure on the Amir, including a letter from the Viceroy of India which the Amir had interpreted as an ultimatum.[17]

All this would tend to support the Afghan contention of duress. But there is also substantial historical evidence that the agreement served many of the Amir's own interest as well. He was trying to consolidate Afghanistan into a united nation for the first time in its history and he needed peace on his borders. To have a clearly defined line beyond which the British would not push was therefore of great advantage to Afghanistan at this particular period. It seems reasonable to deduce that though the Amir may have negotiated reluctantly and under various political and economic pressures, the constraints placed upon him were to some extent compensated by perceived advantages buttressing his own volition so that, on balance, it is probable that the duress involved did not amount to a suppression of his will.

A more cogent case perhaps exists for the Afghan contention

[16]Wilson, *International Law*, St. Paul, Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1939.

[17]Abdur Rahman, *The Life of Abdur Rahman, Amir of Afghanistan*, London: Murray, 1900. See also C.C. Davies, *The Problem of the North-West Frontier, 1890-1908*, Cambridge: The University Press, 1932, p. 184. "In fact one is led to the conclusion that Abdur Rahman Khan turned out to be a 'ram caught in a thicket'." p. 162. "In the light of subsequent events it is difficult to understand the reasons which prompted the Amir to sign this agreement. Perhaps his consent was purchased by the increase of his subsidy... and by the recognition of his right to import munitions of war."

that a meeting of minds between the contracting parties did not take place. If this could be established, the law could regard the agreement not as void *ab initio* but merely as voidable. This is an area where the nuances of language become very important and it must be recalled that the key negotiations were conducted in private between the Amir and the British negotiator, Sir Mortimer Durand. Since the Amir knew no English the conversations were in Persian. Sir Mortimer Durand had the reputation of being something of a Persian scholar. Nevertheless, any one who has conducted delicate diplomatic negotiations in a language other than his own has learned how slippery the path can be. Moreover the wily Amir had concealed a stenographer behind a curtain who wrote down all that was said.

But quite apart from the language problem there are other strong indications that the Amir at least thought he was negotiating about *zones of influence*, whereas what he signed was a document which could easily be, and was, in fact, eventually interpreted as setting up an international boundary. Furthermore there is substantial evidence from both British and Afghan sources that the British negotiator, who was well versed in tribal problems, as well as the Amir, thought they were demarcating a "frontier" in the sense of a zone rather than a "boundary" line marking an abrupt transition of sovereignty. If such was the intention of both parties, then there was indeed a meeting of the minds, but at some later date administrators in Whitehall, who were less familiar perhaps with the tribal situation and who were conditioned by traditional European notions of international boundaries, construed the Durand Agreement as an international territorial settlement rather than as a device for facilitating the administration and pacification of the peoples who inhabited this tribal zone.

In a report from the Government of India to the Secretary of State for India dated soon after the agreement was signed (10 July 1894) the statement is made that "We understand that Her Majesty's Government concurs in this view . . . that while we emphatically repudiate all intention of annexing tribal territory, we desire to bring the tribes whom this settlement concerns further within our influence."

Sir Olaf Caroe, who was the last Governor of the North-West Frontier Province and a strong opponent of the Afghan Push-

tunistan claim, makes the same case. It is true, he writes:

> ...the agreement [of 1893] did not describe the line as the boundary of India, but as the frontier of the Amir's dominions and the line beyond which neither side would exercise interference. This was because the British Government did not intend to absorb the tribes into their administrative system, only to extend their own, and exclude the Amir's authority from the territory east and south of the line. In the international aspect this was of no account, for the Amir had renounced sovereignty beyond the line.[18]

The behavior and statements of both the British and Afghans subsequent to the Durand agreement tend to support the view that both sides regarded their respective areas on either side of the Durand Line as zones of primary influence rather than as an integral part of their territorial sovereignty. Abdur Rahman continued to exercise his influence and develop his connections with trans-Durand Line Pushtuns and subsequent Afghan governments have insisted that they have rights and interests in these tribes. It is these claims which lie at the heart of the Pushtunistan dispute. The British for their part made it quite clear at first that they had no intention of "annexing" the territory in the tribal areas up to the Durand Line but rather hoped for a more orderly administration of those regions, a position more consistent with *hegemony* than sovereignty. At various stages in Anglo-Afghan relations up to 1947, the British seem to have recognized a legitimate Afghan interest in the tribal peoples on the British side of the Durand Line. After 1947, however, a change can be seen in the British position. Thus in 1950, Noel Baker, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, in a speech before the House of Commons stated categorically:

> It is His Majesty's Government's view that Pakistan is in international law the inheritor of the rights and duties of the old Government of India and of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in these territories and that the Durand Line is the international frontier.

[18]Caroe, *op. cit.*, p. 382.

It is to be noted, however, that this statement was made three years after the British had handed the area over to the new state of Pakistan and that it was made by the official in charge of the department concerned with relations with Pakistan. It may fairly be inferred that it was made at the request of Pakistan as a gesture of political support for this new member of the Commonwealth.

Thus the "meeting of the minds" argument can be made at two levels. Either the parties negotiated about two different things—the British about an international boundary and the Afghans about zones of influence—or they negotiated about the same thing—zones of influence—but the British government later interpreted the agreement differently. Either interpretation tends to support the Afghan challenge of the 1893 treaty.

We pass next to the question of the effect of subsequent ratification and repudiation of the Durand Agreement, setting aside for the moment the problem of its original validity. The pertinent documents are the Anglo-Afghan Pact of 1905, the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919, and the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921.[19] All three documents contain language in which the Afghans appear to ratify or at least accept the 1893 Durand Line Agreement.

On closer examination, however, this appears less clear-cut. The 1905 pact contains rather vague and general language couched in personal terms by Amir Habibullah to the effect that he "will continue to act towards all agreements entered into by his father [Abdur Rahman] in the same manner as his father had done." Apart from the hard practical fact that his father had to a large extent disregarded the Durand Line to his dealings with the tribes, this rather vague and imprecise statement of intentions makes no mention of a specific commitment and is utterly silent on the Durand Line as such. Habibullah was no fonder of the 1893 agreement than his father had been and the 1905 pact was signed when his newly-acquired throne was still somewhat shaky. The British negotiators had refused to make any firm commitments to defend Afghanistan against Russia (the 1907 St. Petersburg detente against Germany was already in the wind), and the

[19]For the 1905 Pact, see Charles Aitchison, *op. cit.*, vol. XIII, no. XXI, Afghanistan; for the 1919 Treaty, Caroe, *The Pathans*, p. 464; for the 1921 Treaty, Aitchison, *op. cit.*, vol. XIII, no. XXIV.

disappointed Afghans had whittled down the substance of the agreement to the point where the British seriously considered breaking off negotiations. At the last moment, the widely divergent positions were patched over by an agreement which all understood to amount to little more than a mutual expression of good will.[20] Taken in its surrounding circumstances, the 1905 pact sheds little light on true Afghan attitudes towards the 1893 agreement and its vague terms would appear to have little probative value.

The Treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919 is somewhat more explicit in that it states "the Afghan Government accepts the Indo-Afghan *Frontier* [emphasis added] accepted by the alte Amire Habibullah." This apparently categorical statement, however, must be qualified by the fact that the 1919 agreement was signed essentially as a temporary armistice agreement at the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan war and it was the express intention of the parties to negotiate a permanent treaty later, which was done in 1921. A noted British historical expert on this field has described it thus: "The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of Rawalpindi of 1919 was designed not as a permanent agreement but merely to regulate the immediate relations between the two countries."[21]

Indeed, the 1919 treaty was superseded in 1921 by a much more complete and formal engagement. It is also interesting to note two points: first, that the 1919 provision merely relates back to the 1905 commitment by Habibullah which as we have seen is extremely vague and of low probative value, and second, that the specific use of the word "Frontier" lends additional color to the probability already suggested, that both the Afghans and the British were still thinking of the Durand Line as demarcating zones of influence in a "Frontier area" rather than as an international boundary in the conventional sense. Some British experts, however, have relied strongly on the language in the 1919 treaty as proof that the Afghans had renounced all interest and influence east of the Durand Line.[22]

The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 is a good deal more explicit and enlightening. This document was prepared and signed with more consideration and reflection by both parties. The treaty is

[20]Fraser-Tytler, *op. cit.*, p. 179.
[21]*Ibid.*, p. 198.
[22]Quoted in Caroe, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

a more comprehensive document dealing with the overall relations between the two countries and it contains specific expressions regarding both the boundary question and the tribal problem. The following extracts are pertinent:

> Article 2. The two high contracting parties mutually accept the Indo-Afghan frontier *as accepted by the Afghan Government* under Article 5 of the *treaty concluded on the 8th August, 1919.*
> Article 11. The two high contracting parties, being mutually satisfied themselves, each regarding the good will of the other and specifically regarding their benevolent intentions towards the tribes residing close to their respective boundaries, hereby undertake each to inform the other in the future of any military operations of major importance which may appear necessary for the maintenance of order among the frontier tribes residing *within their respective spheres,* before the commencement of such operations. (Emphasis added.)

The language used in this treaty is interesting because again it refers the Afghan acceptance of the "frontier" (this time without a capital F) to the 1919 commitment, which was in turn based on the 1905 commitment which, as we have seen, was not a very firm one. The 1921 treaty also refers to "boundaries" (the use of the plural may or may not be significant). In other words, the treaty seems to recognize the realities of the situation regarding the tribal belt which neither the British nor the Afghans controlled.

To the language of the treaty itself must be added a document of even greater relevance to the problem under examination, namely the supplementary letter from the British representative to the Afghan foreign minister. This letter was intended as an integral part of the agreement and it has been authoritatively asserted that without it the Afghan King would not have signed the 1921 treaty. This letter states:

> As the conditions of the *frontier tribes of the two governments,* are of interest to the Government of Afghanistan, I inform you that the British Government entertains feelings of good will towards all the frontier tribes and has every intention of treating

them generously provided they abstain from outrages against the inhabitants of India. I hope this letter will cause you satisfaction.[23]

Whatever can be said, then of Afghan ratification or tacit acceptance of the 1893 Durand Line in the 1905 pact and the 1919 treaty, it seems fair to conclude that by 1921 the British government was prepared to admit Afghanistan's "interest" in the tribal people east and south of the Durand Line. This is inconsistent with later British and Pakistani claims of complete sovereignty right up to the Durand Line, and with the claim that the Afghans accepted such sovereignty.

In the 1921 treaty, taken together with its annexed letter, there is surely at least a recognition of residual Afghan rights. The precise nature and extent of these rights is admittedly vague, but they should be entitled to some standing in international law by virtue of having been recognized in a formal treaty and its annex.

The whole legal question of the subsequent Afghan ratification of the 1893 treaty can be put in this way: If the 1893 treaty was originally valid, it required no further ratification by the Afghan Government; on the other hand, if the 1893 agreement was invalid by reason of duress or misunderstanding, a subsequent clear-cut Afghan approval of the 1893 line as an international boundary might cure the voidability of the 1893 agreement or, alternatively, raise an estoppel against Afghan claims.

It is difficult to find in Afghan words or actions any intent to relinquish their continuing interest in the Pushtun tribes east of the border. Indeed the Afghans continued, on every possible occasion, to assert their interest. The internal evidence of the relevant treaties and agreements tends to confirm this interest, but these documents were so often cited as evidence of Afghan intent to relinquish their claims that in 1949 the government took the extraordinary step of convoking Parliament to repudiate all treaties with Britain affecting the status of the Pushtuns.[24] It is difficult to say just what the legal effect of this repudiation might be in view of the fact that the repudiated treaties *tend to establish rather than deny the validity of Afghan*

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 465.

[24] Dupree, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

interests in the Pushtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line, but in any case this action served as a dramatic gesture to emphasize that the Afghans had no intention of permitting their rights to lapse by default.

It is, of course, abundantly clear that creation of Pakistan added a new dimension to the Pushtunistan dispute. In the course of time, relations with British India had become more or less stabilized and the Afghan claims muted. But following World War II, when it became evident that Britian would soon be leaving India, the Afghans revived their claims. In a series of communications with Lord Mountbatten, the last Viceroy of India, the Afghan Government insisted that it was entitled to consultation about any change of sovereignty in India which would affect the status of the border tribes. Though Mountbatten's answers were on the whole evasive, there is evidence that the Afghans were encouraged to believe that they would, in fact, be consulted.[25] This was not done, and though Afghanistan protested, the British by that time were facing the awesome problems of disengagement from a partitioned subcontinent torn by civil strife, as well as a particularly difficult political problem in the North-West Frontier Province where the Muslim Red Shirt Party in power wanted to join Hindu India instead of Muslim Pakistan. The Afghan protests were politely but firmly pushed into the background.

Since the departure of the British, the problem of the status of the Pushtuns living on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line has been a constant irritant in Pak-Afghan relations. For example, in 1952, when the United States extended military and economic aid to Pakistan, American-Afghan relations deteriorated. The alliance with the United States stiffened Pakistan's attitude towards Afghanistan. At first the Afghan reaction was to request American military assistance too. However, Afghan leaders had to take into account possible repercussion from the USSR so they prudently linked their military aid request to the condition that along with the arms they would also obtain a security guarantee from the United States. After careful consideration the American government felt it could not realistically guarantee Afghan security in view of the contiguity of Afghan territory with the

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 85. See also memorandum of Afghan-British conversations, U.S. National Archives, Document No. 890 H.00/7-1447.

USSR along a 1200-mile border remote from effective American power. In 1953 when Prince Daoud became Prime Minister, he accepted the strategic realities and turned to the USSR for economic and military aid.

The USSR also openly backed the Afghan position on the Pushtunistan dispute. With the USSR support, Afghanistan pressed its claims and Pakistan responded by a series of unofficial blockades. Landlocked Afghanistan has traditionally relied on trade routes through the subcontinent for its commerce and with these closed, it turned to the USSR for transit facilities and a substantial part of its economy was turned towards the north. Some observers felt that as a result of these moves, Afghanistan had come perilously close to absorption into the Soviet orbit. On several occasions the dispute broke out into open hostility and Pakistani and Afghan diplomatic missions in the two countries were attacked by "spontaneous " mobs. Afghan irregulars penetrated border tribal areas near Bajaur and clashed with Pakistani troops. Propaganda became more and more vitriolic on both sides and finally in 1961 diplomatic relations were severed.[26] A great deal of diplomatic activity has gone into restoring some normality to the relations between the two countries and avoiding a serious Cold War confrontation in Central Asia (a new version of the Great Game?). But the situation remains dangerous. We are not dealing, then, with a small-scale border dispute with overtones of irredentism. It is a much broader conflict with all kinds of sinister regional and international implications.

Pushtunistan and Internal Politics

The historical and legal background to the dispute indicate that in advancing their claims Afghan leaders are not acting entirely irrationally or jingoistically. They are also acting within certain compulsions and restraints imposed upon them by internal political dynamics. Primary to this consideration is the traditional power and influence of the Pushtun tribes and their position of dominance over other tribal groups in Afghanistan. While the Pushtuns are themselves a minority in the total configuration of tribal groups in Afghanistan, they are by far

[26]Wilber, *op. cit.*, p. 185 *et seq.*, gives a good account of these repercussions.

the largest minority. If the Pushtuns on the other side of the Durand Line are included, the Pushtuns would enjoy a position of majority in the country. The following demographic facts are pertinent:[27]

Population in Millions

Pushtuns	6 to 6.5
Tajiks	3 to 3.5
Uzbek	1 to 1.5
Hazara	1.5 to 2.0
Turkmen	1.0
Other	1.5
	1.4 to 16.0

Approximately three million additional Pushtuns live across the Durand Line in a more or less autonomous tribal belt on territory over which formerly British India (and now Pakistan) have exercised various degrees of control. These trans-Durand Line Pushtuns are closely related by kinship and cultural ties to the Pushtuns on the Afghan side of the line and they have played an important part in the tribal politics of Afghanistan. There are many examples of this, but the clearest case is the direct role played in 1929 by the Wazirs, the Mohmands and several other tribes from the area south and east of the Durand Line in the defeat of Bacha-i-Saqao and the installation of Nadir Shah on the Afghan throne.

The two outstanding political features that have characterized the Pushtun tribes is their resistance to conquest or to integration within a larger nation and their internal conflict and disunity.

It is this internal authority pattern within the Pushtun tribes that has special significance for Afghan politics. It centers on the tension between the individual *daftari* (share-holding tribesmen) and the leaders of the tribe, mainly the *khans* (chiefs and *mullahs* priests). As a rule the *khan* and the *mullah* reinforce each other, having similar economic and political interests. The individual tribesman respects both but they exert only influence, not control,

[27]Estimates given are from the Royal Afghan Government, Ministry of Planning, unpublished studies.

over his actions. The real instrument of social control is the *Pushtunwali*, the tribal code of chivalry and the *jirgah*, the tribal council in which every tribesman has an equal voice. Politically this tenuous authority structure makes the tribe volatile and difficult to control or direct for any sustained period along any given course of action. Leadership is much more dependent on personal qualities of the leader than obedience or loyalty to a hierarchy or ideology. As a result there has been no mystique of kingship in Afghanistan. The king (and now the Prseident), has been viewed by the tribes as merely a superior chief, a *primus inter pares*, who can command loyalty only by virtue of superior force, wealth, or personal qualities admired by tribal standards. In other words, the element of legitimacy plays a small part in tribal loyalty to the central government. For this reason it has proved quite simple to change dynasties, depose kings and, as in the present situation, abolish the monarchy altogether and establish a Republic.

In the nation-building process it has been extremely difficult to harness this conflict-ridden and disunited tribal society into a semblance of a modern nation state. For this reason the history of Afghan political development has been one of periodic fusion and fission, passing through cycles during which a strong charismatic leader captures the throne and unites the disparate tribal elements, thus enhancing the power of the central authority, only to be followed by a period of fission when the charismatic leader weakens or dies and the centrifugal forces of tribal separatism reassert themselves. The latest cycle of fission occurred when King Amanullah (1919-29) was overthrown by a major tribal revolt. The current cycle of fusion commenced with the reign of Nadir Shah (1923-33). It has continued through the reign of Zahir Shah (1933-73) and the new republic under President Mohammed Daoud.

In this task of political modernization the support of the Pushtun tribes is crucial to the central government. Not only must the delicate tribal balance between Pushtun and non-Pushtun elements be preserved, but also the balance of power must gradually be shifted away from the Pushtun tribes in favor of the central government. Historically, the tribes have been king-breakers and makers, and any government that wants to rule in Kabul has had to make its peace with the tribes, usually on

tribal terms. Only recently has that equation begun to change and appropriately the start was made during the time that Mohammed Daoud was Prime Minister in the decade of 1954-64. It was during that period that Daoud began to build up a strong army loyal to the central government (or at least to him) and it must be recalled that he did this by using Soviet military aid which was essential, he argued, in order to strengthen the Afghan position in the Pustunishtan dispute. He thus overcame strong tribal and religious opposition to Soviet penetration by justifying it on the one basis which he knew the tribes and the mullahs would support.

There are serious cleavages in Afghan society which Pushtun nationalism seeks to bridge. Among the principal ones are:

(1) Tribal autonomy vs. centralized government.
(2) Ethno-linguistic rivalry between Pushtuns and non-Pushtuns.[28]
(3) A serious urban/rural split.[29]
(4) Economic class (rich/poor) conflict.
(5) Social class distinctions.
(6) Competition between modernists and traditionalists.[30]

What has all this to do with Pushtunistan? The answer is simple. When a politician is seeking a solid popular power base and finds that the people are divided, he seeks some unifying issue or principle around which he can build a consensus. In Afghanistan his choices are severely limited. Some religious leaders such as the Hazrat of Shor Bazaar have in the past built a political following on an appeal to Islam, but in more recent times Islam has proved too diffuse and elusive to provide a solid cement for political power. Economic and educational modernization have weakened the traditional hold of religious leaders on the masses, at least for the purposes of political mobilization.

Another possible integrating factor in Afghanistan has been

[28]L. Dupree, "Afghanistan Continues its Experiment in Democracy," (LD-3-71) *AUFS Field Staff Reports*, South Asia Series, vol. XV, no. 3, 1971.

[29]L. Dupree. "The Emergence of Technocrats in Modern Afghanistan," (LD-2-74) *AUFS Field Staff Reports*, South Asia Series, vol. XVIII, no. 5, 1974.

[30]*Ibid.*

the monarchy. This is possible at times when the institution is highly regarded and deeply ingrained in the population or if the reigning monarch is a charismatic leader. As noted earlier, in Pushtun tribal society the legitimacy of kingship as an institution is at best weak. Charismatic and forceful leadership has not characterized the recent Afghan monarchy. It is not difficult to understand why in these circumstances the king could not form the nucleus for effective political leadership and why the monarchy was replaced by the Republic with so little public protest or resistance.

This leaves only Pushtun nationalism around which political leaders, who are themselves preponderantly Pushtuns, can rally support from the various conflicting groups. If we examine these groups, it will at once be evident that in nearly every case groups opposed to each other are, within themselves, dominated by Pushtuns or contain a substantial Pushtun plurality. We will find this condition whether we look among the tribes, the central government, the various ethno-linguistic segments, the urban and rural sectors, the economic classes, the technocratic elite, the ordinary citizens, the modernists or the traditionalists. In almost all of these groups, as within each individual group, there exists a consensus among the leadership cadres which is supportive of the Pushtun ethos, which favors Pushtun nationalist values and which feels that the Pushtuns beyond the Durand Line are "soul brothers" who must be protected against absorption into, or oppression by, Pakistan.

It is hardly surprising then, that no Afghan government since the days of Dost Mohammed in mid-19th century has been willing or able to submit to pressure from Sikhs, British or Pakistanis to forget about the status of Pushtuns in the eastern borderlands. In more recent times, as they have become, however reluctantly, more responsive to popular demands, and more dependent on consensus for a base of political power, Afghan leaders have felt even more strongly the need to insist on their right to be considered loyal Pushtun nationalists and champions of the cause of all Pushtuns both inside and outside of Afghanistan.

Pakistanis often ask, if tribal cleavages are such an obstacle to strong centralized government, why would the Afghan leaders want to incorporate the several million trans-border tribesmen

into Afghanistan? Would this not greatly increase their problem of integrating Afghanistan into a strong, centralized nation state? Afghan leaders are well aware of the problem which such massive incorporation of additional tribes would create, but, at the same time, both by inclination and from political necessity, they cannot disown the trans-border Pushtuns. They have consistently handled this dilemma by stressing in all their *official* pronouncements that Afghanistan does not seek to *incorporate* or *absorb* the trans-border tribes; that all Afghanistan requires is the official recognition that the Pushtuns in Pakistan are entitled to a separate identity, a right to self-determination and autonomy or independence if they so choose. Of course if they voluntarily elect to join Afghanistan, the Afghan Pushtuns could not repudiate their "brothers" but such a solution would have to flow from the free choice of the Pushtuns themselves and not from imposition by others.

It is true, of course, that official Afghan pronouncements, often voiced only in the confidence of diplomatic negotiations, tend to be drowned by the rhetoric of ardent Pushtun nationalists. It is also true that the news media, which is controlled by the Afghan government, often provides an open forum for these more extreme claims which at times advocate even territorial annexation and dismemberment of Pakistan. It takes considerable sophistication and knowledge of internal Afghan affairs to be able to discriminate between substantive statements of official policy and the chauvinistic claims of Pushtun zealots. Afghan leaders often find it difficult to maintain enthusiasm for the Pushtun cause and at the same time control the more extreme spokesmen. If the Afghan government tightens the leash beyond a certain point, it runs the risk of undermining and alienating the Pushtun-dominated political base on which it must depend in order to govern. A political leader, such as former Prime Minister Mohammed Maiwandwal, who for reasons of international prudence sought to curb the Pushtunistan extremists, soon found himself on the political rubble heap even though he himself was a sincere Pushtun nationalist and a leading writer and idealogue of the Pushtun cause. His decision to mute the Pushtunistan issue in order to improve relations with the United States and Pakistan may not have been the sole or even the major cause of his downfall but there is little doubt that it cost

him heavily in political capital.

In a sense then, successive Afghan governments have found themselves prisoners of the Pushtunistan issue. Pakistani unwillingness to recognize the unquestionable desire for self-identity in the Pushtun areas of Pakistan has made it impossible for Afghan governments to point to any progress through diplomatic channels. This has played into the hands of the Afghan extremists, making it more difficult for Afghan leaders to impose moderation and restraint on the more strident advocates of the Pushtun cause. Pakistan is, of course, concerned over the effect of centrifugal forces in its own body politic and could hardly afford another full-fledged independence movement among its Pushtuns. Pakistan could perhaps have lessened the controversy by officially recognizing the legitimate interest of Afghans in the fate of Pushtuns within Pakistan, and holding serious diplomatic talks with Afghanistan on this basis. It might also have renamed the North-West Frontier Province as "Pushtunistan" and included the tribal areas within the administration of the new province. The new province could have been granted a reasonable measure of local autonomy, together with assurances that Pushtun cultural values would be respected and preserved.

For Afghan leaders, Pakistani refusal to compromise or negotiate has posed a difficult problem. To prove their sincerity and to appease the more ardent Pushtun nationalists, the Afghan government has expended substantial resources, energy, and international capital. It has maintained and developed, wherever possible, close ties with Pushtun leaders from Pakistan's tribal areas, welcoming them to Kabul and paying them substantial subsidies. It has maintained agents among the tribes to gather information and dispense largesse. Over the years, a barrage of propaganda on the radio and other news media has developed, and the government had founded such institutions as the Pushtun Tolana (Academy) and special schools for the sons of Pushtun tribal leaders.

The creation of the republican regime in Afghanistan under Mohammed Daoud gave new urgency to the issue. Mohammed Daoud, both during his Prime Ministry and now during his Presidency, has been perhaps the most outspoken advocate of Pushtunistan. First of all, he has been convinced for many years that Pakistan is an artificial state, constructed on an

erroneous premise regarding the Islamic State, and that internal centrifugal forces will eventually prevail and cause its dismemberment. If this happens then Afghanistan wants to be in a position to assert its historical and legal claims over the trans-Durand Line Pushtuns. Secondly, Daoud is a direct descendent of the Peshawar Sardars, those brothers of Amir Dost Mohammed who ruled in Peshawar over what is now the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. He remembers that Afghans once ruled the Punjab, Kashmir and Delhi, so he sees nothing extraordinary about the possibility that Afghans may yet reclaim what they regard as their lost lands. Thirdly, as a politician, Daoud believes that continuation of stable government under a Pushtun ruling elite depends on the support of major Pushtun segments in the population, principally in the elites within the intelligentsia, the technocracy, and the army. Finally, Daoud is a Pushtun nationalist, with a genuine feeling for the welfare and future of the Pushtuns on the other side of the Durand Line. His personal beliefs and emotional inclinations therefore coincide to reinforce his sense of historical and political constraints. To Daoud, then, as well as to many Afghans, Pushtunistan is a symbol of a glorious past, a pragmatic formula for the political present, and a harbinger of a more powerful future.

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